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Gareth Michael Jones 
The Development of Nuclear Propulsion in the Royal Navy: 1946-1975 
Abstract 
This thesis covers the development of nuclear propulsion in the Royal Navy from the 
first proposal in 1946 to the start-up of the last core improvement for the first submarine 
reactor power plant PWR 1 in December 1974. There are three topics: Political, what 
problems were encountered in transferring nuclear knowledge from the US in the post-
war period and what support was there for the development of nuclear propulsion? 
Militarily, what was the requirement to develop nuclear propulsion and why submarines 
in particular? Technical, were the problems associated with nuclear energy fully 
appreciated, did the UK have the technical and engineering capability to develop 
nuclear propulsion? 
 
Primary research concentrated on the National Archives; research was also conducted 
on unreleased files relevant to the period held by Director Nuclear Propulsion. A 
number of retired naval officers involved in the early stages of nuclear propulsion 
development gave interviews, copies of their papers and were generally enthusiastic to 
assist with any queries. Visits were paid to the archives of CND at the London School 
of Economics and the Broadlands (Mountbatten) Archives at Southampton University. 
Secondary research was conducted at the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, the 
Institution of Mechanical Engineers, the British Library, Plymouth Central Library, 
Plymouth University Library and using accredited online resources. 
 
Information pertaining to, the Royal Navy’s Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme 
(NNPP) is covered by the Official Secrets Act and the Mutual Defence Agreement 
(MDA) 1958. Due to the nature of the subject matter very little has been written on the 
topic of the Royal Navy’s development of nuclear propulsion. Having recently written a 
history of the submarine service since World War II, Peter Hennessy and James Jinks 
naturally included a chapter on the Royal Navy’s adoption of nuclear propulsion in The 
Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service since 1945, (2015). However, the 
chapter, ‘A New Epoch’: Towards the Nuclear Age, is focussed on UK attempts during 
the 1950s to secure US collaboration. There is no technical investigation of the Royal 
Navy’s nuclear reactor programme during this era nor of the reactor core improvements 
that resulted from the purchase of the S5W reactor under the 1958 Mutual Defence 
 
 
Agreement. The Silent Deep contains no references to any United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority files held at the National Archive and perpetuates the errors contained 
in Philip Ziegler’s biography of Mountbatten which stem from Mountbatten’s draft 
(MB1/K208A) which he forwarded to Captain (Rear Admiral) Peter Hammersley for 
comment; see Mountbatten Corrections in chapter four. Apart from the political 
considerations and military motives for developing nuclear propulsion in the Royal 
Navy, this thesis primarily focusses on the technical problems to be overcome by all 
participants in the Royal Navy’s development of nuclear propulsion. Therefore, this 
thesis adds considerably to the historiography of nuclear propulsion and of Royal Navy 
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manganese to retain austenite at atmospheric temperature, e.g. austenitic stainless steel 
of Hadfield’s manganese steel.  
Burn-up: Amount of fissile material burned up as a percentage of total fissile material 
originally present or fuel element performance - Heat released from a given amount of 
fuel GW/MW per tonne.  
Cermet: Ceramic articles bonded with metal. Composite materials combining the 
hardness and high temperature characteristics of ceramics with the mechanical 
properties of metal, eg cemented carbides and certain reactor fuels.  
Criticality: State in nuclear reactor when multiplication factor for neutron flux reaches 
unity and an external neutron supply is no longer required to maintain power level, ie 
the chain reaction is self-sustaining. 
Enriched Uranium: Uranium in which the proportion of the fissile isotope, uranium-
235, has been increased above its natural abundance. 
Fast Reactor: One without a moderator in which a chain reaction is maintained almost 
entirely by fast fission.  
Hafnium (Hf): A metallic element, it occurs in minerals containing zirconium, to which 
it is chemically similar, but with a higher neutron capture cross-section. This makes it a 
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Intermediate Reactor: One designed so that the majority of fissions will be produced by 
the absorption of intermediate neutrons.  
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considerable time’. 
Scram: General term for emergency shut-down of a plant, especially of a reactor when 
the safety rods are automatically and rapidly inserted to stop the fission process.  




Thermal Reactor: One for which the fission chain reaction is propagated by thermal 
neutrons and therefore contains a moderator.  
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Reactivity. ‘These effects and others like the proportion of neutrons which escape the 
core, contribute to the reactor problem, whose solution determines whether a design can 
sustain a chain reaction without risk of meltdown. They all depend not only on the fuel, 
the moderator and the coolant, but also on the positions and shapes of the components. 
Calculating the effects of various arrangements is no easy task. Much calculation and 
experiment were needed to determine the most suitable materials and their disposition 
in the early years of the nuclear age and so solve the reactor problem. That is in 
ensuring that just one neutron can survive to continue the chain, no more and no less.’  
Zirconium (Zr): A metallic element, the principal ores are zircon (ZrSiO4) which is a 
very common mineral of igneous rocks and concentrated in beach sands. When purified 
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The Development of Nuclear Propulsion in the Royal Navy: 1946-1975 
Introduction 
 
The first controlled self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction occurred in December 1942 at 
the University of Chicago, Illinois in a reactor titled CP-1 (Chicago Pile 1). Subsequent 
early nuclear reactors were developed to produce plutonium, radio-isotopes for research 
and medical purposes, and for nuclear physics research. None of these reactors utilised 
the heat generated as a source of power; Calder Hall in the UK is generally accepted as 
the first reactor in the world to produce electricity for commercial purposes in October 
1956 however, its primary purpose was to produce plutonium. The first purpose built 
commercial reactor was the pressurised water reactor at Shippingport, Pennsylvania 
which went critical in December 1957. Nevertheless, the first nuclear reactor to produce 
power was a prototype pressurised water reactor built in the Idaho Desert which initially 
went critical in March 1953 and after further testing produced steam to a turbine in 
May. This event paved the way for a production model to be fitted into a submarine 
under construction at Groton, Connecticut. 
 
The pressurised water reactor uses enriched uranium to produce heat, the water is 
pressurised to stop it boiling. Pumps remove the heated water from the core and pass it 
through a heat exchanger which in turn produces steam which is supplied to turbo-
generators to produce electricity and, in the case of submarines, turbines to propel the 
vessel. Although the engineering hurdles were formidable, the pressurised water reactor 
was selected as the best design to pursue due its compact design, simplicity of operation 
and its negative temperature coefficient, a description of which is given in chapter two. 






The world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Nautilus, was launched 21 
January 1954 by Mamie Eisenhower, wife of the then US President. The following year, 
17 January, the USS Nautilus slipped down the River Thames leaving Groton, 
Connecticut for her maiden sea trials. At 11:33 her Commanding Officer, Commander 
Eugene P. Wilkinson USN, sent the famous signal: ‘Underway on nuclear power’.1 In 
the intervening sixty-five years only five other nations have developed the technical 
capability and the economic means, to undertake the building, operation and 
maintenance of nuclear-powered submarines: Russia, Britain, France, China and India. 
As an integral part of a balanced blue-water navy, the nuclear-powered submarine 
enables these countries to project their political and military power in ways not possible 
by conventional means. To date, Britain has built twenty-three nuclear-powered 
submarines (SSN) and eight nuclear-powered and nuclear armed submarines (SSBN) 
that carry the nation’s deterrent.2 The first Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarine, 
HMS Dreadnought, was powered by a nuclear propulsion plant purchased from the US. 
Royal Navy submarines since Dreadnought have been powered by nuclear propulsion 
plants designed and built by Rolls-Royce and Associates at their Raynesway plant in 
Derby.3  Since 15 January 1999, the company has been known as Rolls-Royce Marine 
Power Operations Ltd.  
 
Sir Leonard Owen who, in 1954 on the formation of the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority’s (UKAEA), was appointed as its first Director of Engineering, wrote 
that at the time of setting up Britain’s nuclear organisation: ‘…there were few scientists 
or engineers in Britain who were familiar with atomic energy’. Indeed, Owen noted that 
of the twelve personnel starting at the UKAEA’s Industrial Group at Risley, Lancashire: 
                                                     
1 Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 165. 
2 NATO Acronyms: Ship Submersible Nuclear (SSN) and Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN). 





‘…only one person knew anything about atomic energy. He was Dennis Ginns, an 
engineer who was home on sick leave from Chalk River’.4  In private industry as well as 
the Royal Navy, the number of scientists and engineers working on nuclear matters was 
likely to have been negligible. The initial thrust of research and development in nuclear 
power was directed towards its civil application in support of the development of the 
atomic bomb. Yet it is a reflection of the political will on both sides of the 
Parliamentary divide, and of the scientific and engineering prowess that Britain was 
capable of, that from these beginnings within the space of fifteen years Britain was in a 
position to launch her first nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Dreadnought. The 
primary aim of this thesis is to research, investigate and analyse the introduction of 
nuclear propulsion into the Royal Navy’s submarine fleet, because arguably, it is part of 
the legacy of those political, naval and engineering decisions, made over sixty years 
ago, that allow Britain to “punch above her weight” on the world stage long after her 
Empire has ceased to exist. 
 
I. Overview 
With economic decline setting in after World War II in Britain, and the acceptance of 
the right of an indigenous population to self-determination, there was a growing 
realisation in government that the Empire was untenable. The granting of independence 
to the former colonies meant that there was no requirement for Britain to maintain the 
expensive naval bases, air stations and army garrisons that were needed to defend/police 
the overseas territories. Many of these assets were handed over to the new governing 
powers for their fledgling services. Successive British Governments wanted to maintain 
some presence in the regions they vacated, partly in order to influence the democratic 
                                                     
4 Leonard Owen, ‘Nuclear Engineering in the United Kingdom – the First Ten Years’, Journal of British 
Nuclear Energy, (Jan., 1963), 23-32 (p. 23). Note: Chalk River, Canada, was the site of the Tube Alloys 





governance of their former colonies. Mainly, however, the objective was to prevent 
Soviet influence from filling the political vacuum of their departure and gaining a 
presence in these regions. Economically and politically, it can be argued that the easiest 
means of maintaining a presence in a foreign region is through naval power. Unlike an 
air base or a garrison stationed in a foreign country, the warship is sovereign territory 
and it is manoeuvrable. Diplomatic clearance from a foreign government is not required 
to utilise this asset and it can be positioned in areas to react to situations where it may 
be of strategic influence. Unlike the conventionally powered surface warship, the 
nuclear-powered submarine requires no fuelling facilities when deployed, so it does not 
need to call into port or to have a Royal Fleet Auxiliary deployed with her. She can 
operate autonomously from other military and political considerations that would 
constrain a surface warship which makes it a very potent unit to have at a government’s 
disposal. 
 
In the period after World War II up to the present day, British political and military 
influence has been maintained in some areas by a visible maritime presence. Initially 
this was achieved by aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and the Far East and by 
dedicated warships in other areas deemed of importance to governments, such as the 
Beira Patrol which, between 1966 and 1976 enforced UN sanctions, in particular the oil 
embargo against Southern Rhodesia, at an estimated cost of some £100 million.5 More 
recently, warships have been given designated patrol areas to project British influence, 
for instance, the Armilla Patrol which was instigated at the start of the Iran/Iraq war in 
1980 to ensure safe passage of merchant shipping through the Straits of Hormuz. From 
the late sixties however, although Britain has struggled to maintain its political and 
military influence, and its maritime presence has become less visible, Britain has 
                                                     
5 William Minter and Elizabeth Schmidt, ‘When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia re-examined’, 





continued to provide significant submarine focussed support to her NATO allies, the 
most explicit example being the deterrent patrols of the Polaris/Trident submarines. 
Also of note, was the Callaghan Government’s decision in the late seventies to despatch 
HMS Dreadnought to the South Atlantic to deter possible Argentine aggression towards 
the Falkland Islands.6 To this day, the nuclear-powered submarine allows Britain to 
maintain and exercise her political and military role on the world stage. 
 
A typical World War II submarine, such as the German Type VIIC, displaced around 
870 tons submerged, while many modern nuclear-powered submarines displace more 
than 5000 tons submerged.7 The nuclear power plant has not only increased the 
sustained speed of the modern-day submarine it has increased its endurance. Nuclear 
power produces a greater electrical generation capacity which allows for more 
equipment to be fitted into the nuclear propelled submarine. Because these submarines 
are much larger than their conventional counterparts there is more space to carry spares 
and stores. The types of weapons embarked have also changed; conventional torpedoes 
are carried alongside anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. As such, 
the choice of weapons has altered the style of operations that these submarines can 
engage in. The Royal Navy has fired conventional munitions from her nuclear-powered 
submarines in support of government foreign policy in traditional operations such as the 
Falklands Conflict, “Operation Corporate” in 1982. This was the first instance, and is 
still the only occasion, of a nuclear-powered submarine launching torpedoes against a 
warship since World War II. Increasingly, however, the target of these submarines is no 
longer the warship but government defence and communications infrastructure on land; 
as such the British Government has used Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarines to 
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launch cruise missiles against targets in amongst other places, Afghanistan in 2001 and, 
more recently, in Libya in 2011. 
 
The period of 1946 to 1975 has been chosen as the time frame for this thesis as the year 
1946 coincides with the first employment of Royal Naval engineers and Admiralty 
scientists of the Royal Naval Scientific Service (RNSS) at the Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment (AERE), Harwell on the problems of applying nuclear fission to 
submarine propulsion. The end date of 1975 captures the final core improvement of the 
first generation of nuclear reactors which went critical at Dounreay, Scotland 16 
December 1974.8 Although a good source for narrative dates, Lambert’s book is not 
intended as a reference book, there is no bibliography and the material contained therein 
is sometimes vague. The period encapsulates as much of a seismic shift in the 
propulsion of warships as that experienced in the Victorian Navy of the 1840s which 
saw the introduction of steam power. Steam driven warships were significantly more 
manoeuvrable than their sail counterparts and gave the Royal Navy a greater degree of 
flexibility in their tactics and employment. The development, introduction and 
employment of steam powered warships into the Royal Navy has been covered by many 
historians in a variety of media, this PhD thesis will add to the already large canon of 
literature on the subject matter by introducing nuclear propulsion which is missing from 
the historiography.9 The conventionally powered submarine is limited by the capacity of 
her battery for submerged speed and endurance. This is no longer the case for the 
nuclear-powered submarine; as such nuclear propulsion has totally changed the tactics 
and has enhanced the employment of the submarine driven by this technology. 
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At this juncture it is appropriate to illustrate why nuclear power, despite legitimate 
concerns about its radioactive legacy, is deemed so important. Many people are familiar 
with Albert Einstein’s formula, E=mc2, although outside the cadre of physicists and the 
nuclear industry few people would do the maths to realise what this means. When 
confronted with Einstein’s formula many people would imagine an atomic explosion as 
an illustration of the energy released. However, the amount of energy available using 
Einstein’s formula is made glaringly apparent when it is put into numbers. Henry D. 
Smyth, the author of the official history of the Manhattan Project wrote: ‘It shows that 
one kilogram (2.2 pounds) of matter, if converted entirely into energy, would give 25 
billion kilowatt hours of energy […] Compare this fantastic figure with the 8.5 kilowatt 
hours of energy which may be produced by burning an equal amount of coal’.10 Smyth 
also points out that the 25 billion kilowatt hours of energy equated to the total energy 
output of the power stations of the United States for two months, at 1939 figures. It is 
evident that utilising this energy in a submarine would increase its capabilities far 
beyond its conventionally powered counterpart, not only for speed and endurance but in 
its electrical power generation. Distillation plants, health physics equipment and a 
modern galley add to the quality and comfort of life on-board the modern nuclear-
powered submarine. Its greater sensor capabilities, weapons fit, and enhanced 
computing and communications systems equate to a more powerful adversary to be 
countered. The nuclear submarine is one of the most potent military symbols of modern 
day political power projection. 
 
II. Chapters 
The first chapter, “Improving the Submersible”, will investigate the developing Soviet 
submarine threat and the Admiralty’s response to it by the pursuit of greater underwater 
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speed and endurance for her submarine fleet with research into Fast Battery Drive and 
air independent engines. On this subject, Britain and other nations, such as the United 
States and the Soviet Union, were greatly influenced by the engineering advances and 
experience gained by Nazi Germany’s U-boats, especially the Type XXI. Although over 
a hundred of these submarines were constructed, they were produced late in the war and 
did not see active service. However, it was accepted that the Type XXI’s streamlined 
hull, the incorporation of the schnorkel mast and greater battery endurance would have 
posed a formidable threat to the Allies had the war had continued a little longer. The 
other submarine of great interest was the Type XVIIB; these submarines were fitted 
with Walter turbine engines which were powered by High-Test Peroxide, H2O2 (HTP). 
In the Walter turbine engine, the HTP produced the required oxygen making the engines 
independent of the air and when dived gave a great increase in speed: ‘…the Germans 
claimed a top submerged speed of 25 knots, with two turbines’.11  
 
Apart from research into conventionally powered air independent engines, the first 
chapter will also examine what was known of nuclear power as a source for motive 
power in the public sphere. Immediately following World War II, the general public 
knew of the destructive power of nuclear energy but were less aware of the peaceful 
potential of nuclear energy. However, some scientists, engineers and politicians were 
aware of the potential benefits; the peaceful use of nuclear energy was first outlined in 
the MAUD Committee Report of 15 July 1941.12 Part one of the Report focussed on a 
rapid release of nuclear energy, the possibility of an atomic bomb; part two looked at 
ways of controlling the release of this energy in order to create a heat source that could 
be exploited.13 The chapter will examine the immediate effects of the US McMahon Act 
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on Admiralty research into nuclear propulsion; the Quebec Agreement had been signed 
in 1943 and the UK expected nuclear information and technology would continue to be 
exchanged after the war had finished. The Admiralty was aware of the US Navy’s 
interest in nuclear propulsion and since 1946 had maintained a small team of officers 
from the Royal Navy and the RNSS at the AERE, Harwell with a brief to gain 
information on solving the various complex problems associated with the control and 
use of nuclear fission.14 
 
The second chapter, “The Nuclear Option”, will examine the preliminary research into 
utilising nuclear power for submarine propulsion. The AERE at Harwell was founded in 
November 1945 and Sir John Cockcroft arrived as Director in January 1946. The remit 
of the establishment was to: ‘carry out fundamental research and development in atomic 
energy’.15 Research at the AERE, Harwell was, from the outset, primarily focussed on 
the civil nuclear programme which was required to support the project to develop the 
atomic bomb. This chapter will investigate how the Admiralty formed a cadre of nuclear 
experienced scientists and how the Naval Section at Harwell and the Atomic Energy 
Division of the Ministry of Supply went about the initial task of designing a functional 
power reactor for submarine use. The Royal Navy engineers and Admiralty scientists 
based at Harwell set about the task and had produced sketch designs within two years.16 
The chapter will also investigate the problem of reactor size stemming from the use of 
slightly enriched uranium and the challenge of fitting it into the envelope of a 
submarine pressure hull. The chapter will consider the decisions to discontinue research 
into HTP and to fully focus on nuclear propulsion from the mid-1950s onwards. 
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Research in the third chapter, “The Pressurised Water Reactor” (PWR), will examine 
the reactor problem and the engineering and quality assurance difficulties that needed to 
be overcome to harness the power of nuclear fission. A typical pressurised water reactor 
power plant, as used in submarine propulsion, is composed of several components 
which are collectively known as the primary system, these will be detailed in the 
chapter. Due to the radiological problems involved it is necessary to select the necessary 
appropriate materials and to stipulate quality specifications to allow the manufacture of 
primary system components to the highest engineering standards practicable. The 
machinery and equipment need to be as robust and reliable as possible as failure of any 
part could have catastrophic consequences for the reactor plant and indeed, the 
submarine. Maintenance and repair of any component in the primary system cannot be 
undertaken whilst the reactor is critical and even once the reactor plant is shut down, 
entry into the reactor compartment would not be possible for some period afterwards. In 
considering nuclear physics, metallurgical problems such as finding materials that could 
withstand the intense heat, pressure and irradiation of the reactor vessel had to be found. 
Materials chosen would also have to have a low neutron capture cross-section to allow 
fission to take place. Attention will be given to the selection of uranium/zirconium fuel 
elements over uranium oxide/steel fuel elements, which was to have major significance 
for the nuclear submarine programme. Conversely, a material had to be found that 
would readily absorb neutrons to allow the nuclear reaction and the power available to 
be controlled. All these materials would have to be chosen carefully so as not to 
chemically react with each other and would require testing in a specially designed zero-
energy reactor as part of the reactor physics of calculating criticality. 
 
With these factors in mind, the engineering problems to be solved by staff at Harwell 





materials to meet the composition and qualities required by the designers. An effect of 
demanding the highest engineering standards was that quality assurance was to become 
the foremost means of managing suppliers by introducing exacting standard 
requirements for material supplied to the Admiralty and of testing and controlling those 
standards. Research will also consider what information the Americans were publishing 
in peer reviewed articles that could be used by the British in their quest for a naval 
reactor. By the mid-1950s the United States Navy was producing handbooks and papers 
on reactor engineering.17 
 
The fourth chapter, “HMS/m Dreadnought”, will investigate the influence of Rickover 
and his relationship with Mountbatten which was pivotal in Britain, not only by 
enabling a leap forward in reactor engineering knowledge, but also through acquiring 
US methods for engineering acceptance. The chapter will explore the offers to purchase 
an American submarine reactor and the consequences for the UK designed PWR 1; this 
chapter will also consider how far the Admiralty’s own programme had progressed 
when the US made their offer to sell a submarine propulsion reactor. During research it 
has been noted that there are a number of anomalies in Philip Ziegler’s biography of 
Mountbatten concerning the purchase of the S5W plant and machinery, which other 
authors have quoted, these will be addressed for future reference. The chapter will end 
by investigating the consequences of delays in the Admiralty’s nuclear programme, the 
signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement, and the subsequent purchase of an American 
reactor and its associated machinery for the Royal Navy’s first nuclear-powered 
submarine. 
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Chapter five, “Nuclear Training and Dounreay”, will examine what steps were taken by 
the Admiralty to establish a cadre of qualified engineers and mechanics for watch 
keeping purposes prior to launching HMS Dreadnought. Research will examine the 
type, scope and periodicity of training and how it was introduced into the Royal Navy 
so that its engineers and mechanics were able to operate the nuclear power plant and its 
associated machinery. Research will investigate Dounreay’s role as an important 
practical training facility and its primary purpose as a prototype for the whole 
submarine primary and secondary machinery and for testing new types of core, 
establishing maintenance techniques and operating procedures. The chapter will explore 
the initial design and construction of Britain’s first naval reactor (PWR 1)  and the 
setting up of the Dounreay Submarine Prototype (DS/MP) on the north coast of 
Scotland.18 It was essential, to ensure that the nuclear power plant design would fit into 
a submarine pressure hull. It was also deemed necessary to undertake trials of the plant 
and machinery as well as gaining operating experience prior to fitting into the first 
submarine as indeed, a major problem did come to light during commissioning trials. 
This was the same procedure the Americans had used when they built their prototype, 
the Submarine Thermal Reactor (STR 1) in the Idaho desert in 1953 prior to fitting a 
production reactor into the USS Nautilus. Any engineering problems found during trials 
on the prototype could be rectified before fitting the production model into the 
submarine hull.19 
 
The final chapter, “Future Developments”, will look at how advantage was taken of the 
knowledge acquired from the US and managed to develop new generations of reactor 
cores to be back-fitted during refits into the submarines with older types of core. The 
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chapter will look at the relentless Treasury pressure on the Admiralty to save money; 
the Admiralty made references in their correspondence with the Treasury to requests for 
further information from the US authorities in the knowledge that it would not be 
forthcoming. By the end of 1962 the Treasury had stopped asking the Admiralty to 
make requests to the US. The chapter will also consider other avenues of research that 
the Admiralty and Rolls-Royce and Associates undertook; not only were they looking at 
improving the core of the pressurised water reactor, other types of reactor were also 
investigated for their potential application in submarines. The chapter will conclude by 
examining the development and improvement of the associated secondary machinery 
systems, and the all-important advances in air purification without which the benefits of 
nuclear propulsion could not have been fully realised. 
 
III. Literature Review 
Submarines have long held a fascination in the public’s imagination, this can be seen in 
the number of books and articles on the subject matter. All interests are catered for, 
from fiction to fact, as illustrated by Jules Verne’s classic, 20,000 Leagues Under the 
Sea (1873). In 2015, Peter Hennessy and James Jinks had their book published, The 
Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service since 1945, which relates the history of 
the Royal Navy Submarine Service from the opening days of the Cold War to modern 
times and includes personal accounts. In film too, the submarine features in popular 
culture, from the many gritty World War II dramas such as Das Boot (1981), through 
the numerous films of the James Bond franchise to productions featuring the Cold War, 
such as The Hunt for Red October (1990). The main theme of the vast canon of 
submarine literature is concentrated on the “cat and mouse” tactics of the hunter and the 





public’s interest in the exploits and tactics of underwater combat and the missions 
undertaken by these secretive leviathans of the deep.  
 
There are, additionally, many learned articles on submarines to be found in journals 
such as Mariner’s Mirror and International Security.20 Many of these concentrate on 
the historical significance of submarine development and activity during the First and 
Second World Wars. Nevertheless, articles can be found relating to the post-war era 
which relate to general details of the nuclear-powered submarine but the one area that is 
almost always overlooked, if not neglected, is the submarine’s propulsion system and 
this is especially so in the era of nuclear propulsion. An extensive search for literature 
on the history of nuclear power reactor plant development in the Royal Navy has reaped 
a very limited harvest. Much of what has been written on the post-war history of Anglo-
American nuclear relations has focussed on Britain’s attempts to develop the atomic and 
hydrogen bombs without assistance from its former ally, America. Limitations on the 
transfer of nuclear technology and information from the United States to a third party 
that could be used in the development of an atomic bomb, or other military use, was 
imposed by the American Atomic Energy Act of 1946, commonly referred to as the 
McMahon Act.21 
 
America was keen to keep the monopoly on nuclear power to herself for as long as 
possible. This went to the extent of refusing to cooperate further with Britain, her 
closest wartime ally and partner in the Manhattan Project whose crucial contribution has 
been described as: ‘…so small in terms of men and resources, so large in terms of its 
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consequences’.22 Authors about the subject of Anglo-American nuclear relations 
include, John Baylis and C. J. Bartlett. In one article, Baylis argues that the keystone to 
this relationship: ‘…was the desire on both sides of the Atlantic for an interdependent 
nuclear relationship’.23 The Mutual Defence Agreement Act of 1958 is central to this 
“special” relationship and played a critical role in the development of Britain’s first 
nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Dreadnought.24 
 
The history of the United States Navy’s involvement in the development of nuclear 
submarine propulsion under the leadership of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover USN was 
written less than twenty years after the USS Nautilus sailed for sea trials. Richard G. 
Hewlett and Francis Duncan’s seminal work, Nuclear Navy 1946-1962, captures the 
early history of the US Navy’s attempts to overcome the engineering problems 
associated with manufacturing a nuclear reactor compact enough to fit into a 
submarine’s hull. In the United Kingdom, three important lectures have been delivered 
on the Royal Navy’s involvement with nuclear propulsion and were later published as 
articles. The first lecture, the 54th Thomas Lowe Gray Memorial Lecture was delivered 
by Vice Admiral Sir Ted Horlick, who at that time was the Royal Navy’s Engineer-in-
Chief, to the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 26 January 1982. Horlick gives a 
summary of the Royal Navy’s involvement with nuclear propulsion, from the creation 
of the Admiralty Development Establishment Barrow, to the development of the second 
generation of the Royal Navy’s pressurised water reactors (PWR 2).25 The second 
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lecture was delivered to the Institute of Marine Engineers, 10 October 1995, by another 
Engineer-in-Chief, Vice Admiral Sir Robert Hill. In this lecture, Hill reflects on the 
Royal Navy’s achievements of forty years’ experience with nuclear propulsion.26 The 
third lecture was also delivered by Vice Admiral Hill, on this occasion to the Institution 
of Mechanical Engineers, 19 April 2005. The subject of the 77th Thomas Lowe Gray 
Memorial Lecture was Admiral Hyman G Rickover USN and the UK Nuclear 
Submarine Propulsion Programme. This lecture detailed the legacy of Rickover’s 
influence over the Royal Navy’s nuclear propulsion programme, the impact of the 
Mutual Defence Agreement and the consequent purchase of the S5W nuclear reactor 
and associated propulsion machinery which was later fitted into the Royal Navy’s first 
nuclear submarine, HMS Dreadnought.27 Vice Admiral Hill continued to deliver this 
lecture until very recently to Royal Naval engineers and mechanics at the Royal Navy’s 
Marine and Air Engineering School, HMS Sultan, based at Gosport, Hampshire.28 
Because of security constraints at the time these lectures were delivered there was only 
a limited amount of material that could be used and the histories are, by necessity, very 
much a broad sweep of nuclear propulsion in the Royal Navy. 
 
IV. Nuclear Historiography 
The writing of Nuclear History as a subject is by its secretive, some would possibly 
argue controversial, nature in its infancy in the United Kingdom. There are three writers 
who stand out among their contemporaries, all of whom were women. Uniquely, all 
three were “insiders”, employed by the establishments and the authorities they wrote 
about. The Grigg’s Committee report in 1954 on Departmental Records, resulted in the 
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Public Records Act being passed in 1958. The following year, Margaret Gowing was 
employed by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority after they sought to 
appoint a historian and archivist to compile their numerous records which were 
dispersed over several sites across Britain.29 By 1964, Gowing had produced the first, of 
three seminal works on the subject of Britain’s association with nuclear power, Britain 
and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945. Ten years later, Gowing was assisted by Lorna Arnold, 
which resulted in another book in two volumes being published; Independence and 
Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-52: Volume 1 Policy Making, and 
Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-52: Volume 2 Policy 
Execution. 
 
These volumes constitute the official history of British Government development of the 
atomic bomb and civil nuclear power plant building programme. The civil programme 
was developed to support the production of enriched uranium and plutonium; these 
materials were required for the construction of the atomic bomb. Gowing’s focus is on 
both of these nuclear projects, however, Gowing does comment on what was happening 
at the AERE, Harwell during the early years in relation to the nuclear submarine 
propulsion programme. Gowing noted that in September 1950 the UKAEA’s research 
and development staff at Harwell had a high priority for a submarine reactor using 
enriched uranium.30 A design study was awarded the firm Metropolitan-Vickers; 
however, the reactor design was deemed too large to fit in a submarine hull and was 
discontinued.31 Gowing noted that later in 1951 the submarine nuclear reactor project 
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was given a lower priority by the Admiralty because of the expense of having to use 
enriched uranium. It could be argued that it was not the expense of enriched uranium 
but government priority to manufacture the atomic bomb that led to the decision to give 
a higher priority to the fast breeder reactor programme which would produce the 
materials required for the atomic bomb.32 The third woman is Katherine Pyne, who was 
official historian at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston. Pyne contributed 
to the work of Lorna Arnold’s, Britain and the H-Bomb (2001) and Peter Hennessy’s, 
Cabinets and the Bomb (2007). 
 
The focus given to the McMahon Act by historians begs the question why the nuclear 
propulsion of submarines element of Britain’s post-war ambitions has been neglected. 
The most probable reason is a combination of reluctance on the part of the Ministry of 
Defence, the Royal Navy and the nuclear industry in general to engage with historians. 
This reticence to divulge information on nuclear submarine propulsion plants is a direct 
result of the Mutual Defence Agreement. Article III covers the: ‘Transfer of Submarine 
Nuclear Propulsion Plant and Materials’. However, it is made clear in Article VII, 
which covers the dissemination of information, that communication of any information 
to a third party, unless by agreement, is strictly prohibited.33 It is, perhaps, easy to 
understand a historian’s reluctance to undertake this work without official authorisation 
of government departments involved. Support for this thesis from the office of the First 
Sea Lord, at that time Admiral Sir George Zambellas KCB DSC ADC, and the office of 
the Director of Nuclear Propulsion, Commodore Mark Adams, has assisted in allowing 
privileged access to MoD files yet to be released to the National Archives. 
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In 2000, Arnold wrote: ‘Britain’s official nuclear history ranged widely – covering the 
wartime story of Britain’s crucial contribution to the Manhattan Project; … [to] the 
reactor fire at Windscale, in Cumbria. The programme remains incomplete’.34 HMS 
Dreadnought was commissioned 17 April 1963, and it is thirty-nine years since she was 
decommissioned and laid up at Rosyth Dockyard in 1980. There are a few people alive 
today that were actively involved during the 1950s with the research at the AERE, 
Harwell and later with the Dreadnought Project Team (DPT), based at Bath. These 
engineers had first-hand experience in dealing with their American counter-parts during 
the purchase of the S5W reactor plant from Westinghouse in America and the 
associated propulsion machinery from General Electric. Included in this group of first 
generation Royal Navy nuclear engineers is the first Deputy Marine Engineering Officer 
(DMEO) of HMS Dreadnought, Rear Admiral Peter Hammersley CB OBE, who 
undertook sea training on the American submarine USS Skipjack between October 1959 
and May 1960 prior to his appointment to HMS Dreadnought. 35 It is deemed important 
to gather statements of their witness to the early days of nuclear propulsion to add to the 
nuclear history of this country. 
 
V. The Nuclear Submarine in Context 
At the end of World War II, the Royal Navy had a large fleet but many ships were 
obsolete and inefficient. The capital ship of the day, the battleship, was extremely 
vulnerable to air attack as illustrated by the Japanese attacks 10 December 1941 
resulting in the sinking off Malaya of HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales. There 
were also the air attacks by the Royal Navy on the Italian fleet at Taranto Harbour and 
more infamously the Japanese on the US fleet at Pearl Harbour. The last battleship to be 
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built for the Royal Navy, HMS Vanguard, was completed after the war but after a short 
service career she was decommissioned in 1960.36 The concept of the cruiser was also 
reviewed by the Admiralty and resulted in only three new completions after the war. 
The foundations were laid for a more efficient fleet based around the carrier, submarine 
and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) forces, and these improvements to the fleet began 
to appear a decade later.37 
 
As the British, Japanese and Americans had proved during World War II, the carrier 
was considered the new capital ship; Britain was determined to keep at least one 
operational carrier in the Far East station, the Mediterranean and in Home Waters, and 
the Americans continued to refine their concept of the carrier strike force. In the post-
war period, many World War II era destroyers were scrapped; however, some were 
taken into dockyard hands and fitted out with modern machinery, weapons and 
enhanced ASW capabilities. It had been acknowledged that despite the improvements in 
surface ASW the new submarines entering service with faster submerged speeds would 
still be extremely difficult to detect and destroy. During the fifties, the Royal Navy was 
finding it harder to counter Army and Royal Air Force criticism of its expenditure on 
aircraft carriers; this was part of the wider political/military debate in which the Royal 
Navy struggled to argue an effective case for the fleet in war with a growing greater 
political reliance now placed on nuclear deterrence.38 The carriers were also deemed to 
be vulnerable to Soviet missile attack and the RAF strongly argued its case that they 
would be able to cover maritime areas from their air bases which, at that time were 
positioned across the globe. The Royal Navy eventually lost the argument resulting in 
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the cancellation of the CVA01 replacement carrier project in the mid-1960s. By this 
time, however, the nuclear-powered submarine was seen by many to be the capital ship 
of the future. The nuclear submarine was deemed to have the potential to engage in 
covert operations in forward areas and gather intelligence. These were operations that 
the Army and Royal Air Force could not undertake with the same degree of stealth and 
invulnerability, and this presented an opportunity to the Royal Navy to argue the case 
for a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. 
 
The largest threat to Western Europe and America in the immediate post-war period 
was that of the Soviet submarine fleet. In one of his Quarterly Newsletters in 1957, 
Mountbatten noted that according to Jane’s Fighting Ships there were about 400 Soviet 
submarines and some 100 under construction.39 To counter the submarine threat, it was 
argued that the only efficient way to carry out this function was to fight like with like 
and from 1947, the interception and destruction of enemy submarines was the primary 
function of the Royal Navy’s submarine fleet.40 The development of conventional 
submarines incorporating World War II technologies from the German Type XXI U-
boat, the attempts to master Walter HTP propulsion during the 1950s and the eventual 
adoption of nuclear propulsion can be seen as part of the Admiralty’s progressive 
attempts not only to counter the Soviet submarine threat, but also as having the means 
of destroying that threat should the need arise. This threat continued throughout the 
Cold War as the Soviet Union continued to invest in submarine technologies in order to 
maintain, not only a credible ballistic missile force, but also to enhance the hunter-killer 
capabilities of their SSNs. 
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The time has come for the development of nuclear propulsion in the Royal Navy to be 
written and to assess the political, military and engineering decisions which led to the 
building, operation and deployment of these potent naval assets. Research will look at 
such decisions which allowed private industry to develop the reactor core for nuclear 
submarine propulsion rather than the state, through the UKAEA, keeping a monopoly 
on core design. By assessing these decisions, it will allow a better understanding of the 
relationships between the Admiralty, Royal Navy, private enterprise and the UKAEA 
staff based at Harwell, and how these relationships impacted and influenced the 
engineering decision making process.  
 
Research will investigate the role of the First Sea Lord, Earl Mountbatten, who had a 
Royal Naval weapons engineer appointed to the US Polaris project as early as 1955.41 
Given the struggle the Royal Navy had in defining their role in total war, it appears that 
Mountbatten’s long-term aim for the Royal Navy was to carry the nation’s deterrent. 
Strategic thinking at the time was moving towards sea-based deterrent forces and away 
from the static missile sites and free-falling bombs which were deemed vulnerable to 
improved anti-missile defences in target areas. For a sea-based deterrent to be totally 
effective, nuclear propulsion had to be mastered and operating experience gained so that 
a case could be made to government should an opportunity to purchase the Polaris 
system arise, as it did in due course with the Nassau Agreement in December 1962. 
 
This thesis will appraise the development of nuclear submarine propulsion during the 
third quarter of the last century and will add a vital piece of missing literature to the 
                                                     






naval historiography of this country. With support from the office of the Director of 
Nuclear Propulsion, Commodore Mark Adams RN, a Confidentiality Agreement has 
been signed allowing access to unreleased files. A number of retired Royal Navy 
engineering officers involved in the nuclear propulsion programme during the 1950s 
and 1960s have given freely of their time and allowed access to their private papers. 
This will enable personal perspectives to be added to the events of that period which 





Chapter 1: Improving the Submersible 
 
The attrition rate for German U-boats during World War II was an important lesson in 
understanding the vulnerability of the submarine whilst surfaced. The development of 
radar and its employment in long range aircraft in finding and attacking the surfaced 
submarine made research into air independent engines a primary task in the post-war 
period. The Germans had employed the schnorkel in an attempt to limit the losses to its 
submarine fleet; they had also developed U-boats with a higher battery capacity and 
more efficient motors. The design and use of HTP and the Walter turbine were also well 
developed by Germany and was entering production towards the end of the war. 
However, all these improvements could not detract from the fact that the conventional 
submarine would still be limited by the amount of fuel it could carry and would still be 
little more than a submersible reliant on the requirement to surface periodically. 
Therefore, it is important to have a brief understanding of the discovery of nuclear 
fission and how this process, more commonly associated with the atomic bomb and 
civil nuclear power stations became, from the outset, associated with the problem of 
producing what Admiral Chester W. Nimitz USN and others called the “true 
submarine”.1 Within twelve months of the discovery of nuclear fission and the 
suggestion that a chain reaction may be possible to control, proposals were put forward 
in France and America for applying this new science to the problem of air independent 
propulsion for submarines. A nuclear-powered propulsion plant would enable a 
submarine to roam the depths at will, free from the constraints imposed by the diesel 
engines and battery driven motors of the conventional “submersible” submarine with its 
requirement to operate on or near the surface. 
 
                                                     





 I. Introduction of World War II Submarine Developments 
In recording developments in submarine propulsion methods, it is necessary to look at 
why and when the Admiralty began to investigate air independent propulsion systems 
and to understand the reasons why the nuclear option was eventually chosen as the 
preferred method. In the aftermath of World War II, the Royal Navy had a large number 
of operational ‘S’, ‘T’ and ‘U’ class submarines, they also had new ‘A’ class 
submarines in the process of being commissioned and built. It could be argued that the 
Battle of the Atlantic had been won in 1943 when German U-boat losses were running 
at an unsustainable rate due to improvements in, and the employment of, radar and 
long-range aircraft. However, British intelligence learnt that Germany was continuing to 
produce new submarines with higher performances in speed and underwater endurance; 
as such the submarine threat to allied shipping in the Atlantic remained real until 1945. 
Britain and her Allies were quick to learn from German experience, through intelligence 
gained, the Admiralty was made aware of the existence of a new submarine, the Type 
XXI, but in some respects much of what was learnt through intelligence was already 
known. The schnorkel mast had been fitted and trials conducted on Dutch submarines 
before the war. When the Netherlands was overrun in 1940, four Dutch submarines 
made it to Britain and the Germans captured the remainder. Thus, the technology was 
available to both navies.2 The techniques employed and the parameters required to 
streamline a submarine to reduce drag and so increase speed with no increase in fuel 
were also widely known to the British.3 It is sufficient to note that, at that stage of the 
war the British saw no requirement to incorporate the schnorkel mast into her submarine 
fleet; some drawings were made during 1942-43 for the ‘U’ class submarines but never 
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completed.4 However, a decision was made to convert and streamline one submarine, 
HMS Seraph, in order to train surface ships against a high underwater speed target with 
the potential performance of the Type XXI.5  
 
HMS Seraph was taken into dockyard hands 16 June 1944, one month after the first 
Type XXI, U2501, had been launched. HMS Seraph’s gun was removed, and fairings 
fitted around the masts and periscopes. Shutters were also fitted to the torpedo tube 
openings in order to streamline her. Paul Kemp noted that: ‘Seraph’s underwater 
resistance was reduced by 45 per cent and she achieved a speed of 14.25 knots dived 
compared to 8.82 knots with an unconverted S boat’.6 Comprehensive trials were 
conducted and two more ‘S’ class submarines were converted in 1945, HMS Satyr and 
HMS Sceptre, to assist in training the surface fleet in tactics against the Type XXI.7 As 
noted previously, this class of submarine did not materialise operationally during the 
war, however, as Llewellyn-Jones noted: ‘…it re-emerged in the real, or perceived, 
menace from the Soviet submarines exploiting the Type XXI technology’.8 It was this 
looming threat, not readily apparent in 1945-46, that Britain faced and proved the prime 
mover in adopting technological improvements such as the schnorkel in her submarine 
fleet. By 1947, the deterioration in relations between the Western Powers and the Soviet 
Union was to provide the stimulus to find a means of air independent propulsion as a 
method of combatting the growing Soviet submarine threat. 
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Towards the end of the war the schnorkel, known as the snort in the Royal Navy, was 
seen as the quickest means of increasing a submarine’s dived endurance and many 
submarines were taken into dockyard hands to have the mast fitted, the first being HMS 
Truant in the closing stages of the war.9 A series of so called “snort” patrols were 
conducted in order to increase experience and also to gain information on any 
physiological problems with the crew which may be associated with being submerged 
for prolonged periods. These patrols can be seen as an acknowledgement that the 
Admiralty realised that submariners were entering into areas where medical science 
may be needed to counter the possible ill effects of the submarine’s atmosphere and 
other factors experienced during an extended dived period. HMS Taciturn conducted 
the first prolonged dive in temperate waters followed by HMS Alliance which carried 
out her dived patrol in tropical conditions. HMS Alliance began her patrol 9 October 
1947 diving off the Canary Islands and surfaced thirty days later, 8 November 1947 off 
Freetown.10 The final experiment in this series of extended dives was conducted by 
HMS Ambush in the Arctic between Jan Mayen and Bear Island during February and 
March 1948.11 The patrols gave not only a great deal of operational experience in 
snorting techniques, in some respects they also contributed to the foundations of 
improving atmosphere control and domestic arrangements that would be required so 
that nuclear propelled submarines could take full advantage of their increased 
endurance. 
 
As part of the Allies agreement covering the distribution of war spoils, ten U-boats each 
were to be divided between the US, the Soviet Union and Britain, the remainder were to 
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be disposed of. During 1946-47, four Type VIICs, one of each Type IXC and Type 
XXIII, and most importantly, four of the advanced Type XXI submarines were 
transferred to the Soviet Navy. However: ‘The Soviets also captured fourteen 
incomplete Type XXIs in an advanced state of construction, together with a large 
number of prefabricated sections, when they entered Danzig in 1945’.12 Although the 
British and Americans conspired to keep any of the Type XVIIB Walter submarines 
from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union, the Soviets did gain access to the 
technology. At Blankenberg, the Soviets captured the Walter design office together with 
the Walter turbine plant and two complete turbines.13 As was the case with the Western 
Allies, the U-boats transferred to the Soviet Navy were used to trial the advances in 
German submarine engineering to evaluate if they could be incorporated into their 
submarine fleet. The number of submarines would be dispersed between the Soviet 
fleets; however, the majority would be based with the Northern Fleet and were to be a 
serious threat to Europe’s northern flank which had to be met by NATO submarines. 
 
II. The Soviet Submarine Threat 
The worsening political situation between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union led 
to the creation of NATO in April 1949 which allowed for a more effective defence of 
Europe from Soviet aggression. Throughout the 1950s, figures pertaining to the size of 
the Soviet submarine fleet varied widely. During a debate in the House of Lords, 
Viscount Hall mentioned a figure in excess of 360.14 In a Quarterly Newsletter to senior 
officers some years later, Mountbatten predicted the Soviet submarine threat by 1960 to 
be between 599 and 659 submarines.15 Mountbatten only refers to the new Whisky, Zulu 
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and Quebec conventional (SSK) classes of submarine and disregards 160 older types of 
submarines; although the Soviets did not build the quantity Mountbatten envisaged, a 
total of 292 submarines of the Whisky, Zulu and Quebec classes were built during the 
1950s. The possible reason the Soviets did not build as many as predicted was due to 
their limited operational function and new submarine concepts and weapons that were 
being developed. The Soviets converted some of their Whisky class submarines to carry 
cruise missiles (SSG) which could be used against land targets on the eastern seaboard 
of the United States or against their strike carriers; these complemented the new build 
Juliet class (SSG).16 Some Zulu class submarines were also converted to become the 
Soviets’ first ballistic missile submarines (SSB) the majority of these could only carry 
two R-11FM Scud missiles with a limited range of 150 KM. The subsequent Golf class 
(SSB) could carry three R-11FM Scud missiles; all these classes of submarines were 
conventionally powered and had to surface to launch the missiles.17 This was the threat 
that the Royal Navy’s submarine fleet faced from the late 1940s onwards and nuclear 
propulsion was required not only to counter conventional Soviet submarines but their 
predicted nuclear-powered successors.18 
 
In August 1958, the Soviets commissioned, Leninsky Komsomol, the first of the NATO 
designated November class (SSN).19 The following year they launched their first 
nuclear-powered ballistic submarines (SSBN), the Hotel class, however, these too could 
only carry three (R-13) missiles with an improved range of 600 KM. The deployment of 
the Zulu (SSB) and Whisky (SSG) classes and Soviet developments in the nuclear 
propulsion field are the possible reference to the “urgency of the international situation” 
that Rickover noted in his letter to Commander William Anderson USN discussed in 
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chapter four. Despite over estimating, the Soviet submarine fleet still consisted of 
significant numbers; in 1967, its total strength was reported as 392.20 It can be argued 
that, until the mid-1960s, the Soviet Navy was anything but a maritime force that acted 
in support of the “Red Army”. However, it is especially true that during the 1960s and 
1970s the Royal Navy had to plan its submarine fleet to cope with the strategic and 
dynamic changes that were likely to happen with the Soviet submarine fleet. 
 
George Hudson, who has written on Soviet naval doctrine, claimed that the building of 
Soviet submarine fleet was politically driven from the mid-1950s by Khrushchev and 
the Soviet Army, who were keen to maintain their position as the “defender of the 
Motherland”, naval doctrine was viewed as supporting Soviet land forces and 
characterised by the notion that the nuclear submarine should form the main arm of 
Soviet naval power. This dogmatic view, however, was countered by the formidable 
Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, (Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy 1956-1985), who 
continuously argued for a balanced fleet to counter the sub-nuclear, rather than the 
nuclear, threat of war.21 Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that the limitations imposed on 
the Soviet Navy, its inability to react other than by a nuclear strike during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of October 1962, won Gorshkov’s argument which he espoused more 
forcefully after the fall of Khrushchev. Although the Soviet Navy developed into a 
“blue water” navy and commissioned two aircraft carriers of the Kiev class during the 
1970s, it was in its nuclear submarines that the Soviet Union invested its maritime 
strength with larger and more powerful submarines of all types. From 1961 the Soviet 
submarine fleet declined slightly in numbers however, over the next twenty years: 
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‘…their collective tonnage trebled to a gigantic one-and-a-half million tons’.22 By the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the submarine strength was calculated by the author and 
analyst, Norman Polmar, at over 250 submarines (nuclear and conventionally 
powered).23 This was the numerically superior adversary that the Royal Navy (and its 
allies) had to counter throughout the period of the Cold War and it was to do this with 
the advantages of advanced sonar equipment and methodologies, stealth (through noise 
reduction technologies) and improved propulsion systems. 
 
III. Conversions to “Fast Battery Drive” 
America and Britain identified the risk posed by the Soviet use of “Fast Battery Drive” 
(FBD) based on the designs of Type XXI U-boat and had, by 1947, begun to respond to 
the threat. Although already developing nuclear propulsion, in the interim, the 
Americans began their “GUPPY” programme to convert some of their World War II era 
submarines.24 Eighteen Tench and thirty-four Balao class submarines were selected to 
be streamlined and given increased battery capacity; some submarines were also 
selected to be fitted with schnorkel masts. As well as achieving greater endurance, the 
GUPPY conversion programme typically increased the dived speed of these submarines 
from 8.75 knots to between 16 and 18 knots depending on the type of conversion and 
the class of submarine.25 Britain too, began to look at ways of improving their fleet of 
World War II era submarines. 
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As noted earlier, by 1947 the Admiralty had come to the conclusion that rather than rely 
solely on radar and improving the tactics of its surface fleet, the best way to counter and 
destroy the fast submarine was with another submarine and the concept of the hunter-
killer was born.  A preliminary study into converting some of the World War II ‘T’ 
class or the new build ‘A’ class submarines was organised by Vice Admiral M. 
Mansfield, Flag Officer Submarines (FOS/M). The study found that converting the 
older ‘T’ class submarines would be more practicable than converting the new ‘A’ class 
due to the former already having three battery sections and a fourth could easily be 
fitted under the control room by utilising the oil fuel tanks sited there. One of the naval 
constructors, A. J. Sims, argued that a better option would be to insert an additional 
section in the pressure hull aft of the control room as this would alleviate the crowding 
experienced in the ‘T’ class control room and make room for additional motors to be 
fitted.26 The idea was taken forward and the Director of Naval Construction produced 
two conversion schemes for the Admiralty to select from. 
 
In Scheme A, much the same work as was conducted on HMS Seraph was to be done, 
external fittings and the gun were to be removed, the bridge redesigned to incorporate 
the revised layout of periscopes and masts, including fitting the snort induction mast, 
and having bow shutters fitted etc. An additional battery section was to be fitted in lieu 
of the oil fuel tanks under the control room. These improvements would increase the 
dived speed from 9 knots to 14.5 knots and the conversion work was estimated to cost 
£330,000.27 Scheme B was more ambitious, apart from the recommendations of Scheme 
A, the proposals covered in Scheme B included inserting an extra length of pressure hull 
aft of the control room, fitting an extra pair of motors and other improvements to the 
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propulsion system. This scheme gave a dived speed of 16.75 knots and increased 
endurance over the rival scheme, the cost of this conversion was estimated at £410,000.  
 
The Admiralty opted for the latter scheme and plans were put in hand to convert eight of 
the all welded ‘T’ class submarines between November 1948 and June 1956. Three of 
the first four submarines had a fourteen foot section inserted, HMS Turpin for reasons 
not discovered, had a twelve foot section inserted.28 In 1958, it was disclosed in the 
Commons that HMS Turpin had cost £420,000 to construct during the war and that the 
price of her conversion had been £1,240,000, well in excess of the estimated cost 
detailed above.29 As a result of complaints about of the sea-keeping capabilities of the 
first conversions, a number of experiments were conducted and it was concluded that 
sea-keeping could be improved by lengthening the section to be inserted to seventeen 
feet and six inches and this was approved in the case of the last four conversions.30 The 
benefits of streamlining, identified in exercises conducted between HMS Truncheon and 
HMS Alcide, resulted in Admiralty approval for the limited streamlining for some of the 
hulls of the older riveted submarines, effectively Scheme A.31 Five of these submarines 
were converted and as Kemp noted: ‘…the T Conversions were the Royal Navy’s first 
operational fast submarines and experience gained in them was invaluable in operating 
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IV. HTP and Air Independent Engines 
Although the ‘T’ class conversion programme gave these submarines increased speed 
and a greater dived endurance, they still required to either snort or to surface to recharge 
their batteries and the Admiralty was still keen to continue investigating other areas in 
their quest for air independent engines. Along with a number of Type XXIs which the 
Admiralty had commissioned for trials and evaluation purposes, the Admiralty also 
possessed a Type XVIIB submarine, U1407. This submarine had been scuttled at 
Cuxhaven in northern Germany in early May 1945, she was salvaged and returned to 
Kiel prior to being allocated to Britain and towed to Barrow in August 1945.33 In May 
1945 the inventor of the Walter turbine, Dr. Helmut Walter, and his senior staff had also 
been captured at Kiel. By November 1945, the Walterwerke factory at Kiel had been 
stripped of its spares, drawings and other assets which were sent to Britain to support 
the repair and trials of U1407. Dr. Walter and several engineers were brought to Britain 
in January 1946 to continue work, under British contracts, at Barrow. A major refit was 
conducted on U1407, the torpedo tubes were removed, all electrical equipment was 
refurbished, and the ventilation system overhauled. The submarine commissioned 26 
August 1947 as HMS Meteorite and trials began in 1948. 
 
The Admiralty required a trials report to evaluate whether it would be in the interest of 
the Royal Navy to further develop the HTP turbine. The report highlighted the 
operational prospects of the Walter turbine which highlighted the huge advantages of 
speed. However, disadvantages noted were the cost of the HTP fuel, about £150 per ton, 
the requirement for a dedicated HTP supply ship due to the fuel being extremely 
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hazardous and a depot ship for accommodation etc.34 Throughout her trials HMS 
Meteorite was fitted with only one turbine, not two as designed, so only achieved 
fourteen knots which, while it impressed the British, was not its designed top speed of 
twenty-five knots.35 The trials however, gave the Admiralty the confidence to order two 
new British designed HTP experimental submarines, HMS Explorer and HMS 
Excalibur. Concerns were raised in the House of Lords over the cost of HTP fuel; 
Viscount Hall advised the House that the Americans had successfully launched their 
first nuclear submarine and the results confirm their expectations of nuclear propulsion. 
Hall added that, unless the same advantages were to be gained from experimenting with 
HTP then: ‘…we ought to think twice before we go on with this new kind of propulsion 
unless fuel is available to a much greater extent and can be produced at a much lower 
price’.36 
 
During 1952, HTP fuel prices were falling, Friedman quotes the cost of a submarine 
patrol using HTP at about £15,000 for 300 tons of fuel. A comparison for a 
conventional diesel-electric submarine, which required their batteries replacing after 
about six patrols, was around £120,000, equal to £20,000 per patrol. This was a good 
financial reason for the Admiralty continuing with the trials of HTP powered 
submarines.37 HMS Explorer was the first submarine to be a joint managed project 
between Vickers-Armstrongs (Engineering) at Barrow and the Fleet Engineers 
Department. The Admiralty Development Establishment, Barrow (ADEB) was formed 
to facilitate this joint venture and, as Vice Admiral Horlick noted, the experience gained 
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was later invaluable in designing and building HMS Dreadnought.38 HMS Explorer was 
launched 5 March 1954 and during the next two years was alongside at Barrow being 
fitted out and readied for the first of class sea-trials planned for April 1956. As proposed 
in the trials of HMS Meteorite, the crew were accommodated in a dedicated tender, an 
old mine-layer Miner VIII. They also had a dedicated HTP fuel supply ship, RFA 
Sparbeck. HTP refers to hydrogen peroxide in concentrations greater than eighty 
percent which can be very stable with some materials, such as stainless steel and 
plastics. However, it is a highly combustive material and can be very explosive if it 
comes into contact with most metals, hydro-carbons, clothes and skin.39 As such it 
requires special precautions when handling and a ready supply of fresh water to dilute 
any spillages. 
 
HMS Explorer was designed so that the HTP fuel was carried external to the pressure 
hull in four groups, each consisting of four bags on either side of the hull. The tank, 
pipework and pump on board Sparbeck were manufactured from stainless steel and the 
procedure for fuelling was to pump the fuel into a header tank on board the Sparbeck 
and allow the HTP to gravity drain into the bags. On first filling during the summer of 
1956 the HTP began to decompose which resulted in two explosions requiring a 
docking period for repairs.40 In early spring 1957, HMS Explorer eventually conducted 
trials in the Irish Sea, problems were experienced with carbon monoxide and carbon 
dioxide leaking into the turbine room; this problem was never fully resolved. Small fires 
also tended to break out in the turbine room so the compartment was unmanned and the 
machinery controlled remotely during operation. The speed log fitted to HMS Explorer 
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was modified from an ‘A’ class and was not deemed to be accurate above twenty knots, 
therefore, during full power trials it was arranged that the submarine would keep a 
steady course and launch a signal at set intervals. The escort frigate would sight these 
and be able to make accurate predictions of her speed.41 During trials, the estimated top 
speed was calculated to be near thirty knots, faster than the USS Nautilus, but only 
available whilst the 100 tons of HTP fuel lasted. Evidently, lower speeds could be 
maintained for longer and dived endurance would increase as less fuel is required; it 
was stressed in the House of Lords that her high speed would be sustainable.42 
 
However, before the trials were conducted in HMS Explorer, and her sister, HMS 
Excalibur, the Admiralty was supporting research into nuclear-powered submarines. 
The two submarines continued to be utilised in training the Royal Navy’s surface and 
submarine fleets to attack fast submarines. The experience gained in manufacturing 
material of the cleanliness standard required for use with HTP, the welding techniques 
developed for stainless steel and other disciplines and skills learnt with the two 
submarines were of great benefit to Vickers-Armstrongs and the Royal Navy. The staff 
with their newly acquired skills, transferred from ADEB to the Dreadnought project 
when Vickers-Armstrongs was awarded the contract to build HMS Dreadnought. In 
1948, Captain (E) L. A. Taylor, on the staff of FOS/M wrote in reference to future 
policy concerning the snorting submarine and the use of HTP: ‘Both these are 
considered to be “stepping stones” to the time when atomic power is a practical 
proposition for submarines’.43 Indeed, by 1948, research at Harwell was already being 
conducted into nuclear propulsion. 
 
                                                     
41 Hall, ‘HMS Explorer/Excalibur, 1956-62’, p. 139. 
42 Parliamentary debate, House of Lords sitting, 27 July 1954, Col. 181. 





V. The Discovery of Nuclear Fission and its Application to Submarines 
Knowledge of harnessing and exploiting the power of the atom really began in 1938 
when the German Nobel winning chemist, Otto Hahn, discovered that he could produce 
an isotope of barium by bombarding uranium atoms with neutrons. However, it was his 
Jewish assistant, at the time exiled in Denmark, Lise Meitner, and her colleague, Otto 
Frisch, that first fully appreciated the phenomenon and its relation to Einstein’s formula, 
E=mc2.44 Their theory quickly spread and during discussions at a Conference of 
Theoretical Physics held in Washington D.C. in January 1939 it was proposed that if 
uranium atoms underwent the process of fission then the energy released would be 
enormous and there was a great possibility that sufficient neutrons could be released to 
form a chain reaction. ‘By February 1939 the major researches which showed the 
possibility of both the power reactor and the atomic bomb had been completed and had 
been published in various international journals’.45 
 
Further work at the College de France by Frederic Joliet-Curie and others showed that 
fission of uranium was accompanied by the release of further neutrons, but he was 
unable to promote a chain reaction. Only after further experimentation was it realised 
that it was not natural uranium, 238U, which released its neutrons. It was discovered that 
it was the rare isotope, 235U, which constitutes about 0.7 percent of natural uranium 
which releases its neutrons upon being bombarded during the fission process. 
Throughout Europe and America, institutes and universities were involved in these 
experiments, the US Navy had provided a $1500 grant to the Carnegie Institution to 
study the fission process.46 By May 1939, the conditions had been established for 
maintaining a chain reaction and patents had been filed in Paris, for a proposal for a 
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nuclear reactor. By the end of the year France was at war with Germany, Joliet-Curie 
and his team were instructed by the French Minister of Supply, Raoul Dantry: ‘…to 
continue their work with the object of developing a submarine engine which did not 
need oxygen’. 47 In this instance, Joliet-Curie was the first scientist to lead a team to 
tackle the problem of submarine nuclear propulsion. 
 
During the spring of 1939, Enrico Fermi had reached much the same conclusion as his 
European counterparts and attended a meeting with Admiral S. C. Hooper USN, 
technical assistant to the US Naval Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral William 
D. Leahy USN, to explain the potentialities of these recent discoveries. The meeting 
resulted in funds being allocated by the US Navy’s Bureau of Engineering for further 
investigation of nuclear power. One of the United States’ principal naval engineers and 
Director of the US Navy’s Naval Research Laboratory was, Vice Admiral Harold G. 
Bowen USN. It was Bowen who wrote the first detailed treatise on the application of 
nuclear power to submarine propulsion in November 1939, ‘Memorandum on Sub-
Atomic Power Sources for Submarine Propulsion’.48 President Roosevelt was also 
informed in early November of the possibilities of an uncontrolled chain reaction 
producing a powerful bomb, and that if it could be controlled it may provide power for 
submarines.49 
 
During World War II the majority of funds for nuclear research were allocated to the 
Manhattan Project for the development of the atomic bomb. Hewlett and Duncan noted 
that: ‘While the Army had been spending $2.5 billion in building a nation-wide 
complex of nuclear laboratories, production plants and reactors, the Navy was permitted 
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to do little more than preliminary development of a secondary process used to produce 
fissionable material for the atomic bomb’.50 It is evident that given the allocation of 
resources and priorities during World War II, the United States Navy’s research into 
nuclear reactor engineering was severely curtailed. Britain did not have the economic or 
industrial resources of America and her priority during 1939 and 1940 was one of 
survival. At the end of World War II, apart from the nuclear research facility at Chalk 
River, Canada where most of the British scientists and engineers carried out their 
research, the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom was practically non-existent. Due 
to the successful security policy of General Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan 
Project, of excluding direct British scientific involvement, Britain was ignorant of the 
means of large scale production of enriched uranium and plutonium. The effect of the 
US McMahon Act in 1946 would have an immediate impact on British nuclear 
ambitions, preventing the transfer of nuclear information from the US to other parties. 
In isolation from her former partner, Britain would have to overcome and solve the 
chemical, metallurgical, engineering and other technological problems in order to 
produce her own enriched uranium and plutonium.51 
 
Professor Margaret Gowing, the historian, observed that in 1946, the Government had 
in principle, given approval: ‘…for a low-separation gaseous diffusion plant subject to 
confirmation before more than limited expenditure had been incurred’.52 The 
expenditure limit was £500,000 and the plant’s function was primarily to economise the 
use of uranium and help with research into nuclear-powered submarines. It is entirely 
possible that this decision was made before the Government became aware of the 
McMahon Act which was signed by President Harry S. Truman in August 1946 and 
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came into force 1 January 1947. The UK Government had every expectation that 
nuclear information and technology would continue to be transferred, under the Quebec 
Agreement of 19 August 1943, Britain had entered into a full and effective field of 
scientific research and development with the US (the Manhattan Project). Furthermore, 
under the Hyde Park Memorandum, signed between Roosevelt and Churchill 19 
September 1944, it was agreed that full collaboration in developing atomic energy for 
military and commercial purposes would continue after the defeat of Japan.53 The 
McMahon Act ended any further collaboration and the low-separation plant’s output 
would not sustain research into nuclear propulsion and development of the atomic 
bomb. The only immediate military atomic objective was the Government’s priority, 
articulated by the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, for the UK to develop its own 
atomic bomb with a “bloody Union Jack on top of it”.54 This was the first obstacle 
posed to the development of nuclear propulsion and it would not be surmounted for 
nearly a decade with the construction of the high-separation diffusion plant and 
doubling the output of the low-separation plant allowing a sufficient supply of fissile 
material for the Royal Navy’s development programme.  
 
Throughout the period that the McMahon Act was in force, British governments 
attempted to get the Act repealed and allow exchange of nuclear information and 
technology, initial negotiations in 1949 eventually failed due to the arrest of Klaus 
Fuchs. Further negotiations were hampered by the US Atomic Energy Commission 
(USAEC) and the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). The 
JCAE was suspicious that transferring information on submarine reactors would enable 
the UK to also apply the technology to its civilian commercial activities.55 However, Sir 
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Leonard Owen, reflecting on the first ten years of nuclear engineering in the United 
Kingdom, wrote of the McMahon Act: ‘Looking back, the McMahon Act was probably 
one of the best things that happened to the technologists of the British Atomic Energy 
Project as it made us work and think for ourselves along independent lines’.56  
 
At the end of World War II, while the general public became aware of the destructive 
use of nuclear power with the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 
1945, they were however, largely ignorant of its potential application for peaceful 
purposes. Shortly after the War, articles were written promoting the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy for power stations, industry and for medical research but mainly these 
would have been read by academics and engineers with a particular interest in the 
subject matter.57 As a means of introducing the subject to the public, the BBC broadcast 
a number of interviews with people ranging in disciplines from Professor Mark 
Oliphant and Bertrand Russell to Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, a book was later 
published which contained these, and additional thoughts, on the challenges of nuclear 
energy.58 Lectures were also given; Sir John Cockcroft spoke of: ‘The application of 
nuclear energy to mobile power units […] Ship propulsion would seem to offer a more 
favourable field’.59 In Atomic Challenge, Professor P. M. S. Blackett also postulated the 
use of nuclear energy: ‘…for very large ships, such as our great liners’.60 Indeed, in 
1947 the BBC broadcast a dedicated talk on the subject of: ‘The Propulsion of Ships by 
Atomic Energy’, on their Third Programme.61 With all this information entering the 
public sphere there is little doubt that Royal Navy officers and Admiralty scientific staff 
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were also aware of the potential for nuclear propulsion, indeed some had their own 
ideas. 
 
VI. Discussions on the Development of the Nuclear “Engine” 
In spring 1948, the future application of nuclear power to warship propulsion was 
discussed after a paper was read by a member of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors 
(RCNC), R. J. Daniel, at a meeting of the Institution of Naval Architects in London. 
Daniel had served with the Royal Navy in the Pacific and had the opportunity to inspect 
the damage inflicted on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Daniel was also present as a British 
observer at the US atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll where they had been used against a 
fleet at anchor in order to assess battle damage.62 Daniel’s lecture was in three parts, in 
the first section it discussed ship defence against atomic weapons and the third section 
dealt with the use of a warship armed with nuclear weapons. The middle section of the 
lecture, however, dealt with the problems of harnessing atomic energy for ship 
propulsion. Daniel proposed how such a reactor may be constructed and discussed the 
shielding, metallurgical and other engineering problems that would have to be 
overcome. Daniel highlighted the advantages to be gained once the difficulties had been 
resolved. With reference to submarine propulsion Daniel advised that: ‘The atomic 
reactor is well suited to submarine propulsion, developing full power under all 
conditions, and quite independent of whether the submarine is on the surface or not’.63 
Daniel envisaged that due to the high cost of uranium and the requirement to gain 
operating experience it would be several years before nuclear power could be applied to 
Royal Navy vessels but when the time came it should be: ‘…devoted to submarine 
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propulsion, for it is in this field that the true worth of this power, its independence of 
external fuels, is of the greatest value’.64 
 
Apart from civilian members of the Institution taking part in the discussions, there were 
also members of the Royal Navy and the RCNC. It is clear from the discussions that not 
all members shared Daniel’s optimism for nuclear propulsion. D. B. Kimber RCNC 
argued that until the associated problems of radioactivity had been solved then: ‘…the 
possibilities of using this source of power for warship propulsion appear extremely 
remote’.65 Vice Admiral Sir John Kingcombe, who between 1945 until his retirement in 
1947, was the Royal Navy’s Engineer-in-Chief, was a strong proponent of HTP and is 
quoted in Waller’s article as advising that: ‘…the whole future submarine policy 
depends on the successful development of these engines; this is a matter of outstanding 
importance and urgency’.66 In the discussions however, Kingcombe called the proposal 
“Wellsian fiction” and drew the analogy of the promise of unlimited endurance to the 
amount of potatoes HMS Nelson, a World War II battleship, could store. After giving 
numerous reasons why he thought the proposal implausible, Kingcombe dismisses the 
idea: ‘I suggest that the use of nuclear power in the high-speed submerged submarine 
will also be impossible’.67 This does seem peculiar because, in November 1946, the 
Deputy Controller, John Carroll, and Kingcombe, had stated their intention of 
seconding as many RNSS personnel as could be spared and two engineer officers to 
Harwell to form a trained nucleus of a team to take up the development of atomic 
energy for marine purposes as soon as was practicable.68 If Kingcombe, as Engineer-in-
Chief, held the view that nuclear propulsion was “Wellsian fiction”, it may in part 
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explain what appears to have been a half-hearted start to the Royal Navy’s nuclear 
programme. 
 
Despite Kingcombe’s dismissiveness of nuclear propulsion, there were members who 
spoke in support of Daniel’s ideas, although they envisaged the possibility as being 
anywhere up to fifteen years into the future. Professor A. J. Sims RCNC, noted that 
many decisions will have to be made before embarking on a project to build a nuclear 
power propulsion plant but that: ‘The submarine designer, too, has opened up to him at 
long last the possibility of achieving the true submarine’.69 Rowland Baker RCNC, who 
would eventually become the Technical Chief Executive (TCE), head of the successful 
Dreadnought Project Team at Bath, noted in his written contribution to the discussion: 
‘…that the atomic propelling unit is not in being and cannot be used, at least not for the 
next few years’.70 In addressing some of the issues raised, particularly in reference to 
the time scale involved in building a functioning nuclear propulsion unit, Daniel argued 
that: ‘Surely now is the time that we should begin at least thinking about its application, 
if not actively planning it’.71 It is quite understandable that many of the members 
present at the reading of Daniel’s paper may not have been aware of what research and 
development the Admiralty was undertaking into nuclear propulsion. The following 
year, the Naval Section at Harwell had investigated the possible use of a helium-cooled 
reactor and although this did not come to fruition: ‘…the study provided some useful 
information about gas cooling for the civil power programme’.72 
 
In the years following World War II, it was mainly Royal Navy interest, not political 
concern that provided the impetus to improve conventional submarine propulsion. The 
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Admiralty learnt lessons not only from the technological advances of the German Type 
XXI and XVIIB U-boats, but also in their employment. Twice in the early Twentieth-
Century, Britain had nearly lost a war against Germany, her submarine forces inflicting 
such heavy losses on the British merchant fleet that the country was nearly starved into 
submission. Although no debates on the subject of nuclear propulsion appeared in 
Parliament for some time, the subject of submarines was debated, especially when 
discussing the Navy Estimates. During the late 1940s most of the debates in both 
Houses of Parliament, concerned snorting and HTP submarines. Although there was no 
political impetus to improve the Royal Navy’s submarine fleet the Prime Minister was 
briefed on research and development being conducted by the Armed Forces and may 
have been aware of the Royal Navy’s drive towards high speed submarines and the 
potential use of nuclear power.73 Indeed, the first record of the Prime Minister being 
informed of the Admiralty’s intention to pursue development of nuclear propulsion was 
not until after 6 April 1950 when the Admiralty Board had discussed a memorandum, 
“Nuclear Fuel Submarines”, the First Lord, Viscount Hall, subsequently informed 
Clement Attlee of this development.74 It was around this time that the US was about to 
disclose their intention to build a nuclear-powered submarine and Hall was aware of the 
possibility of questions being asked in the Lords during an upcoming debate on naval 
affairs. Hall went to see Attlee to request that he could make a statement to the effect 
that the Admiralty was working on all new types of submarines.75 Attlee sanctioned 
Hall to make his statement in which he highlighted the problem of submerged high 
speed and endurance and advised that: ‘…priority has been given to research and 
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development in this particular problem’.76 From the files researched however, there 
appears to be no further correspondence involving a Prime Minister until Macmillan’s 
request to the First Lord, the Earl of Selkirk, for information on how the nuclear 
submarine project began 7 August 1957. 
 
For those interested enough to discover what was happening in the development of 
submarine propulsion, tucked away in a Command Paper on the Navy Estimates for 
1950-51 it was noted that: ‘A programme of investigation into the development of 
nuclear propulsion is in hand’.77 This would appear to be the first official public 
statement that development of nuclear propulsion was being undertaken by the 
Admiralty. By the early 1950s the subject of nuclear propulsion was seen to emerge and 
during a debate in the Lords on the Navy Estimates, Viscount Hall made reference to 
the fact that: ‘…all possible means of submarine propulsion were under investigation, 
including systems using nuclear energy and oxygen bearing fuels’.78 It is to the issue of 
developing a viable nuclear propulsion plant that the next chapter is directed.  
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Chapter 2: The Nuclear Option 
 
The submarine had nearly defeated Britain in both World Wars; however, the German 
submarine threat had effectively been resolved in 1943 using radar and attacking the 
submarine on the surface, or just below, at periscope depth. With the submarine threat 
foremost in the minds of naval planners at the start of what became the Cold War, the 
possibility of the nuclear-powered submarine presented a new challenge to naval 
thinking. Even with a snort mast fitted, the submarine was vulnerable running her 
diesels just below the surface; during the day the exhaust and plume from the mast 
would be visible and improvements in radar technology meant that even an object the 
size of the snort head was detectable. The nuclear-powered submarine had no 
requirement to surface so new means had to be found to combat it. The Admiralty 
issued a policy paper in 1947 which determined that the Royal Navy Submarine 
Service’s main priority was to intercept and destroy enemy submarines.1 The 
conventional submarine was limited by its speed and endurance; unless lying in wait 
with a good firing position the “submersible” would struggle against the “true” 
submarine. This was made evident during Exercise Rum Tub in October 1957, HM 
Ships Brocklesby and Undaunted, together with the submarine HMS Auriga, were pitted 
against the USS Nautilus in which she beat them convincingly.2 The rationale in the late 
1940s was that a Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarine would be used to train anti-
submarine forces against fast speed Soviet submarines and future nuclear-powered 
submarines. It would also give the Royal Navy the capability to get the submarine to its 
patrol area in the Arctic quicker and thus, spend more time on station to hunt its prey. 
HMS Ambush had been the first Royal Navy submarine to conduct a pro-longed patrol 
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in the Arctic using her snort system.3 There was concern the Soviets would capitalise on 
the Type XXI U-boat improvements and build them in large numbers. Also of growing 
concern was the possibility that the Soviets would develop their own nuclear-powered 
submarines. If the Royal Navy was to fight and win the next submarine war, research 
and development into nuclear propulsion was essential. 
 
As noted previously, Part II of the MAUD Committee report related to the controlled 
release of nuclear fission in what they referred to as a “uranium boiler”. The committee 
advised that such a “boiler” could be used to produce power. ‘It promises to have 
considerable possibilities for peace time development, but we do not think that it will be 
of great value in this war’.4 Importantly, under the section of “Industrial and other 
possibilities”, the authors noted that using natural uranium with a greater proportion of 
the isotope 235U would give a chain reaction in ordinary water.5 The main outcome of 
the MAUD Committee report was the establishment of the Tube Alloys (TA) 
Directorate within the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), to co-
ordinate work such as isotope separation that was required to develop an atomic bomb. 
In the summer of 1942, the project moved to Chalk River in Canada and in a short space 
of time became part of the US led Manhattan Project.6 From 1946, Admiralty scientists 
and Royal Naval engineers were appointed to the AERE at Harwell to form the nucleus 
of a team known as the Naval Section. Their brief was to follow the work of the AERE 
and to extrapolate information that might be of benefit to marine applications from 
investigations and experience based on existing reactors. However, prior to 1946 a 
number of Admiralty scientists were already at work on nuclear matters. 
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I. Acquiring an Experienced Team 
Admiralty scientists became involved with atomic energy research in the early 1940s, 
with scientists being removed from Admiralty work and seconded to the top-secret 
Tube Alloys Project at Chalk River. Professor Mark Oliphant, a member of the MAUD 
Committee who led the RADAR team working for the Admiralty at the University of 
Birmingham was one of the first to be seconded in early 1943 along with members of 
his team.7 It is apparent from the correspondence between the Director of Scientific 
Research at the Admiralty, C. S. Wright, and the Director of the DSIR, Sir Edward 
Appleton that in late 1943 Wright was opposed to releasing further staff from Admiralty 
research for the Tube Alloys Project. Oliphant was pressing for the release of Sayers 
and Massey; Lord Cherwell, the Paymaster General, and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Sir John Anderson, had to intervene.8 A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, wrote to the Chancellor stating it was unreasonable to expect the Admiralty 
to release these men from their work.9 It is apparent from correspondence that the men 
were released, in a reply to Alexander’s letter the Chancellor wrote that when these 
transfers were agreed by the Admiralty: ‘…it was made clear by us that the transfer of 
Sayers would be needed at some future date’.10 At a meeting in February 1944, the 
Chancellor discussed a request for the release of further members of scientific and 
technical staffs, for work on the Tube Alloys Project. Alexander indicated that they had 
already released a number of experts to work on the Tube Alloys Project, including Dr. 
Massey from the Mine Design Section. Massey’s proposed replacement, Dr. Allibone, 
and two members of Massey’s team, Mr. Bates and a Mr. Gunn were also being 
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requested for TA work.11 In June 1944, it was agreed that Professor Jack Diamond of 
the RNSS would be seconded to Chalk River; two other Admiralty personnel were also 
made available. Two years later, in a general enquiry of Admiralty interest in atomic 
energy, Vice Admiral McGrigor, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, was informed that a Mr. 
Grout and Mr. Pinniston had also been seconded to nuclear work.12 
 
In June 1944, the Chancellor received a note with reference to a future meeting 
concerning the implications of the Tube Alloys Project for the naval construction 
programme. The Chancellor was informed that it would not be possible to discuss the 
implications of TA work on the Navy’s future construction programme without 
revealing the present state of the work and: ‘…also the extent to which our complete 
freedom of action in the matter is limited both by general political considerations and by 
the terms of the Quebec Agreement’.13 A fortnight later, the Director of Tube Alloys 
Project, Wallace A. Ackers, wrote to the Chancellor advising that the Tube Alloys 
Project was of special interest to the Admiralty because of the: ‘…possibility that 
nuclear energy might be used for ship propulsion. This would affect radically the design 
of naval vessels, especially Battleships, Aircraft carriers and Submarines’.14 In the same 
letter Ackers advised that the Admiralty was now engaged in research and development 
for the future construction programme and therefore wanted to take account of any 
possible revolutionary developments in ship propulsion evolving from TA work. This 
appears to be the first British document to mention nuclear propulsion and its 
application to submarines; however, although the Admiralty suggest engaging in work 
to meet naval requirements at establishments under their control: ‘…for reasons of 
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Policy, it is not possible, at this time, to undertake work specially directed towards the 
development of a plant for the production of nuclear power’.15 Obviously, at the time 
the Royal Navy was heavily engaged in establishing the Normandy beach-head in 
France as well as conducting operations in other theatres. In January 1945, Ackers 
wrote to Major Sumner at the Directorate of Atomic Energy in the Ministry of Supply 
concerning the employment of Admiralty engineers at the Directorate. The Admiralty 
assumed that their staff were to be seconded, whilst the Directorate considered that they 
should be transferred. Ackers requested that: ‘In view of the arrangement approved by 
Sir John Anderson in 1944, I would ask you to agree to the secondment plan’.16 This 
was an obvious attempt by the Ministry of Supply to poach from the Admiralty highly 
qualified personnel whose skills were in great demand. The Admiralty was keen to keep 
their own personnel because as Ackers noted in the same letter, if the development of 
atomic energy progressed well the Admiralty would establish their own team to 
investigate its naval applications and would want their original staff back to lead that 
research. 
 
The Government decision to create the Atomic Energy Research Establishment was 
taken in October 1945 and to base it at a soon to be redundant RAF airfield at Harwell. 
One of the reasons the site was chosen was for its proximity to the University of 
Oxford, thus allowing for an interchange of ideas amongst scientists.17 The 
Establishment’s remit was four-fold; first, the provision of scientific and technical 
information for producing fissile materials. Second, investigation into the application of 
atomic energy for heat and power; thirdly, the production of radioactive materials and 
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separated isotopes for scientific, medical and industrial research and finally, the 
provision of facilities for research into atomic energy generally.18 The second of these 
activities would be the Admiralty’s focus of attention. Crucially, any Admiralty 
interests would be subsidiary to the AERE research and would only be considered if 
they were of benefit to Harwell’s own research as was noted in a draft paper on 
submarine propulsion, discussed at a meeting 13 August 1951. In paragraph 2.2(c) the 
author noted that the choice of reactor: ‘…gave promise of yielding information 
additional to that required for purely naval purposes and therefore could be considered 
on grounds other than the naval application.’, and in paragraph 3.5 noted that: ‘A water 
reactor would be solely of interest to the Admiralty’.19 It is of interest to note that 
although the Select Committee Report, (132), advised that a research establishment was 
to be created there was no Parliamentary debate on its creation. Indeed, as Gowing 
noted: ‘During the whole period of the Labour Government there was not a single 
House of Commons debate devoted to atomic energy’.20 Initially, therefore, there was 
no Parliamentary scrutiny of the Admiralty’s nuclear propulsion programme. 
 
It has been noted of Harwell that: ‘Although it always employed a mix of engineers and 
scientists, it was in spirit a scientific rather than an engineering establishment, with a 
strong science base, and with scientists in almost all the key positions’.21 This is 
precisely what Rickover had succeeded in avoiding with his management of the US 
Naval Reactor Programme, as Vice Admiral Sir Robert Hill wrote: ‘Right from the start 
of the naval programme Rickover preached that the aims would be achieved by good 
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engineering rather than by more science…’22 With a larger budget and greater resources 
Rickover was able to exploit his engineering and managerial skills to great effect. The 
Admiralty, however, would have to proceed at a more restrained pace and take 
advantage of Harwell’s scientific advice; moreover, their concepts for submarine 
propulsion would have to fit in with the AERE’s civil research programme. 
 
On 18 February 1946 the Controller of the Navy, Rear Admiral Charles Daniel, 
submitted a paper to the Sea Lords, “Consideration of Future Naval Development”. 
Under the section on research and development Daniel wrote:  
‘24. All this research and development covers a vast field, and many years may 
pass before the new navy will emerge. But I believe that it will emerge, and the 
change from the present to the future, will be as great as the change from sail to 
steam. For not only have we to consider atomic attack and defence, but also 
atomic ship propulsion…’23 
 
This was the first official reference to nuclear propulsion for warships. As noted earlier, 
in November 1946, the Deputy Controller, Dr. Carroll, and the Engineer-in-Chief (E-in-
C), Vice Admiral Kingcombe had expressed their intention to appoint as many RNSS 
personnel as could be spared, along with two engineers. However, according to the 
Royal Navy’s unreleased record of their nuclear propulsion programme, it was not until 
early 1948 that two engineers were appointed, and it was recorded that no further RNSS 
personnel could be spared. Eventually, one of the engineers had to be withdrawn 
because of staff shortages in the E-in-C’s department.24 This could be construed as 
evidence of Kingcombe’s lack of belief and possible commitment to the nuclear 
propulsion project. However, evidence from files released by the UKAEA show a 
steady intake of Royal Navy and Admiralty staff during the period 1946 to 1948. In 
January 1946, Diamond became the first Admiralty scientist to be seconded to Harwell 
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and brought with him a lot of knowledge and experience. Sir John Cockcroft took up his 
appointment as Director of Harwell at the same time; during their time on the Tube 
Alloys Project they had worked on the joint British/Canadian reactor plant at Chalk 
River, Canada, where they helped design a moderate sized reactor consisting of 
aluminium canned uranium rods suspended in heavy water surrounded by a graphite 
moderator, (the prototype for the Canadian NRX pile).25 Diamond was head of the 
Naval Section at Harwell until March 1953 when he left to take up the post of Chair of 
Mechanical Engineering at Manchester University.26 
 
In a Minute to Cockcroft, Diamond advised that the E-in-C was now willing to appoint 
both naval engineering officers and civilian engineers to Harwell. ‘The total Admiralty 
complement mentioned is between 20 and 30, including Engineer Chemists, 
Metallurgists and Physicists’.27 Carroll confirmed to Cockcroft the intention to second 
as many RNSS staff as rapidly as possible, E-in-C will send one engineer officer now 
and reinforce with a second next year, the intention being that they serve two years and 
their posts will continue to overlap. Carroll stated the objective was to build an 
adequately trained team: ‘…to take up development of atomic energy for naval marine 
propulsion as soon as this is practicable’.28 In May 1947, Diamond noted Lieutenant (E) 
K. B. Clarke was appointed with responsibly for liaising between the Pile Operating 
Group and the rest of the AERE concerning matters of the experimental facilities in the 
pile.29 Also appointed to Harwell in 1947 was Surgeon Commander Wedd who was 
conducting research into problems associated with the protection of personnel from 
radiation. Wedd left in 1948, to set up a school to instruct naval personnel on the 
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implications of atomic energy with reference to naval problems.30 It can be seen from 
this correspondence that there was a definite commitment from the Royal Navy and 
Admiralty to build a dedicated team at Harwell. What is also evident from the 
documentation are the recruiting problems faced by the Admiralty due to the general 
shortage of trained scientists, technicians and engineers. The First Lord, Viscount Hall, 
noted in his statement on Navy Estimates, March 1947, that progress in building up the 
numbers of RNSS personnel would, by necessity, come second to the claims of the 
universities, schools and industry for trained scientific personnel.31 The shortage of 
trained scientists and technicians was also cited in the Navy Estimates the following 
February by Viscount Hall as a limitation to the progress that could be made although 
Hall did mention that the maximum effort, and highest priority, were being devoted 
from the resources that are available.32 
 
II. Harwell and the Admiralty 
To keep abreast of developments at Harwell, an informal committee known as the “Tea 
Party” was established by the Admiralty in early 1947, and was formed of members 
from a number of Admiralty departments.33 It is interesting to note the use of the term 
“informal” in the unreleased narrative file, and again it could imply that nuclear 
propulsion was not a high priority within the Admiralty at that time. In March 1948 
however, the Admiralty gave the committee a more formal title, the Atomic Propulsion 
Working Party (APWP). The Tea Party visited Harwell 12 May 1947, an informal 
meeting was held between the Party and members of the AERE staff, the visit also 
included a tour of the Harwell Pile.34 One of the actions from the meeting was for work 
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being carried out by the E-in-C department on steam generation associated with atomic 
piles to be put on an official basis by means of a request for this work by the Ministry of 
Supply to the Admiralty. After the Tea Party visit, Captain J. G. C. Given, head of 
research and development in the E-in-C’s department, wrote to Diamond enclosing a 
draft letter suggesting the form that the official letter should take.35 Another action, for 
Dr. E. G. Hill and Diamond, was to produce a draft assessment within three months on 
the present position of nuclear propulsion for circulation to the Tea Party for comment. 
In August, Diamond submitted a paper in which he noted that the weight of shielding 
for naval use is an important question which, as in other aspects of nuclear energy, 
reliable information must await experience gained: ‘…much has yet to be learned about 
shielding and present designs are probably conservative’.36 
 
One further detail of the Tea Party visit to Harwell to address was a joint meeting held 
with the Power Steering Committee (PSC) who agreed: ‘That the fullest possible 
interchange of information on research and development should take place between 
Admiralty and A.E.R.E’.37 It is important to note, that the Chairman of the PSC was 
Klaus Fuchs who was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union in 1950. Fuchs was a 
German communist sympathiser who fled the Nazis in 1933 and continued his 
education at Edinburgh University. He was recruited to work on the Tube Alloys 
Project in 1941 and eventually posted to Los Alamos in New Mexico returning to the 
UK in 1946. After Germany invaded Russia in 1941, Fuchs contacted an old communist 
colleague who put him in touch with a Soviet embassy official.38 Fuchs began passing 
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information from then on, inevitably, information concerning the early part of the 
Admiralty’s nuclear propulsion programme would have been passed to his Soviet 
handlers thereby giving Soviet scientists an insight into Admiralty thinking, and their 
progress and manner of solving the various technical problems of reactor design. It has 
been postulated that Fuchs’ arrest led to the collapse of the 1949 negotiations between 
Britain and America which aimed at improving nuclear collaboration.39 
 
To enable the AERE to formulate their future research and development programme 
Cockcroft asked Carroll for the Admiralty’s views so they could be considered. Carroll 
replied that nothing had occurred to alter naval interest and the Admiralty’s view was 
that it was crucial to proceed with development so they may know what is achievable 
and what the advantages and disadvantages might be.40 Carroll noted that based on the 
possibilities and the limited knowledge advised in the earlier paper by Diamond, the 
Admiralty would not express any views on the design of the pile itself but development 
was certainly worthwhile. It has been noted there was a national shortage of scientific 
staff and Carroll could not allocate any more scientific staff to the project. Noting this 
may affect progress Carroll advised that he would see if it was possible to release a 
physicist to work with the AERE investigating the reduction of shield weights as it 
would improve progress with the research.41 However, six months later it would appear 
that the Admiralty was still rather non-committal. Diamond wrote to Cockcroft asking 
why Carroll’s letter of Admiralty interest was not now sufficient support. Diamond 
noted that when written, it was a helpful guide, but time was approaching when the 
Ministry of Supply would need to commit finances and effort on a large scale whilst 
doubts remained surrounding the practicality of nuclear propulsion which: ‘…can be 
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resolved only by an expression of Admiralty opinion based on real study of the whole 
problem’.42 
 
Diamond suggested that Cockcroft approach Carroll and arrange for the Admiralty to 
conduct the study with the assistance of the AERE. In October, Cockcroft wrote 
requesting a meeting with Admiralty representatives to discuss Harwell’s reactor 
programme.43 The meeting was held at Harwell, 19 November 1949, and discussion 
centred on whether the advantage of nuclear power to submarine propulsion would be 
worth the research and development effort. Cockcroft advised that the cost of the first 
reactor was about £2,000,000 and the fuel was: ‘unlikely to be less than £600,000’.44 In 
comparison, £2,500,000 would purchase one of the Navy’s new Daring class 
destroyers, launched between 1949 and 1952.45 Cockcroft did note that the fuel would 
still have value once discharged from the reactor as only ten percent of the fuel will 
have been burnt, and the cartridges could be returned to the Ministry of Supply for a 
considerable sum. Dr. J. V. Dunworth, head of Harwell’s Nuclear Physics Division, 
emphasised the need for clear guidance from the Admiralty so time was not lost in 
asking questions once the project started. The Admiralty noted there was a greater 
advantage to be had in a nuclear propelled submarine than a surface ship and a tonnage 
of between 2500 and 3000 tons was mentioned; accordingly, it was proposed that the 
first prototype should be built with that application in mind.46 During discussions on 
endurance the Admiralty said that 100 days at full-power equated to two years’ wartime 
service and: ‘…in view of the expenditure involved the submarine should have a 
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working life of, say, 700 days’.47 The Admiralty’s requirement for its first nuclear-
powered submarine to operate for 700 days would give the AERE staff immediate 
problems concerning the moderator.48 The proposed reactor would have graphite as the 
moderator and would be gas-cooled. Although graphite would outlast one or two 
charges of uranium, its reliability to withstand those operating conditions for 700 days 
was unknown. Harwell staff advised that an alternative moderator, beryllia, was 
considered capable of doing so but would add at least £1,000,000 to the cost of the 
reactor.49 This avenue of research was to be a cul-de-sac development for the Royal 
Navy which resulted from the water-cooled reactor piles at Hanford in Washington 
State, which had been built to produce plutonium for the Manhattan Project. Analysis 
had shown these piles to be inherently less safe than similar gas-cooled reactors and on 
this basis given the size of the UK it was decided to focus British development on gas-
cooled reactors.50  
 
The Admiralty advised they were studying the problems of propulsion for high speed 
submarines but so far, every system proposed was very expensive. The Admiralty had 
quoted that using HTP at £5000 per hour would cost £12,000,000 if run continuously 
for 100 days as was being proposed for a nuclear propelled submarine.51 This is a rather 
skewed comparison as a HTP propelled submarine could only maintain a high speed for 
a few hours at best due to the amount of fuel that could be carried. A better comparison 
would be the FBD submarine: ‘Battery costs per patrol £20,000 (batteries require 
replacing after six patrols at a cost of £120,000). HTP costs per patrol are advised at 
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£15,000’.52 In a paper released by the Admiralty Chemical Advisory Panel it advised 
the cost of fissile material compared with other fuels. The author, E. J. Macnair, noted 
the cost of fissile material is less important in a submarine since alternative fuels are 
equally expensive or more so. ‘The estimated consumption of 235U or plutonium (at 
£250/gram) in a 20,000 KW pile is 1g./hr. The corresponding cost of HTP and fuel 
would be about £900/hr’.53 Macnair noted the advantages of nuclear propulsion but 
raised doubts that a pile small enough to operate in a submarine could be achieved much 
before 1958, adding that research into HTP should continue. It can be surmised from 
these figures that the high-speed submarine would be expensive no matter what fuel 
propelled it and led the Admiralty to change the emphasis from speed to endurance, as 
such new staff requirements were issued in January 1953. This requirement advised that 
if there was no operational reason for high speed, a thermal reactor might be used. Apart 
from using less fissile material than an intermediate reactor, it had the advantage of 
having had more work done on it and therefore, far more was known about this type of 
reactor and could reduce research costs.54 
 
Discussions continued with the problem of shielding. Harwell staff advised that for the 
proposed reactor, the shielding would weigh around 700 tons although this could be 
reduced by 200 tons if the reactor was situated in the bow or stern. The Admiralty 
doubted these proposals citing the shafting and steering arrangements aft and the 
torpedo tubes forward. It was agreed that because shielding was of great importance and 
both sides could co-operate now, Harwell would prepare a report on the problem. The 
Admiralty also stated that if more collaboration were possible: ‘…the present high 
                                                     
52 TNA, ADM 1/23729, Requirements for an HTP operational submarine, 1952-53, paragraph 10. 
53 TNA, ADM 247/79, Note on the possibilities of applying atomic energy to submarine propulsion, 1947, 
Paper, Group II Fuels and Propellants, October 1947, paragraph 9. 






security grading within Admiralty would have to be reduced’.55 No objection was 
raised, and Carroll was left to organise the appropriate action within the Admiralty. The 
meeting ended with Harwell advising the Admiralty that the company, Metropolitan-
Vickers, had agreed to undertake construction of the reactor if requested, the Admiralty 
agreed that the firm was suitable. The Naval Section at Harwell had devoted a lot of 
their attention to the problems of shielding; the calculations for shielding on ship borne 
reactors used data from Hanford in Washington State.56 This use of data from the US 
illustrates the fact that nuclear information was available to the design engineers at 
Harwell through published journals and articles. By August, Price had produced a paper 
on shielding requirements noting that: ‘…there is little – apart from the use of the most 
efficient materials – that can be done to reduce shielding weights appreciably’.57 In an 
undated memorandum, Diamond advised that the AERE will shortly start work on 
shielding experiments for the Admiralty. Diamond noted that this would involve heavy 
engineering construction and machining and if left to Ministry of Supply resources 
delays will occur. Diamond advised that to expedite the shielding work: ‘…it will be in 
the Admiralty’s interest to provide the workshop and possibly some final design office 
effort’.58 Shielding studies continued with development of the reactor and further papers 
were raised to reflect new thinking and improved calculations.59 
 
III. Initial Considerations 
By November 1949, it was already known that a natural uranium powered reactor 
would be too large for the Royal Navy; therefore, Cockcroft formed the Enriched 
Reactor Group to consider using slightly enriched 2:1 uranium in a gas-cooled, 
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graphite-moderated reactor for power production.60 The initial reactors built at Harwell 
and Risley were primarily to produce radio-isotopes for research and medical 
purposes.61 A minute on the proposed enriched uranium plant noted that: ‘Present 
reactors use natural uranium as fuel and have not been designed so that use can be made 
of the heat generated in the fission process. […] They are also much too heavy for naval 
use’.62 Royal Naval requirements at Harwell were only investigated if they were to be of 
benefit to Harwell’s primary task which was aimed at gaining information on all types 
of reactor, noting that land power generation must compete economically with other 
forms of power generation. The paper advised that naval requirements demand fuel with 
a higher concentration of the isotope 235U but also noted that the same economic caveats 
do not apply in this case which: ‘…gives the prospect of naval power being applicable 
first’.63 With the formation of the Group, Harwell thought that development of the 
submarine reactor was a means of obtaining early operating experience with a power 
reactor. 
 
Dunworth was appointed leader of the Group and Diamond deputy leader, the Group 
was responsible for initiating and developing the design work.64 In December, the 
APWP issued a report of their findings which summarised that a reasonable target for 
development was to achieve endurance on one charge of fuel, of 100 days at 25 knots in 
a vessel of 20,000SHP and about 2500 tons.65 The report noted the precise size of the 
submarine could not be predicted without building and operating a shore prototype in 
which the size and weight of the reactor and shielding would be known. However, the 
report was quite prescient advising: ‘The first reactor designed conservatively on 
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knowledge available prior to its running may be too large for a vessel of less than some 
3500 tons’.66 The report envisaged that, barring unforeseen difficulties, the first 
submarine might be ready for sea trials in seven to eight years’ time. The £2,000,000 
figure advised by Cockcroft at the November meeting was recommended as the cost of 
reactor development, including a suitable heat exchanger. The report dwelt on whether 
enough enriched uranium would be available to meet the Admiralty’s requirements. The 
AERE stated that it would be able to provide what was proposed for one submarine and 
starting in 1953 the fuel will be produced in larger quantities than Ministry of Supply 
requirements. It was noted however, that the extent of supply to meet Admiralty 
requirements depended upon such factors as the rate of consumption in trials and tests 
and the production and stockpiling of atomic bombs. 
 
Viscount Portal, Controller of Nuclear Energy, assured the Admiralty that sufficient low 
enrichment fuel would be available for one submarine to be at sea by 1959 and twelve 
by 1968.67 With these assurances the Admiralty had to set out what design and 
development effort was required to support the project noting this would require a joint 
effort of the relevant Admiralty departments and staff at the AERE. Portal had been 
Chief of the Air Staff from October 1940 until December 1945 and it may be argued 
that, as a former leader of the Royal Air force, he may have a bias towards meeting their 
requirements and ignoring naval needs for enriched uranium. However, from the 
material researched there appears to be no evident partiality in favour of RAF demands, 
it was a simple case of not enough enriched uranium being produced and government 
priorities. Portal had reluctantly taken the job when offered by Attlee, but with the 
attributes he displayed during his wartime career, he effectively managed not only the 
demands of the Chiefs of Staff, but also the work being conducted under the three giants 
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of UK atomic research, John Cockcroft at Harwell, Christopher Hinton at Risley and 
William Penney at Aldermaston. 
 
The APWP report considered the uncertainty surrounding materials, noting that 
deterioration of the moderator, failure of the fuel sheathing or self-poisoning may also 
limit the endurance of the reactor. All parts of the reactor system design and engineering 
proposals would require careful investigation and before an appraisal could be made to 
determine the suitability of materials to be used. The report noted that to be successful, 
the design of the reactor, the associated propulsion machinery and the submarine hull 
must proceed together. Given the very early stage of design and development the 
Admiralty appeared to be cautious in committing itself totally to the proposed reactor 
design noting that during the design and development process other types of reactor 
may evolve that might be preferable to the proposed type to be developed by Harwell. 
Following circulation of the report, Carroll wrote to Cockcroft enclosing a proposed 
statement to forward to the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC). Carroll 
advised that the statement consisted of the salient points of the scientific and technical 
elements of the report, advocating the importance of: ‘…successful development of 
such vessels and a firm statement of Admiralty policy’.68 The statement closed with the 
recommendation that every effort be made to produce a nuclear submarine. Four days 
later the Controller, Admiral Sir Michael Denny, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, 
Rear Admiral Sir Ralph Edwards, wrote to Viscount Hall, and the First Sea Lord, 
Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fraser, recommending that the Board give its support noting: 
‘This development offers the Navy a submarine of performance transcending that of any 
other type…’69 
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Towards the end of February, Cockcroft wrote to Carroll enclosing a copy of a 
commentary on the paper that had been agreed by the Atomic Energy Council. 
Cockcroft suggested, with minor changes to the paper, that the commentary be 
submitted with the paper to the Defence Research Policy Committee.70 The commentary 
can be seen as a statement of governmental atomic energy policy whose focus was on 
gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural uranium fuelled reactors. This was the AERE’s 
area of competence and it made economic, and engineering sense to concentrate their 
effort on reactor designs where there were fewer unknown problems to be tackled. It is 
with this policy in mind that the Committee recommend that: ‘…the development of a 
fast or intermediate reactor shall be given first priority in view of its importance to the 
development breeding processes for nuclear fuel’.71 The Committee, however, 
recognised that it might be possible to develop one other thermal reactor in parallel, 
provided sufficient industrial assistance was available.72 The Committee warned that 
although development of a high temperature thermal reactor fuelled with enriched 
uranium would be an important step in demonstrating the feasibility of nuclear power 
for submarine propulsion, its development would restrict the form of the development. 
The Committee advised that: ‘The development should only therefore be linked with the 
naval requirements if the Defence Research Policy Committee evaluation shows that 
there are worth-while operational advantages to be gained’.73 It can be seen from the 
commentary that Cockcroft and his staff at the AERE was willing to work on a land-
based low enrichment fuel reactor as a prototype for a submarine project so long as the 
Admiralty’s requirements suited the AERE’s design and development effort.74 Without 
doubt, the lack of availability of highly enriched uranium to support research into 
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reactors for naval propulsion, would delay the completion of the submarine propulsion 
project by a number of years. The following year the Ministry of Supply would start 
work on a High Separation Diffusion plant to increase production of highly enriched 
uranium. Only when the demand for research and development of the atomic bomb had 
been satisfied, would highly enriched uranium be made available to the Admiralty 
project. 
 
IV. The Mark I Enriched Reactor 
When Diamond met representatives of E-in-C’s department at their offices at Foxhill, 
Bath, the object was to gain their opinion on the suitability of Metropolitan-Vickers as 
the choice of contractor for the Mark I reactor. Diamond advised that the AERE was 
after a list of firms with a realistic capability of undertaking the work and advice on 
their suitability in order to assess whether another firm appeared superior enough to 
warrant an enquiry: ‘…which would possibly jeopardise the arrangements already made 
with Metropolitan-Vickers’.75 A number of firms were discussed including English 
Electric, CA Parsons, British Thompson Houston and Rolls-Royce, and their respective 
merits and disadvantages debated. Metropolitan-Vickers was listed first in order of 
preference and advised as “technically very good – administratively difficult”. Diamond 
was advised that E-in-C had never found the firm easy to deal with: ‘Technically they 
tend to go their own way and ignore advice’.76 On the merit side E-in-C advised they 
had a most competent team and were already working on HTP turbines for submarines. 
It became evident during the meeting that Metropolitan-Vickers was probably a better 
choice than the other firms discussed. It is not clear whether staff at the AERE had 
doubts about the ability of Metropolitan-Vickers to conduct the work or whether, 
through E-in-C’s advice, they merely wanted the confidence of knowing they were 
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contracting the work to the most suitable firm. What is certain is that queries were being 
made of all the prospective firms and the AERE was not willing to proceed further 
without having searched the market. The same day of the meeting, Cockcroft wrote to 
Sir John Hacking, head of the British Electricity Industry, asking for his advice on the 
relative merits of the major electrical firms.77 In April, Cockcroft received a note 
enclosing a draft paper suggesting he may like to put it to the next Council meeting. The 
paper advised the Council to reconsider their decision to discuss suitability of firms with 
representatives of the electrical engineering industry. The reasons given were that 
discussions on the proposed design study had been ongoing with Metropolitan-Vickers 
for some months and there was some concern if they found out that enquiries were 
being made of other firms they may withdraw from the project. Since the previous 
meeting steps had been taken to get advice from the Admiralty and the British 
Electricity Authority. ‘In each case, quite independently, Metropolitan-Vickers was 
recommended as the organisation best equipped to tackle the problems involved in this 
project’.78 The paper ends requesting the Council to agree to the development contract 
being placed with Metropolitan-Vickers. 
 
The AERE began holding exploratory meetings with Metropolitan-Vickers from 
autumn 1949 and further meetings were held in December and February, during which 
the AERE expanded on their ideas for their reactor programme. After a meeting with 
Metropolitan-Vickers’ chief engineers, Major J. W. Buckley wrote to Diamond to 
advise that it was not felt possible to do any further detailed design work without more 
information concerning the core dimensions and operating parameters for the helium.79 
A paper was issued in June by the AERE laying out the objectives of the Mark I reactor 
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noting among other items that it was to be a pilot for Mark II, intended for submarine 
propulsion. The Admiralty had advised the Defence Research Policy Committee that 
although they would not pay for the construction of the Mark I they were willing to pay 
a share of the design costs.80 Mark I was to decide general design and constructional 
methods for high temperature reactors; determine control characteristics and prove 
control methods for Mark II; and establish the best shielding arrangements for Mark 
II.81 The paper defined the areas of responsibility such that the AERE, in consultation 
with the Admiralty, would specify the operating conditions of the plant. The AERE was 
to be solely responsible for the physics, site selection, experimental and development 
work, specification of radiological safety measures and general reactor characteristics 
and control methods. Metropolitan-Vickers was responsible for the detailed design of 
the plant, its components and the combined layout of the whole plant together with 
estimated costs. The Admiralty’s responsibility was the design and operating conditions 
of Mark II and to give similar guidance on Mark I to the AERE and Metropolitan-
Vickers so that the maximum experience was gained with Mark I for Mark II.  
 
On 19 June, a meeting was held with Metropolitan-Vickers to discuss what was now 
referred to as the “Type ‘H’ Tank” which was to be comprised of the pressure vessel, 
moderator, cooling channel and fuel cartridges. Diamond informed the meeting that 
most of the operating conditions for the design criteria for the Main Tank had been 
settled advising that: ‘The maximum heat output is to be taken as being 40 MW for 
design purposes for all heat exchangers’.82 At the end of June, Buckley wrote to 
Diamond to expand on items discussed during the meeting. Buckley stressed the 
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importance of embodying as much of the Mark II conditions in the Mark I to prevent 
wasting design effort and incurring possible delays further into the programme.83 The 
project was starting to gather pace, at a meeting in July it was reported that E-in-C 
considered it important the machinery for Mark II be shore tested with Mark I to prove 
the control arrangements and its performance. This was agreed, one shaft set of Mark II 
machinery would be produced by the middle of 1955: ‘…and tested in conjunction with 
the Mark I reactor’.84 By the summer it was felt enough had been achieved for a draft 
contract specification to be raised.85 The Ministry of Supply also thought that sufficient 
progress had been made for a press statement to be released notifying the public of the 
placing of a contract with Metropolitan-Vickers noting that the Admiralty was also 
associated with the project.86 Indeed, the AERE invited the press to Harwell on 22 June 
to view a mock-up of the general machinery layout for a nuclear propulsion unit and to 
hear of the work progressing at Harwell.87 During the summer, more meetings were 
held and correspondence exchanged between the AERE and Metropolitan-Vickers 
culminating in September with a contract for Stage 1a.88 
 
By November, however, there was concern over the lack of progress with the pressure 
vessel. Metropolitan-Vickers was invited to a meeting to discuss acceptance of a design 
study for the Mark II machinery and boiler. The meeting appears to have been 
acrimonious, in Diamond’s opinion the results were nil, Diamond also noted: ‘My 
impression is that the firm are getting anxious about their ability to understand the 
project…’ and this was the cause of their hesitancy in accepting the Admiralty 
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contract.89 This was possibly caused by the Admiralty bringing too much research work 
to Metropolitan-Vickers. The following January Dr. N. F. Goodway, head of the Extra-
Mural Research Division, AERE, asked Diamond if the Admiralty should again be told 
that: ‘…with MV’s limited staff, pushing machinery design at this stage may well delay 
the ultimate completion of the programme’.90 To expedite the pressure vessel design it 
was decided, with Metropolitan-Vickers’ agreement, to ask whether other firms would 
be interested in collaborating on the pressure vessel. A meeting was held with Babcock 
& Wilcox in January, involving the AERE and Metropolitan-Vickers, another meeting 
was held the following day with the firm GA Harvey. Discussions took place with 
Whessoe Co. Ltd. at the beginning of February to discuss designs for a pressure vessel. 
Goodway noted in a letter to H. Tongue, Harwell’s Chief Engineer, that competitive 
tender against a fixed design was not possible and each firm had been asked if they 
would produce their own design studies under contract: ‘…with a view to producing by 
mid-June 1951, a design and a quotation for manufacture and supply’.91 By mid-
February, Whessoe had already replied advising that although interested in the project a 
lack of staff and facilities meant that they were unable to commit the required 
resources.92 At the end of February, Goodway wrote to Buckley noting that 
Metropolitan-Vickers had advised the AERE they were not willing to quote for the 
manufacture of the pressure vessel. Goodway advised that the letter was formal 
permission to place sub-contracts with Babcock & Wilcox and GA Harvey to produce 
the pressure vessel design studies.93 In reply to questions from the Parliamentary 
Secretary, the Engineer-in-Chief wrote at the beginning of May that Harwell was 
finding Metropolitan-Vickers: ‘…slower than they had hoped.’, but that there was no 
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point in reviewing the target dates at this stage noting that the project was linked with 
the Mark I reactor.94 
 
Within a couple of months, the two firms selected as prospective sub-contractors for the 
pressure vessel design study had forwarded their proposals. On 30 April, a meeting was 
held with Babcock & Wilcox to discuss their proposals for the pressure vessel. It was 
proposed to manufacture an eighteen foot diameter vessel from two rings and two 
ellipsoidal end caps leaving three circumferential welds to be made on site.95 During the 
first week in June, GA Harvey’s design proposal for a spherical shaped pressure vessel 
was discussed. Metropolitan-Vickers expressed the opinion that although there was no 
real objection to the design, it was considered that Harvey: ‘…were introducing 
additional problems in respect to the bending moments incurred by the discharge tubes 
and gas pipes within the vessel’.96 The two designs were discussed a week later during 
which Tongue emphasised the need to keep to designs which were equated to the 
experience available. The AERE stressed the requirement to avoid the catastrophic loss 
of coolant by selecting material that reduced the risk of failure. It was also noted that 
Babcock & Wilcox had experienced only one failure of a class one fusion welded vessel 
and it was considered enough was known of past failures to prevent future 
occurrences.97 Apart from Carroll’s paper on nuclear fuelled submarines, dated 19 
December 1949, which mentions the use of materials affecting shielding, there are no 
further specific files or records, from those researched, to material selection until late 
1951. Although there is recognition by all parties that selection of materials will be 
important to the success of the project, there appears to have been no significant 
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metallurgical research to support the enriched reactor. Instead, there was a reliance on 
the use of existing material and technology in the hope this would produce quicker 
results. As recorded earlier, a draft paper on nuclear propulsion was discussed in August 
1951 between Diamond, Tongue and Dunworth. They refer to the Mark I reactor design 
as involving the least extrapolation of present experience which, with existing 
knowledge, could be guaranteed using enriched uranium.98 Indeed, references to, and 
discussions of, metallurgy are only readily apparent from 1955 onwards and this neglect 
surely impacted on the ultimate rejection of this design of reactor for submarine 
propulsion. 
 
By mid-June however, the Admiralty felt that sufficient progress had been made to seek 
Treasury sanction of £500,000 to proceed with the project. In reply to the Admiralty’s 
letter of 19 June, H. J. Orem of the Treasury noted that when the project was considered 
a year before by the Defence Research Policy Committee the conclusion was that the 
design study should go ahead: ‘…but before proceeding further the Committee should 
reconsider the scheme in the autumn when an estimate of the additional cost would be 
available’.99 The Admiralty’s finance department letter was the first indication that the 
Treasury had received of estimated costs and advised that the DRPC should be allowed 
to comment prior to Treasury sanction being given. The Admiralty forwarded a paper, 
D.R.P/P. (51) 50, on nuclear fuelled submarines to the Committee, which was discussed 
at their 24 June meeting. The Committee endorsed the proposal to spend up to £500,000 
and in light of the Committee’s agreement, the Admiralty wrote to the Treasury to 
sanction the spend.100 A reply was received a few days later authorising the sum to be 
spent over a four year period. Subsequently, the Admiralty placed a contract, 
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C.P.8/52601/51/M.325, with Metropolitan-Vickers. The firm was advised that the 
design investigation to confirm the feasibility of a nuclear submarine subject to the 
satisfactory performance of the Mark I reactor (Stage 1) and the development of 
components to the extent necessary to prove that the nuclear submarine was not 
unviable (Stage 2) were connected and had to proceed together.101 
 
V. Metropolitan-Vickers and the Problem of Scale 
After an initial meeting in December 1949 and a further meeting in February 1950 
between the Enriched Reactor Group and Metropolitan-Vickers, development was seen 
in two parts. Stage 1 was to build a land-based reactor of minimum size in which 
uncertainties could be examined. Stage 2 was to build a prototype submarine propulsion 
reactor. Although the immediate problem would be the design of the Mark I, the AERE 
was also tasked with forecasting design and performance characteristics for the Mark II 
so Admiralty could proceed with tactical and ship design.102 At the meeting the 
following figures were used to illustrate the dimensions envisaged for Mark I, the 
reactor prototype. Pressure shell inner diameter sixteen feet, length of the shell eighteen 
feet, internally the core was to be ten feet in diameter and the graphite cylinder outer 
diameter was to be fifteen feet. The equipment would need to be encased in a shield 
four feet thick if constructed of water and steel or eight feet thick if constructed of 
concrete.103 The Mark I reactor itself would be some 3600 to 4000 cubic feet in volume 
and in order to contextualise the extent of the problem the reactor would have to be 
reduced in size and weight in order for Mark II to fit into the Admiralty requirement of 
a submarine hull of 2500 tons displacement. To put the Admiralty’s requirement into 
perspective; the Royal Navy’s latest ‘A’ class diesel submarines built at the end of 
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World War II displaced 1120 tons surfaced and had a 23 feet, 3 inch beam; HMS 
Porpoise, the first of a new class of conventional submarines to be launched in 1956, 
displaced 1605 tons surfaced with a 26 feet, 6 inch beam.104 It can be determined from 
these figures that staff at the AERE and Metropolitan-Vickers, together with naval 
architects, constructors and the other Admiralty departments would have to work very 
hard to resolve the weight and dimensional issues that confronted them. 
 
The following month the staff from Harwell paid a visit to Fort Blockhouse at Gosport 
to learn more about the operational requirements of the submarine. Scheduled in the 
visit was a tour of the submarines HMS Ambush and HMS Aeneas whose internal 
dimensions are given as 16 feet diameter and 272 feet in length.105 These tours would 
have further demonstrated to the AERE staff the severe limitations on space in a 
submarine. At the meeting machinery pitch limitations were discussed and acceleration 
parameters suggested; attention was also given to the need to reduce noise to the 
absolute minimum. The Admiralty stressed that the submarine should be quiet at 
submerged speeds between two knots and ten knots, although the upper limit had not 
been fixed. As noted in the previous chapter, submarines of that period would not have 
met this criterion without major streamlining and noise attenuation mounting of 
machinery. One major concern with high speed that needed addressing was the 
requirement to stop the submarine quickly if the hydroplanes jammed whilst diving as 
the submarine would quickly pass its safe diving depth at speed. It was suggested that 
reactor power should be able to be cut-off in ten seconds, however, it was noted that 
further study was needed to define the reactor shut-down requirement. 106 
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In June 1950, the Admiralty submitted a paper to the DRPC in which they stated their 
support for the development of nuclear-powered submarines and advised the expected 
tactical advantages such a submarine would have over its contemporaries. The scale of 
the research and development effort including cost was also advised in the paper with a 
recommendation that: ‘…every effort should be made to produce the nuclear submarine 
as soon as possible’.107 The submarine’s displacement was advised at about 2500 tons 
yet within a few days, at an informal discussion at Foxhill, E-in-C staff had discussed 
provisionally lengthening the engine room from 55 feet to 74 feet thus increasing the 
displacement to between 4200 and 4600 tons. It was agreed that Flag Officer 
Submarines: ‘…should be warned that investigation so far indicated that the submarine 
would be larger, and the performance would fall short of that already quoted’.108 It is 
difficult to say from the files researched whether the Admiralty’s paper was deliberately 
misleading the DRPC to get official sanction of the project. What is known is that 
officers in the E-in-C’s department at that time certainly knew of the scale of the 
problem and the requirement to enlarge the submarine. Initial design investigations had 
confirmed that the first submarine, known as N.1, would be larger than originally 
envisaged and have a 25 feet diameter pressure hull, a surface displacement of 3700 
tons and a speed of 22 knots.109 Further studies allowing for factors peculiar to naval 
service such as shock, pitching and rolling etc, meant that to maintain criticality the size 
of the reactor would have to increase so substantially as to make the type of reactor 
unattractive. This submarine, N.2, would see an increase in the pressure hull to 31 feet 
and the surface displacement to 4500 tons.110 It is recorded in the unreleased narrative 
that: ‘Some work was done on a water moderated and cooled reactor and another 
submarine design, N.3, was prepared. This had a surface displacement of 2480 tons, a 
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pressure hull diameter of 22ft., and an underwater speed of 22½ knots’.111 It can be 
deduced from these figures that the reactor designers were struggling to reduce the size 
of the reactor, limited in effect by using uranium enriched to only twice its normal 
value. The Admiralty, conversely, was increasing the size of the projected submarine to 
accommodate the plant. In contrast to the eighteen feet diameter Mark I reactor: ‘The 
core diameter of the US submarine was thought by the British to be 6 feet’.112 The scale 
of the problem was the Admiralty required a reactor three times smaller than it was 
possible to make with low enriched uranium fuel. A more compact designed reactor was 
only possible using highly enriched uranium fuel and at that time in Britain, it was a 
scarce and expensive commodity. 
 
Although the Admiralty had been in the process of securing Treasury funding for the 
feasibility report, it was apparent to the AERE in July 1951 that while progress had 
been made, the reactor design would not be practicable for an operational submarine. 
Cockcroft wrote to Sir Henry Tizard, Chairman of the DRPC, to apologise for not being 
able to attend the next meeting and advised that the AERE was not yet in a position to 
present their report to the Committee but had made good progress and reached some 
provisional conclusions which would need to be discussed with the Admiralty. 
Cockcroft acknowledged that the present reactor design could only be built into a large 
submarine: ‘…and it may well be necessary to use a different design, using more highly 
enriched uranium which we now expect to be available in 1956…’113 In September 
1951, Diamond wrote a paper in which he acknowledged that the present reactor design 
would mean the submarine would have to be about 5000 tons. Diamond noted that: 
‘Should fuel of higher enrichment become available, the experience of the present study 
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points to the desirability of liquid coolants to permit component size reduction and to 
simplify the pumping problem’.114 By October, Metropolitan-Vickers had been 
requested to submit their final report, including time and costs, on the feasibility of the 
Mark I reactor. Some sub-contract work was still ongoing and there were reports by 
other departments within the AERE to expedite before the final report could be 
submitted. 
 
Although the enriched reactor initially had a strong naval slant: ‘The technical 
Committee felt that treatment of the enriched reactor simply as a pilot plant for 
submarine propulsion would restrict the form of development’.115 This opinion indicates 
how the Royal Navy’s requirements were initially “taken into account” but when 
development seemed to be restricted by their requirements Harwell changed the design 
objectives. Cockcroft instructed that the reactor should not be referred to as the naval 
reactor but the high temperature or enriched reactor. The success of the enriched reactor 
project was dependent upon active Admiralty engagement; together with the AERE they 
had contracted Metropolitan-Vickers to conduct the feasibility study. However, as 
Gowing noted, the requirement of the Mark II (submarine reactor) had largely been 
abandoned in favour of the land-based Mark I, which paradoxically, was dependent on 
the requirement for the submarine reactor.116 This was increasingly unlikely due to the 
reactor size and weight problems, with the abandonment of the Mark I enriched reactor, 
from which the Mark II submarine reactor was to evolve: ‘The entire attention of the 
A.E.R.E. was now diverted to land-based power production piles and the experience 
gained from the Mark I reactor was diverted into the design of […] Calder Hall’.117 The 
                                                     
114 TNA, AB 15/2043, An enriched uranium reactor for submarine propulsion Author(s): J. Diamond J. 
Smith, 1951. 
115 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Volume 2, p. 274. 
116 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Volume 2, p. 275. 





nuclear submarine project would be removed from a Defence Research Class I project 
status and Harwell assistance would all but be withdrawn. 
 
In February 1952, Cockcroft had a meeting with the Controller of the Navy, Admiral 
Denny. An aide memoire written for the meeting noted that: ‘…whatever reactor is 
developed for submarine propulsion, it will be of use only for submarines and would not 
be developed in the same form for any other purpose’.118 The memoire sets out three 
types of reactor suitable for development varying from: ‘...a crude, comparatively 
certain solution of low efficiency,’ (the PWR) to a more highly efficient solution with 
more uncertainties and a longer time scale.119 An attached synopsis detailed three 
options for the Admiralty to deliberate; A – a thermal water-moderated and cooled 
reactor, B – a thermal water-moderated and sodium-cooled reactor and C – an 
intermediate reactor, beryllium-moderated and sodium-cooled reactor. It is evident from 
the memoire that the longer-term solutions of B and C were closer to the AERE’s 
programme and it can be inferred from the memoire that Cockcroft would have 
emphasised B and C as the AERE’s preferred course of action. Denny wrote to 
members of the Admiralty Board, enclosing a memorandum on the subject of the 
nuclear fuelled submarine. Denny advised that the feasibility study had indicated that a 
graphite-moderated, low enriched uranium reactor would have been too large to be of 
use to the Royal Navy. Denny noted that a high pressure water-cooled reactor, as being 
developed by the United States Navy, had the disadvantage of low temperature: ‘…and 
a development programme quite different from the remainder of the Ministry of Supply 
reactor programme’.120 
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After discussions with Cockcroft and his staff, Denny noted it had been agreed to 
change the development plan of the nuclear submarine and it was proposed to 
concentrate on a liquid metal-cooled reactor of either the intermediate or thermal type. 
A memorandum, B.781, was placed before the Board of Admiralty by Denny, 
explaining that the Ship Design Policy Committee at their meeting on 24 April, 
approved the proposal of the Special Propulsion Sub-Committee: ‘…that a water 
moderated reactor, using liquid metal as a coolant and heat exchanger be developed in 
place of Mark I…’121 It is evident from this memorandum that, at that time, the 
Admiralty was still not willing to request the AERE to support research into pressurised 
water reactors citing that: ‘The need for a nuclear submarine is not so great […] to 
develop what is considered to be an interim solution to the submarine propulsion 
problem’.122 This was despite the fact that the Admiralty was aware that the US Navy 
was concentrating on the pressurised water reactor and that the Ministry of Supply had 
authorised the building of a High Separation Diffusion (HSD) plant in 1951 ensuring 
that highly enriched uranium would be available in sufficient quantity for Admiralty use 
from 1956 onwards. 
 
VI. The End of the Beginning 
Metropolitan-Vickers’ report was submitted in May 1952 and advised that: ‘As a result 
of studies carried out jointly between Admiralty and AERE, it has recently been decided 
by Admiralty that the reactor would be too large for submarine use…’123 There are six 
sections to the Metropolitan-Vickers feasibility report and it was noted that the report 
would only be of interest to the natural uranium power project. Indeed, the feasibility 
study had not all been in vain as the experience gained in the Mark I reactor was 
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employed in the design of Calder Hall, Britain’s first nuclear power station.124 In a 
memorandum to Cockcroft, Diamond noted that there was plenty of money for research 
and development, £400,000 in the E-in-C’s Department alone, but that the rate of 
development would be slow without clear commitment by the Admiralty in terms of 
manpower. The AERE felt it was necessary for the Admiralty to loan additional staff to 
Harwell to expedite the purely naval aspects of reactor development. However, after 
consultation between the Chief of the RNSS and Denny, the request for staff was 
rejected: ‘…the term of the letter indicating that the submarine project was not of 
sufficient priority for even one or two staff to be transferred’.125 Diamond further noted 
that there was considerable doubt among those who would do the work as to whether 
the effort was worthwhile, the view throughout the Ministry of Supply was that the 
Admiralty was not serious about the project. Three possible lines of action were 
outlined; abandon the project, continue with gradual development until the Admiralty 
defined their choice of reactor with cost estimates or give the project top priority. As far 
as the AERE was concerned it was for the Admiralty to decide its priorities and advise 
them accordingly. 
 
Following discussions between the Admiralty and the AERE, Tongue wrote to 
Cockcroft and advised that the Admiralty would examine the problems of using of 
sodium as a coolant and would advise if they were satisfied and prepared to accept 
liquid metal cooling. Tongue also advised that Denny was still adamant that the nuclear-
powered submarine: ‘…was of vital interest to the Admiralty’.126 A few weeks later 
Denny wrote to notify Cockcroft that arrangements had been made for development of 
the engineering side of the reactor and all that entails from it, by the Admiralty 
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Development Establishment at Barrow (ADEB) acting as main contractors. Denny 
reiterated that it should be clear in everyone’s mind that the nuclear submarine 
propulsion project: ‘…is in fact an approved project which in theory has been in hand 
now for some time’.127 Cockcroft replied to Denny and advised that the project had been 
discussed with the Atomic Energy Board and that the Chairman, Lord Cherwell, would 
like to discuss the programme with Denny; Cockcroft also advised that if the project 
was to proceed Denny should inform the DRPC and the operational case stated.128 
Despite these reassurances from the Admiralty, for the remainder of 1952 little 
correspondence appears in either the National Archive files or unreleased files in the 
offices of the Director of Nuclear Propulsion. This implies that the project was 
effectively mothballed by both parties pending a serious commitment from the 
Admiralty and an assured supply of highly enriched uranium.  
 
In February 1953, an Admiralty draft paper to the DRPC was tabled for discussion 
between the Admiralty and the AERE staff with a view to progressing the project. It 
was noted more was known about the low power thermal type of reactor than the high 
power intermediate type. The AERE staff stated that while the intermediate reactor was 
not a scaling up of the thermal reactor: ‘…if high speed was an important requirement, 
the thermal development would be a useful step in the ultimate development’.129 At this 
point it was envisaged that a high-speed submarine, 20-23 knots, would be propelled by 
an intermediate type reactor and a low speed submarine, 10-12 knots, by a thermal type 
reactor. Further discussions noted that parallel research, to the naval thermal reactor, for 
other purposes would gather data for a naval intermediate reactor. The unreleased 
narrative file notes that in 1953, the AERE design studies were concerned with two 
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thermal reactors, one water-moderated and cooled and the other liquid metal-cooled. 
‘No work was being carried out on intermediate reactors’.130 Before making a final 
decision to embark on development of the thermal reactor rather than, or as a step 
towards an intermediate reactor, the Admiralty requested the AERE to collaborate in 
forecasting the trends of cost and manpower for both courses so that the statement could 
be forwarded to the DRPC for review. The completed paper was forwarded to the 
DRPC on 25 June by John Lang, Secretary of the Admiralty, setting out the importance 
of nuclear propulsion to naval power. The paper gave a brief history of the development 
of nuclear propulsion to date, its advantages and strategic significance to the navy and 
recommended development of nuclear propulsion to be of national importance. Of the 
present position, the paper noted that there were three possible reactor types suitable for 
submarine propulsion and there were sufficient resources to investigate two. The AERE 
was in any case, carrying out research for purposes other than naval use.131 
 
A provisional programme was out-lined and development costs were estimated at 
between £11.325M for a 10MW liquid metal-cooled reactor, and £15.125M for a 
70MW pressurised water reactor. The Admiralty proposed that the project be placed in 
Class II of Defence Projects: ‘...it should be allocated effort and resources to meet the 
rate of progress expected, but suffer retardation if more urgent needs demand it’.132 By 
reply, the DRPC Committee agreed with the Admiralty’s opinions advised in Lang’s 
paper that early work should be placed in Class II and that the Chairman should 
approach the Paymaster General to issue instructions to the AERE. The Committee also: 
‘…invited the Admiralty to raise the matter again before a development project was 
begun’.133 Sir Frederick Brundrett, Chairman of the DRPC Committee, wrote to the 
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Chiefs of Staff to inform them of the DRPC’s decision and to request that, if research 
proceeds to plan and financial resources allow, there would be: ‘… no objection to the 
diversion of the requisite fissile material when needed in 1957 or 1958’.134 In 
September, Brundrett wrote to Lord Cherwell, to advise on the proposed design studies, 
one design was the pressurised water reactor and the other a graphite-moderated liquid 
metal-cooled reactor. Brundrett seems to have made an error in the latter description, 
the synopsis of reactor characteristics makes no mention of graphite-moderated reactors; 
indeed, graphite-moderated reactors had been ruled out, partly because of their 
susceptibility to underwater shock and partly because: ‘…it was unlikely that the 
graphite would have the necessary stability of structure under the intense radiation to 
which it would be subject’.135 As noted earlier, the unreleased papers state that Harwell 
was concentrating on two types of thermal reactor which clarifies that the second type 
of reactor to be subject to the design study would be the thermal water-moderated and 
sodium-cooled reactor, option B on Cockcroft’s memoire.136 Brundrett ended the letter 
by requesting a formal agreement to the design studies being undertaken at the 
AERE.137 Cherwell does not appear to have been impressed by Brundrett’s letter, 
writing to Cockcroft to advise that the proposals required further consideration. 
‘Perhaps you will have the paper circulated the Board in due course. I take it there 
cannot be any immediate urgency’.138 Cockcroft forwarded a copy of this note to 
Brundrett on 15 September and advised to leave the matter until Cherwell returned by 
which time he hoped the Chiefs of Staff would have made their decision on the 
allocation of fissile material. 
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The unreleased file notes that now the project was in the lowest priority given to 
defence projects, hardly any effort could be spared at Harwell for projects not in Class I 
and little progress could be expected from the reduced Naval Section at Harwell.139 This 
approach is apparent in Cherwell’s letter to Cockcroft above. With the departure of 
Diamond, the Naval Section at Harwell consisted of two ADEB engineers, one RNSS 
metallurgist and a Lieutenant Commander (Engineer), the complement reflecting the 
Admiralty’s decision to reduce the research effort pending supplies of highly enriched 
uranium.140 Gowing referred to Diamond as: ‘…the moving spirit in the enriched 
uranium reactor’, a description borne out by the proliferation of papers and 
correspondence bearing his name.141  With the decision by the Admiralty, on their part, 
to cease further research into the enriched reactor it would appear inevitable that 
Diamond must have come to the conclusion that there was nothing further he could 
contribute to the nuclear propulsion programme. Although no evidence has been found 
in the archives concerning Diamond’s decision to accept the Chair of Mechanical 
Engineering at Manchester University, the unreleased files do note that: ‘…the 
Admiralty lost the main spring of their effort in A.E.R.E’.142 Being one of the main 
advocates for the enriched reactor it would be of interest to know if Diamond was aware 
that the day before his resignation from the RNSS the US Navy’s Submarine Thermal 
Reactor (STR 1) prototype had gone critical for the first time at Arco in the Idaho 
Desert on 30 March 1953.143  
 
Enriched uranium and submarine propulsion are entwined, especially if using ordinary 
(light) water as a moderator and coolant. In the early 1950s both enriched uranium and 
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heavy water were scarce materials in the UK; it is recorded that Harwell’s chief 
engineer, Mr. H. Tongue, thought that research of a light water reactor would restrict 
further development because of the limited temperature that could be achieved resulting 
in limited thermal efficiency.144 The lack of enriched uranium, coupled to the 
knowledge that the US was developing two types of thermal reactor (water cooled and 
liquid metal cooled) makes it understandable that the submarine reactor programme was 
effectively moth-balled until more fissile material became available. It is also evident 
from the opinions described in this chapter and of what material was available, that the 
gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor came to dominate the civil power programme 
and discouraged further research into the submarine reactor for several years. This is 
borne out by the observations of Captain John Jacobsen (a member of the Dreadnought 
Project Team). Some years later in 1958, Jacobsen attended a fortnight’s reactor course 
at Harwell for senior executives and all but one afternoon was devoted to the design and 
advantages of gas-cooled reactors. Jacobsen remembers that the afternoon on water 
cooled reactors was devoted to their disadvantages, and that there was no mention of the 
intrinsic safety of the negative temperature coefficient. More is laid out in the next 
chapter on the factors affecting the reactivity of a reactor however, moderator 
temperature and density are two factors. As the moderator increases in temperature it 
becomes less dense thus slowing down fewer neutrons resulting in a negative change of 
reactivity. Therefore, if there is a problem removing heat from the core and the 
temperature rises, it will produce less power. The negative temperature coefficient is 
also load following; that is, as the throttles are opened to increase speed, the reactivity 
of the reactor automatically increases to suit, and vice versa. It is this feature that makes 
the pressurised water reactor most suitable for submarine propulsion. The problem with 
the UKAEA during the 1950s can be summed up by Jacobsen’s observation of his 
                                                     





lecturer that afternoon: ‘The man knew little about water cooled reactors and nothing 
about submarines’.145  
 
By the end of 1953, the Admiralty’s military case in favour of a nuclear-powered 
submarine had been put to the DRPC and agreement had been given to proceed with a 
feasibility study on nuclear propulsion with limited funds sanctioned by the Treasury. 
No political considerations had been given to the programme beyond the involvement 
of the First Lord and the Parliamentary Secretary; certainly, there had been no debates 
on the subject in both Houses of Parliament. The engineering aspect of the project was 
proving to be very challenging, solutions to the metallurgical problems identified had 
yet to be resolved and the type of nuclear reactor had still to be identified and agreed. 
Finally, the lack of highly enriched uranium was an impediment to the Admiralty’s 
nuclear programme. Excluding financial funding which would have to be approved by 
the Cabinet, engineering-wise, the Admiralty was in 1953, a long way off producing 
their nuclear-powered submarine.  
                                                     





Chapter 3: The Pressurised Water Reactor 
 
From mid-1953, the Admiralty’s submarine reactor programme was given the lowest 
priority for defence projects, Class II. Harwell could not afford to spend much effort on 
the Admiralty programme and with reduced manning of the Naval Section the 
programme was, in effect, mothballed until highly enriched uranium could be made 
available. However, this period would also give the Admiralty time to improve their 
knowledge of reactor systems, shielding technology and to re-evaluate the pressurised 
water reactor as the plant most suitable for submarine propulsion. There would also be 
time to forge alliances with industry to harness their engineering expertise and ensure 
industry was ready to deal with the exacting standards required of nuclear engineering 
with the introduction of new defence standards and quality control measurements. New 
materials had to be produced more affordably and means of fabricating components 
with these materials had to be created. Challenges with the fuel element components 
also had to be overcome. The Admiralty also had to resolve all the uncertainties of 
reactor physics relating to calculations concerning criticality which they did by 
awarding a contract to Rolls-Royce to design and build a zero-energy reactor. It was 
imperative that the Admiralty programme was promoted to Class I and that a nuclear-
powered submarine was in commission in as short a time as possible, the Admiralty was 
already discussing the possibility of having ballistic missile submarines by 1965.1 
 
During the period, Britain was still experiencing a prolonged period of austerity, goods 
were being made primarily for the export market and the defence budget was 
continuously being examined with a view to making cuts in expenditure. The RAF 
appeared to be the main beneficiaries in defence spending during the early 1950s, a new 
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force of ‘V’ bombers and other types of aircraft were being produced and air stations 
built overseas.2 Army numbers were continuously being reduced, however, it was the 
Royal Navy that was most under attack from defence cuts as it was argued that if 
another war broke out in Europe it would quickly turn nuclear and, therefore, there was 
no role for the Navy in nuclear war. The RAF claimed it could carry out the Navy’s role 
of maritime surveillance from its overseas stations; the Navy was struggling to argue its 
case and to voice its role in the defence of the nation. Nuclear propulsion, when 
mastered, would give the Navy a submarine able to counter the Soviet submarine threat 
as they left their bases in the Barents Sea, and with development of the sea launched 
ballistic missile, a sea-based nuclear deterrence. 
 
I. The Reactor Engineering Challenge 
The first requirement for a nuclear reaction is access to fissile material. The fuel mainly 
used in a reactor is, 235U, an isotope which forms just 0.7 percent of natural uranium, 
99.274 percent of which is 238U. To make a nuclear reactor small enough to fit into a 
submarine, natural uranium requires to be “enriched” so that it contains a greater 
percentage of 235U. With health and environmental issues concerning the resultant 
radioactivity paramount, to ensure reliability in its operation the reactor must not only 
be built to the highest standards but use the highest quality materials in its construction. 
The selection of materials to be used in a reactor and its component parts, and the 
quality specification of that material must be assured and controlled. Quality is absolute 
and pivotal in ensuring the safe operation of the reactor, as Captain John Jacobsen 
noted: ‘It is one thing to design and engineer an atomic bomb for instantaneous energy 
release. It is another thing entirely to design and engineer a controllable nuclear reactor 
                                                     






and systems to power a submarine for thirty-five years without refuelling’.3 Before 
nuclear engineering standards were applied, manufacturers would work to ill-defined 
work scopes, for example, details in some British Standards were left: ‘…for 
arrangement with the manufacturer’.4 Procedures and processes for quality standards, 
where they existed, differed widely throughout British industry; the control of these 
differing standards was also inconsistent, with Admiralty overseers, manufacturers’ 
foremen and shipbuilding production engineers applying various control mechanisms. 
Uniformity of material specification and the testing of those specifications to give 
product assurance, together with the control of the raw material, the finished product, 
and its certification would mean a quantum leap forward in production engineering and 
quality in British industry. 
 
Having sourced fissionable material, the next challenge is to transfer the heat away from 
the reactor core. There are different types of nuclear reactor, the gas-cooled reactor, 
integral boiling reactor and pressurised water reactor to name a few. Using pressurised 
water as a coolant and moderator in a reactor was first proposed in a paper by A. M. 
Weinberg in 1946, and was chosen by the Americans as the type best suited for 
application in a submarine.5 After the false start with the enriched gas-cooled reactor 
and likely encouraged by the launch of the USS Nautilus, the Naval Section at Harwell 
also came to the same conclusion as the Americans in early 1955. A basic pressurised 
water reactor is constructed of the following main components; the reactor pressure 
vessel which contains the fuel elements, control rods, reflector and the 
moderator/coolant. External to the reactor pressure vessel connected by pipework are 
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the main circulation pumps, pressuriser and heat exchanger, these components 
constitute the primary system.6 Within the heat exchanger the primary coolant heats 
water which produces steam in what is known as the secondary system. Steam is fed to 
turbo-generators to produce electricity for the numerous submarine systems reliant on 
electrical power; steam is also fed to the main turbines which propel the submarine. The 
steam is then condensed and fed back to the heat exchanger in a continuous process. 
The cycle begins with the nuclear chain reaction in the reactor core.  Each atom of 235U 
disintegrates to produce a pair of fission products, neutrons and energy. To maximise 
the chance of fission the neutron’s energy is reduced by use of a moderator and 
reflected back into the reactor by the reflector. The choice of fuel element such as 
uranium oxide/steel or uranium/zirconium; the choice of moderator, such as water or 
carbon and the choice of control medium, such as boron or cadmium, have a direct 
effect on the design and criticality of a reactor. The presence of reactor poisons, 
elements that capture neutrons very effectively, and the reactivity of the neutron flux 
will also determine how easy a reactor design will be to control. ‘These effects and 
others like the proportion of neutrons which escape the core, contribute to the reactor 
problem, whose solution determines whether a design can sustain a chain reaction 
without risk of meltdown’.7  
 
Material within the reactor pressure vessel should not contain elements (other than the 
control rods) which are strong neutron absorbers as they will choke the chain reaction. 
Therefore, component materials must be carefully selected for their suitability for use in 
a reactor. Apart from the requirement for materials not to adversely interact with each 
other, their corrosion properties, resistance to heat and irradiation, low neutron capture 
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cross-section had to be calculated and subjected to experiment. How reactor 
components are manufactured and shaped, the position into which they are placed 
within the reactor pressure vessel are also part of the reactor problem that had to be 
solved. ‘That is in ensuring that just one neutron can survive to continue the chain, no 
more and no less’.8 
 
The early nuclear engineers had the tremendous task of finding the best materials for 
each application in the reactor plant. They had to define the quality specification, source 
reliable suppliers and produce a system of examinations to assure that the material 
supplied was to the design specification. Although the engineering difficulties involved 
in designing a functional nuclear reactor were appreciated, from what is now known 
there are instances of what one may call “nuclear naivety” concerning the use of helium 
because of its property to diffuse through solid material and also in the handling of fuel 
elements and the complexity involved in refuelling. The draft specification drawn up by 
Harwell staff in 1950 for the Mk I reactor advised: ‘The permissible helium leakage 
from the circuit depends partly on the effort required to dilute it to breathing 
tolerance…’9 At a meeting in January 1951, it was recorded that: ‘A provisional limit of 
1 cu. ft of helium per hour has been placed for helium leakage from the whole 
circuit…’10  With regards to the handling of fuel elements, in a paper written in 1947, 
Diamond noted that: ‘There is every possibility of storing both used and unused charges 
[fuel elements] onboard ship’.11 
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One last example is contained in a memorandum written in 1956. Captain R. I. A. Sarell 
noted that: ‘Little difficulty is expected in designing reactors so that they can be 
recharged by ships staff’.12 Sarell thought it entirely feasible that ships staff could start 
the process of discharging the reactor within twenty-four hours of shut-down. He added 
another day to refuel the reactor, all with the assistance of a couple of dockside cranes. 
It is evident from these examples that, although engineering difficulties had been 
identified, there could be some degree of risk to health and possible environmental 
issues if no solutions were found to resolve the envisaged leakage problems. The 
difficulties involved with refuelling and the storage of spent fuel rods would also need 
to be addressed. The reactor plant and systems would be engineered to be as safe as 
possible and handling procedures would be written to mitigate risk. Quality assurance 
and quality control would ensure issues such as these were managed and monitored in a 
structured fashion. 
 
It was not only British industry that would have to change their attitude towards quality 
assurance and control; the Royal Navy would also have to change their approach to 
quality procedures. The Journal of Naval Engineering contains many examples of bad 
engineering practice prevalent in the Royal Navy throughout the 1950s. As an example 
of not being able to identify and control unmarked material, during her refit in 1955 the 
submarine depot ship, HMS Maidstone, landed thirty-five tons of metals: ‘…the 
majority of which could not be identified since it bore no markings’, in the comments 
section it was advised that: ‘The marking of metals for identification had been under 
consideration for many years’.13 The problem of identification was obviously known to 
the authorities but the time taken to establish procedures to deal with it highlights to a 
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certain extent the bureaucratic nature of the Admiralty. In another article, on hydraulic 
contamination, it was concluded that the materials supplied had not been in accordance 
with the specification.14 This is another example of the Royal Navy not being able to 
identify and control material. However, there was also a lack of uniformity and 
consistency in the management of ships’ engineering departments. In an article on 
planned maintenance in HMS Newcastle, it was noted that the planned maintenance 
system had been set up using locally printed forms. The comment section noted that 
there were five cruisers running their own systems of planned maintenance. Admiralty 
Fleet Orders were issued to introduce: ‘…the Admiralty scheme for documentation 
which includes a system for planned maintenance, together with associated forms and 
equipment.’15 The absence of a uniform schedule advising periodicity for planned 
maintenance of equipment would lead to a rather chaotic approach to the subject. As 
one correspondent noted: ‘…the Engineer’s Office is usually run to one particular 
individual’s liking, and rarely, if ever, laid out in a standard manner as any organization 
should be’.16 By the end of the 1950s, planned maintenance schedules were introduced 
into the Royal Navy for all engineering disciplines; it would be crucial, for the reactor, 
to have a standard operating procedure and a standardised maintenance schedule for 
ensuring its safe operation. 
 
Harwell too, had experienced problems with quality control, a pilot circulator 
manufactured by Metropolitan-Vickers, had been received with faults at Harwell. The 
motor was not properly connected, and the rotor assembly was fouling the stationary 
parts. In a note addressing these problems the author also advised that the cover studs of 
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the pilot circulator had been positioned according to Metropolitan-Vickers’ standard 
practice and the drawings were accepted by the AERE drawing office. However, the 
flange designed to take the cover studs had been drilled to Harwell’s standard practice 
and due to the half-pitch difference could not be mounted without remedial work being 
undertaken.17 Of the files researched, this was the only recorded incident of failure in 
Harwell’s quality control procedures and is an indication of the level of attention to 
detail that is required when dealing with product design for nuclear components. 
 
II. The Brontosaurus in the Museum: Quality Assurance 
The Admiralty argued that if Britain was to maintain a Royal Navy, nuclear propulsion 
had to be adopted and contemporary weapons fitted if it was still to be a relevant 
fighting force. If not, it risked becoming obsolete and: ‘The purpose of its existence has 
vanished, and it is merely the skeleton of a brontosaurus in a museum’.18 That risk was 
a possibility if industry failed to break out of the engineering conservatism that 
dominated industry in the middle of the twentieth-century. In 1940s Britain, few 
manufacturers would have had the capability of producing the material and equipment 
that would meet the exacting standards, tolerances and cleanliness required to build a 
nuclear reactor. The development of fabrication methods and welding techniques for 
new materials would also have to be learnt. Observation of these higher specifications 
and standards would have to be audited to ensure compliance; it was noted during 
World War II that British Standard Specifications were not always adhered to. When 
they were, and drawings were scrutinised for modern production techniques which also 
contained details of fit, form and function, production methods improved; as the author 
noted: ‘The days of a “nice easy fit” have gone forever’.19 Writing some years later Rear 
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Admiral MacLean noted that in 1948: ‘…our own marine industry was then about ten 
years behind the times’.20 That is not to say, however, that everyone else was ten years 
ahead. Even Rickover had to spend time bullying American industry into accepting the 
high level of quality that nuclear engineering demanded. Rickover is internationally 
renowned for his abrasive manner, a quality it could be argued that allowed America to 
produce the world’s first nuclear powered submarine from nothing in the space of eight 
years. Rickover would justify his brusque managerial style on the basis that he was so 
dismayed at the poor engineering standards of American industry that: ‘…it required an 
inordinate effort from him to raise these standards to what he considered essential for 
his nuclear submarines’.21 
 
It can be argued that the motor and aircraft industries had every incentive in the 
twentieth-century to improve their products, to have a higher quality and thereby be 
more reliable and safer than the previous product. No one would buy a car that is always 
at the garage for one defect or another and an aeroplane with a bad reputation, for 
example the de Havilland Comet, would soon be out of production. By contrast, it can 
also be argued that the UK marine industries saw no need to improve their products; 
they were still complacent from being the world’s largest ship producers. In 1912 the 
world mercantile output was 2,902,000 tons, of which 1,739,000 tons was built in the 
UK.22 However, their position as the largest producer had been steadily declining since 
the end of World War I and in the 1950s that decline was escalating due to reduced 
costs and increased reliability in machinery from overseas competitors which possibly 
prompted MacLean to write his paper. MacLean attributed the maritime engineering 
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industries’ weakness to three separate problems. First, the issue of selecting the most 
suitable machinery designs; secondly, the problem of obtaining the best designs, which 
MacLean identified as the consequence of handling as much design work as possible 
within the industry to the exclusion of the high-quality design potential outside the 
industry. ‘The third problem is the production of a first-class result at an economical 
price’.23 Yarrow was the only company with a design office capable of undertaking the 
major design problems discussed in MacLean’s paper. The Yarrow Admiralty Research 
Department team, Y-ARD, was set up after the war and faced jealousy from the rest of 
industry. MacLean also noted that other engineering disciplines had been employed to 
assist in educating the maritime engineering industry without which the Royal Navy 
would not be able to get the equipment they required at the necessary quality standard. 
However, MacLean noted that few companies were willing to make the required 
changes, and few had technical staff with the experience to offer the advice needed. The 
Admiralty, the UKAEA and Rickover too, would play their part in developing the 
marine industry’s experience in nuclear engineering and its ability to manufacture 
products to the quality standards required of them. 
 
The Admiralty did not sit idly on the side-line waiting for the marine industry to 
revolutionise its manufacturing and quality processes. Naval Engineering Standards 
were introduced to industry which they were expected to conform with; these standards 
imposed quality requirements on a manufacturer and also had documentation to control 
the material. These standards are reviewed periodically and amended in accordance with 
the latest applicable British and International standards. Material for use in a nuclear 
reactor plant had separate quality assurance regulations and means of identification and 
control documentation which is also subject to periodical review. During the early years 
                                                     





within Rolls-Royce, quality documentation was not very formalised, although one could 
argue that it must have been thought good enough for Rickover to advise the Admiralty 
to use them as their prime contractor. Different departments had their own 
documentation and: ‘…confusion concerning data transfer was possible and did indeed 
arise’.24 Lambert noted that it was due to staff professionalism that it did not occur more 
often, Rolls-Royce eventually produced a standardised quality manual in 1976. 
 
Aside from the Y-ARD collaboration, as discussed in chapter one, the Admiralty also 
collaborated with Vickers-Armstrongs; a combined design and development team 
known as the Admiralty Development Establishment Barrow (ADEB), was formed 
which had facilities for design, development, prototype and production testing. As 
Horlick noted, ADEB represented a different management method in which a small, 
highly-qualified team was dedicated to a single project: ‘…from initial design through 
to production testing’, this was to be the future of all naval projects, but change would 
come slowly.25 As things stood in the early 1950s there were many Admiralty 
Departments with their own demarcation zones, the AERE and civil engineering 
companies involved with the nascent nuclear propulsion programme and all were 
serving different masters resulting in a rather chaotic management of the programme 
which would not be resolved until the formation of the Dreadnought Project Team in 
early 1958 under the management of one man as Technical Chief Executive, Rowland 
(Roly) Baker RCNC. 
 
Both Y-ARD and ADEB would second men to the Naval Section at Harwell to support 
the Admiralty and the AERE in the design and development work. In 1953, the Naval 
Section consisted of a Royal Navy engineer, a RNSS metallurgist and two men from 
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ADEB, the Admiralty decided that more resources needed to be committed to the 
project if it was to progress. Captain (E) Harrison-Smith was appointed to head the 
section from mid-May 1954.26 In January, Jack Edwards was appointed as the senior 
RNSS representative, the first since Diamond had left two years previously.27 Edwards 
played a major role in the project and would eventually become professor of nuclear 
engineering at Royal Navy College Greenwich. By April the Admiralty side of the 
section had increased to eleven personnel, four Royal Navy engineers, five RNSS staff, 
one RCNC constructor and one man from Y-ARD.28 As the project began to gather 
pace, engineers were also seconded to the Naval Section from Rolls-Royce and Vickers-
Armstrongs. The UKAEA was also keen to share their experience in nuclear technology 
with industry. William Strath, Managing Director of the UKAEA wrote to Rear 
Admiral Rebbeck of Vickers-Armstrongs, to advise that the UKAEA was anxious to 
disseminate their experience to industry and see them play: ‘…an increasing part in the 
development of the country’s atomic energy programme’.29 Vickers-Armstrongs was 
the Royal Navy’s principal company for building submarines and there were other 
companies in the UK who thought that they had the technical competence to assist the 
Admiralty in their nuclear propulsion programme. 
 
III. Industry Joins the Project 
Rolls-Royce’s Chairman, Lord Hives, heard that the Admiralty was getting frustrated 
with the slow response from Vickers-Armstrongs and saw his chance to extend his 
company’s remit to include marine engineering.30 Certainly, by 1955 the Controller of 
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the Navy, Admiral Ralph Edwards, had been in discussion with both firms.31 It would 
appear that industry was hesitant to get involved with the nuclear submarine project, 
Harrison-Smith wrote to Cockcroft to inform him that the Controller and E-in-C, Vice 
Admiral Mason, were looking to overcome the difficulties in obtaining assistance from 
industry, a further meeting was to be held between the Admiralty and the Directors of 
Vickers-Armstrongs and Rolls-Royce on 11 July.32 Edwards visited Rolls-Royce 
accompanied by Lord Weeks, Chairman of Vickers Group, and Major General Dunphie, 
Chairman Vickers-Armstrongs. The object of the visit was to consider the best 
organisation that could be developed to progress the nuclear propulsion programme. 
The group were shown around by Lord Hives and Edwards recorded that Hives already 
had some twenty scientists and draughtsmen working on various possible installations.33 
By the end of July, discussions had been so successful that the Admiralty had agreed to 
place a contract with Rolls-Royce for a pressurised water reactor using enriched 
uranium. Cockcroft noted that: ‘…the relationship between Rolls-Royce, the Admiralty 
and Harwell would need to be agreed’.34 It is apparent that Cockcroft wanted to 
delineate areas of responsibility to prevent inefficiency and duplication of effort, but it 
would take time to get all the agreements necessary in place as it would also involve the 
firms Vickers-Armstrongs and Foster-Wheeler. 
 
In July, Hives had been invited to visit the Westinghouse Company at Pittsburgh and 
was planning a return trip with three Rolls-Royce engineers. Hives reported that the 
project was to be reorganised with Vickers-Armstrongs as the main contractor and 
Rolls-Royce and Foster-Wheeler as sub-contractors. Hives also advised that 
Westinghouse had agreed to give Rolls-Royce: ‘…access as commercial friends to their 
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pressurised water reactor work’.35 At that time it was illegal for US citizens to divulge 
any information on nuclear propulsion, however, the Admiralty noted that there was no 
objection to Rolls-Royce advising Westinghouse that they were interested in the 
proposed visit and would presume that Westinghouse would arrange for all US 
formalities to be complied with.36 Hives had informed Cockcroft that if arranged by 
Admiralty: ‘…they might get advice and help from Westinghouse’.37 However, advice 
and assistance would not be forthcoming as Admiral Strauss, Chairman of the US 
Atomic Energy Committee, noted: ‘…there was both legal and political difficulty, and 
he had to take account of the position of certain individuals’.38 This last remark is 
certainly directed at Admiral Rickover who was “dual-hatted” in the US Navy as head 
of the Nuclear Power Division in the Bureau of Ships and as the naval liaison officer at 
the US Atomic Energy Commission’s Division of Reactor Development.39 At that time 
Rickover was firmly opposed to any nuclear technology exchange with the British as he 
did not think they were committed enough to developing the technology nor had the 
engineering discipline in place to make it happen. 
 
Noting that the pressurised water reactor had been selected and the project was being 
reorganised along the lines advised by Hives, the UKAEA, looking to involve 
engineering firms with nuclear technology, wrote to the E-in-C, enclosing a draft 
agreement between the UKAEA and Rolls-Royce and any other company collaborating 
in connection with the project. The UKAEA considered that the greater part of the 
reactor and heat exchanger effort would be done by them and that Rolls-Royce had 
under estimated the amount of work required to be done, noting the work would require 
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greater effort from them than Rolls-Royce have indicated.40 A few days later Cockcroft 
noted that the Authority would be asked to provide assistance with core physics, 
metallurgy of fuel elements, chemical effects of radiation on corrosion of materials, 
shielding studies and siting facilities for the prototype. It was envisaged that Admiralty 
and Rolls-Royce staff would be made available to assist in the work and Cockcroft 
would liaise with Harrison-Smith to discuss requirements.41 With discussions and draft 
agreements beginning to formalise the project, the Admiralty wrote to the Treasury in 
December for approval to place an order with Vickers-Armstrongs for a prototype set of 
machinery. The Admiralty advised the Treasury that they intended to design a nuclear 
propulsion plant of 15,000-20,000SHP for use in a submarine and required 40Kg of 
enriched uranium by mid-1956 for critical experimental work. The Admiralty required a 
further 80Kg of enriched uranium by late 1958 for the prototype reactor and 40Kg for 
the submarine by late 1960. The project was foreseen as taking six to eight years at a 
cost: ‘…in the region of £10M but I am afraid it may well be quite substantially 
more’.42 Individual access agreements were arranged and signed between the UKAEA 
and Rolls-Royce, Vickers-Armstrongs and Foster-Wheeler during June and July 1956 
detailing services the UKAEA would provide to support their work. Anticipating 
Treasury approval, the Admiralty had written to Vickers-Armstrongs (Shipbuilders) to 
inform them of their intention to place an order with them as main contractors and, 
where necessary, to use Rolls-Royce and Foster-Wheeler as sub-contractors.43 Treasury 
approval for HMS Dreadnought and the Dounreay Submarine Prototype was 
forthcoming in January with an agreed expenditure of £300,000 in 1956/57. The 
Treasury advised that approval for the project was: ‘…without prejudice to any decision 
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on an advance beyond the prototype of the nuclear power submarine’.44 The Royal 
Navy’s nuclear submarine project was once again getting the resources it required, 
engineering problems were being overcome and Parliament was starting to take notice. 
 
No debates over the Mk I enriched reactor were held in Parliament and only guarded 
references were made in Command Papers to investigating all possibilities for 
submarine propulsion.45 From early 1956 however, the Government was becoming 
more open about the project. In his statement on the naval estimates the First Lord, Lord 
Cilcennin, noted that scientists and naval officers had been working on the possibility of 
nuclear propulsion for some years: ‘…but it has only recently become possible to start 
practicable work of planning a marine power plant’.46 This was the first implicit 
statement by a government Minister that the Admiralty was committed to developing a 
nuclear submarine and it was reported the following day in the major daily newspapers, 
The Times article noted that industry was also to work with the Admiralty on the 
project.47 The article was tucked away on page eight suggesting that it was not a story of 
great importance, however, the convention of the day was for stories of international 
importance to be placed on the front page. HMS Dreadnought’s launch was reported on 
page six, in contrast, the launch in 1967 of France’s first nuclear-powered submarine, 
Redoubtable, made the front page of The Times.48 A few days later, George Ward, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, advised that a subsidiary company was to be 
formed, Vickers Nuclear Engineering Limited (VNEL). Ward noted that he expected 
other companies to become associated with the project as it evolved.49 VNEL was 
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eventually formed in April 1956 and after protracted negotiations the contract was 
signed in June allowing work to start in earnest.50 
 
IV. Miracle Metals 
In January 1956, the Admiralty formally wrote to the UKAEA requesting technical 
advice and assistance in pressurised water reactor technology. The UKAEA was advised 
that it was the Admiralty’s intention to build a pressurised water reactor of 
approximately 80MW output and commence trials on a land-based prototype by late 
1959 and for trials in a submarine by 1962.51 Professor Jack Edwards observed that the 
pressurised water reactor had been chosen as the most feasible reactor for installation in 
a submarine because of its compactness and good prospects of completing the project 
within a reasonable timescale.52 Edwards also noted little was known in the UK of light 
water moderated and cooled reactors, there were considerable gaps in the available 
knowledge and little information was available from the US. This was not unreasonable 
given the impact of the McMahon Act, however, British engineers adopted novel ways 
to collect information on nuclear energy. In 1952, it was noted that due to there being 
no official channel for the exchange of nuclear power generation information, as much 
knowledge as possible was gleaned from Congressional reports, reports of the United 
States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), press releases and other published 
documentation.53 
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Writing in 1956 however, Edwards observed that a great deal of experience had been 
obtained in the US on pressurised water reactor and was one: ‘…on which considerable 
data have been published.’ It was also one of the systems that had been intensively 
investigated by the UKAEA and the Naval Section.54 Rickover had committed to 
publishing a lot of information on pressurised water reactors that would be applicable to 
civil nuclear power stations; Cockcroft and Lord Plowden had received copies of 
Corrosion and Wear Handbook for Water Cooled Reactors, the data from which had 
been developed in the naval reactors programme and the Shippingport pressurised water 
reactor project.55 The fuel cladding material, zircaloy, had initially been developed for 
the US submarine programme, it became evident there were also applications as a 
cladding material in civil pressurised water reactors, such as the reactor at Shippingport, 
Pennsylvania: ‘…extensive data was declassified; for example a volume on the 
Metallurgy of Zirconium by Lustman and Kerne was published in 1955’.56 Murray 
noted that it was implicit from the preface of Lustman and Kerne’s book that Rickover 
had instigated its publication to encourage fundamental research on the metallurgy of 
zirconium and stimulate commercial development of zirconium. More pressurised water 
reactor nuclear information entered the public domain from the Shippingport reactor 
which impacted greatly on nuclear technology in general because Shippingport had no 
military applications: ‘…every aspect of its design and operation could be 
declassified’.57 No doubt these and other publications would have been made available 
to engineers from the technical library at Harwell. 
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Robert Gordon, manager of Westinghouse Electric’s Special Alloy Development 
Department, was chosen to: ‘…develop and manufacture the nuclear core of the 
Nautilus’.58 Gordon noted that the design report specified using zirconium as the 
structural material to contain the fuel and using a chemically similar metal, hafnium, to 
control the power level. Gordon referred to these two materials as “miracle metals” due 
to their qualities and use in the reactor core (zirconium has excellent mechanical 
properties and a very low neutron capture, whereas hafnium is a very efficient neutron 
absorber). Both metals are found in the same ore and require chemical processes to 
separate the small percentage of hafnium impurity from the zirconium; with hafnium 
present zirconium is of no use as a reactor material. ‘In the Fall of 1949, the world 
supply of these two (then rare) metals was measured in ounces and their purity level 
was very inadequate’.59 In 1948, prices for zirconium varied between $135 and $235 per 
pound, by 1954 the purity and quality had risen, and the price had fallen to $13.10 per 
pound. By 1963, zirconium was considered a commercial product: ‘…falling in some 
cases below $4 per pound’.60 In the UK a commercial plant was producing zirconium, 
the metal cost £10 per pound but contained between half and three percent hafnium. The 
ratio of zirconium to hafnium as an ore is roughly sixty to one and for reactor 
construction, hafnium had to be reduced to less than 0.05 percent, it was estimated that 
the price of zirconium would increase to between £13 and £15 per pound.61 The 
exchange rate in the 1950s was approximately $2.80 to £1.00 the cost to Britain buying 
US produced zirconium would have been around £4.67 per pound, cheaper than the 
home-produced metal. The UKAEA had advised the Admiralty that they were confident 
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of meeting any of their demands for zirconium from either British or foreign sources.62 
Economically it would make sense to purchase zirconium from the US, however, 
although it was recognised there would be a capital cost to increase domestic production 
of zirconium for a limited market, the submarine project, governments of the period 
were keen to avoid unnecessary dollar expenditure. The political implication of relying 
on foreign supplies of material for the nuclear submarine programme was also 
considered. Eisenhower and some members of his administration were keen to help the 
UK’s submarine programme, but their political goodwill was countered by Congress. 
The Admiralty and the UKAEA needed reliability in the supply chain to meet their 
programme targets until such time when assistance from the US allowed the supply of 
such materials for use in reactor components. 
 
A meeting was held to obtain an opinion on the best fuel and canning materials on 
which to concentrate the efforts of the Naval Section. Among the possibilities 
considered the two favoured elements were zirconium canned uranium/zirconium fuels 
and mild steel canned uranium oxide fuels. Although zirconium and its alloys were 
considered a better proposition, production facilities were deemed inadequate. Opinion 
favoured a uranium oxide fuel element canned in mild or stainless steel, preferably mild 
steel.63 The Admiralty was already conducting tests on different zirconium alloys and 
the meeting concluded that nuclear calculations on uranium oxide/mild steel cermets 
and uranium oxide/zirconium cermets could start as soon as the current 
uranium/zirconium alloy work was completed. Work proceeded equally on mild steel 
and zirconium fuel elements until March 1957 when a decision was taken to proceed 
with uranium oxide/steel: ‘…at that time all work on uranium/zirconium ones was 
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stopped in order to concentrate the effort’.64 Some basic information on fuel and 
canning materials was exchanged with the Americans during a visit by Rickover and his 
party in August/September 1956 however, discussions were limited to the UKAEA’s 
effort on gas-cooled reactors.65 A report on the satisfactory reprocessing of a zirconium 
core, published by the USAEC and received by the Admiralty in October 1957, 
influenced the Admiralty to stop production of the uranium oxide/steel fuel elements 
and to change to uranium/zirconium fuel elements, even though this meant a further 
delay in the project of six months.66 
 
The availability of hafnium was a problem for most of the nuclear submarine 
programme. Rear Admiral Nuclear Propulsion, G. A. M. Wilson, wrote to Strath noting 
some short-comings with the Exchange Agreement. The restriction on information 
concerning absorber materials was of concern as the project was practically forced to 
use an alternative to hafnium due to no information on alternatives being available from 
Westinghouse. However, in Wilson’s covering letter he describes how two Rolls-Royce 
personnel had a conversation with staff from Westinghouse about the lack of 
information concerning absorber material, their reply was to advise Rolls-Royce to 
write to them: ‘…because all this information has been de-classified anyway’.67 
Hafnium is about thirty percent more effective than other neutron absorbers such as 
cadmium which is why it was the preferred material for fabricating the control rods.68 
Recollecting events some forty years later, Edwards described how the project had 
preferred hafnium because of its advantageous nuclear properties but there was none in 
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the UK available for testing. ‘Somehow or another when this became known, a small 
piece of reactor grade hafnium came into our hands during the American trip…’69 
Edwards explains how this small sample was invaluable, being put through various tests 
in the UK allowing the project to formulate their future design plans. Nonetheless, 
concerns were still being expressed during 1958. Edwards wrote that an order had been 
placed for twelve tons of hafnium free zirconium for the year ending March 1958 which 
would have yielded some 800 pounds of hafnium oxide. Edwards calculated another 
120 pounds would have accumulated from other sources which would not be enough to 
satisfy the core requirements.70 
 
At a meeting to discuss progress with the nuclear submarine Wilson pointed out the 
difficulty in obtaining hafnium, Sir William Cook, head of the RNSS, suggested getting 
an undertaking from the Americans to supply. Harrison-Smith advised that the 
Americans: ‘…had barely enough for their own requirements’.71 However, Macmillan’s 
objective of achieving a comprehensive nuclear exchange treaty, interdependence with 
the Americans, was slowly coming to fruition. Macmillan’s main foreign policy was to 
pursue the London-Washington special relationship as a priority over Europe and with it 
to prevent war by developing an independent nuclear deterrent.72 Achieving nuclear 
interdependence with the US would be a means of sharing rather than duplicating 
nuclear knowledge, following a meeting of atomic experts Macmillan noted that in 
some respects the UK was as far ahead and even further advanced in the art than the 
Americans who thought the interchange of information would be all give.73 
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Interdependence would be a chance for the Admiralty to alleviate many of the problems 
in their nuclear submarine programme. 
 
In the spring of 1958, negotiations were proceeding with an amendment to the 1956 
Civil Exchange Agreement which would culminate in the 1958 Mutual Defence 
Agreement. The Admiralty was keen to ensure that the future exchange agreement not 
only covered uranium requirements but also hafnium. The Foreign Office contacted the 
Embassy in Washington to ensure the amended bilateral agreement was worded 
sufficiently to cover not only enriched uranium but also other special nuclear materials 
such as hafnium.74 The problems concerning availability of hafnium were finally 
resolved by the Mutual Defence Agreement which enabled the UK to buy a complete 
submarine reactor plant from the US. The Admiralty also placed a contract through 
Rolls-Royce with ICI to procure enough hafnium for the Dounreay Submarine 
Prototype, although discussions concerning hafnium continued for a couple of years.75 
 
V. The Fuel Element Decision 
At a meeting in 1957, Rear Admiral Wilson considered the choice of materials for the 
fuel elements. Wilson noted it had been decided previously to proceed with uranium 
oxide/steel elements, partly on the grounds of doubts on the supply of British refined 
zirconium which made the expense of full scale development of a material for a limited 
application difficult to justify. Partly also, it was believed that there was a better long-
term development potential for uranium oxide/steel elements. The UKAEA had advised 
that the use of zirconium added serious complexity to the proposed chemical separation 
plant for treating irradiated fuel elements which would add £400,000 to the capital cost 
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and a further £250,000 to increase British production of zirconium to meet Admiralty 
requirements.76 Despite the UKAEA’s reservations, following a recent visit to the USA 
there was a revived interest in the zirconium core, the main reasons for this was a more 
favourable supply of zirconium that could be purchased from the USA or Japan and the 
fact that: ‘A zirconium core uses only a little over half the amount of fissile fuel 
required by the steel core’.77 A smaller reactor core design could be achieved, and the 
price of zirconium was likely to give an overall saving. It was estimated that the total 
fuel costs for the submarine programme up to 1970 would be roughly £23M for steel 
cores and £16M for zirconium cores. It was noted that economy of operation of either 
core depended on the value of fissile material ultimately recovered and returned to 
stock. ‘If reprocessing of Zirconium fuel elements is practicable the overall economy 
will favour this type of core’.78 Wilson argued that given the technical, economic and 
political considerations, there was little to choose between the fuel elements and the 
submarine’s completion date was unlikely to be affected by the choice. The 
recommendation was to proceed with a reactor designed with uranium oxide/steel 
elements. However, it was thought necessary to mention the reduction in fissile fuel 
required for a zirconium core if satisfactory reprocessing could be developed. The 
recommendation was accepted by Admiralty’s finance section in late August and the 
Admiralty notified the UKAEA that the reactor design should proceed on the basis of 
uranium oxide/steel fuel elements.79 
 
However, a fortnight later Wilson noted that the recent reservation expressed by the 
AEA concerning the reprocessing of zirconium cores was unfounded as the US had 
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recently reprocessed their first zirconium core.80 Wilson advised the meeting that they 
should now proceed with the zirconium core and accept a delay of some six months to 
HMS Dreadnought’s completion date. A decision on Wilson’s view does not appear in 
the records; however, Harwell’s Head of Metallurgy, H. M. Finniston, was certainly 
aware of the Admiralty’s intention to change to zirconium elements by mid-October and 
advised the UKAEA Secretary, D. E. H. Peirson, that he envisaged a delay of six to 
twelve months.81 Sir John Lang, Secretary of the Navy, wrote to Strath to inform him 
that, knowing that zirconium could be reprocessed safely and that the methods of doing 
so are within the scope of the exchange agreement: ‘…we assume that the A.E.A will 
feel assured of their ability to reprocess zirconium elements for us’.82 The basis for the 
Admiralty’s decision to proceed with zirconium based fuel elements for HMS 
Dreadnought is open to conjecture. The meeting at which Wilson advised changing to 
zirconium also discussed the threat to the Dreadnought project posed by possible 
political support for a nuclear-powered tanker. Wilson had written an earlier paper 
stating the case for a Fleet Replenishment Tanker for the Galbraith Committee.83 In the 
paper Wilson argued that machinery developed for the Fleet Tanker would be applicable 
to a merchant ship.84 Mountbatten told the meeting he was certain Wilson supported 
HMS Dreadnought but: ‘…the figures that the latter had produced in his paper had 
made it very easy to argue that it would be better from every point of view to build the 
tanker rather than the submarine’.85 
 
Although the tanker was a paper study and some three years behind the Dreadnought 
project, Mountbatten was concerned that once people became aware of it there would be 
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support for the tanker especially at the Air Ministry. Considering the first Polaris 
submarine, the USS George Washington, was laid down in 1958, the fact that the UK 
was still pursuing a policy of what Macmillan called the “Great Prize” of 
interdependence with the US, and that the Polaris Sales Agreement lay six years in the 
future, it was quite prescient of Mountbatten to tell the meeting that to adopt the tanker 
in place of HMS Dreadnought: ‘…would suit the Air Ministry well, as not only would 
it remove a rival to the deterrent, but the tanker would require less fissile material than 
the Dreadnought’.86 Given these facts it seems entirely probable that the Admiralty 
adopted the uranium/zirconium element on the grounds of reducing by nearly half the 
fissile material required for HMS Dreadnought and thus, countering any Air Ministry 
argument that may have been used to make a case for cancelling the nuclear submarine 
programme in favour of the tanker. During his brief tenure at the Ministry of Defence 
Macmillan had acknowledged that the Armed Forces were still bloated from World War 
II and had not adjusted fast enough. Shortly after the Suez crisis, whilst still Chancellor, 
Macmillan wrote a memorandum to Anthony Head, Minister of Defence, arguing the 
case for radical cuts in defence spending.87 In the memorandum, Macmillan prioritised 
the prevention of global war; this would be achieved by nuclear deterrence, atomic 
weapons carried by the Royal Air Force and a ballistic missile, to be developed. 
 
On becoming Prime Minister in January 1957, Macmillan appointed Duncan Sandys as 
Minister of Defence with a brief to cut defence spending. With the Royal Air Force 
having the major role, perhaps it was natural that the nuclear submarine programme 
would come under scrutiny. Although the axe was to fall on the Army and the Royal 
Navy it is reported that Sandys developed a good relationship with Mountbatten.88 This 
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is no surprise as Mountbatten immediately set out on a charm offensive as only he 
could; in March Sandys accepted an invitation to dine at Mountbatten’s residence where 
the Queen and Prince Philip would be guests.89 In October, Sandys, with other senior 
Admiralty figures, would spend a day at sea in the USS Nautilus organised by 
Mountbatten, and in the November Sandys would enjoy dinner onboard HMS Victory.90 
Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, Mountbatten’s predecessor as First Sea Lord, had written to 
Mountbatten stating that he was: ‘…somewhat horrified at the news of Duncan Sandys 
becoming Defence Minister.’, ending the letter: ‘All my best wishes to you in the 
struggle ahead’.91 Sandys was a great advocate for basing the UK’s defence on the 
policy of nuclear deterrence and saw the RAF as the prime carrier of the deterrent in his 
Defence White Paper, Outline of Future Policy, issued in April 1957. The Paper 
envisaged a huge reduction in the Army with the ending of conscription; the Royal 
Navy’s role was defined merely as: ‘Peace time emergencies or limited hostilities’.92 
Indeed, there was no perceived role for the Royal Navy in total war as it was assumed at 
that time that any conflict between the NATO member countries and the Warsaw Pact 
would immediately go nuclear. Considering many military commanders and politicians 
expected a future war with the Soviet Union would be short and intense with air power 
playing the major role, Eric Grove raised the question which was possibly at the back of 
Sandys’ mind: ‘Was it really prudent to re-arm for a long-drawn-out World War II type 
war under the new conditions?’93 
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After Sandys’ White Paper, each of the services gave a series of briefings to back 
benchers and the press to either promote one area of interest or prevent Treasury cuts in 
another area. The RAF went about their briefings with alacrity and mounted a three-day 
conference for selected RAF officers and Air Ministry officials, a further one day 
conference was held 6 May 1958 for selected correspondents.94 Laurence Martin argued 
that at these briefings, the deterrence operated by the RAF was held as the only realistic 
policy for the UK. During the mid-1950s, the “V” bomber force was being built to 
deliver the deterrent which was initially based on Blue Danube, a gravity bomb. An 
improved bomb codenamed Red Beard was also a gravity bomb which left the RAF 
bombers open to attack from improved Soviet air defences. The UK was developing its 
own air launched stand-off missile, Blue Steel, to maintain the “V” bomber force as a 
credible deterrent but it was cancelled due to development difficulties. From 1960 the 
UK sought to purchase the US stand-off missile, Skybolt, which was under development 
to improve the deterrent. However, the US Government cancelled the Skybolt missile 
system in 1962, also due to development difficulties, much to the dismay of the British 
Government. 
 
Development of the Polaris system began in 1956 and was not taken seriously by the 
British Government; Martin noted the influence of the USAF in providing the RAF and 
Ministry of Defence with sceptical assessments of its performance.95 In contrast to the 
RAF, Martin argued that the Royal Navy was more restrained and that it saw its role in 
deterrence in terms of the aircraft-carrier; however, the carrier was also criticised for 
being vulnerable to Soviet anti-ship missiles. Martin also noted that: ‘…the Navy was 
slow to develop an alternative interest in the Polaris’.96 It can be argued that through 
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being discreet in their briefings, the Navy would make a shrewd case for a sea-based 
deterrence founded on technical and engineering fact once the US Navy had deployed 
their own Polaris submarines. Mountbatten had discussed Polaris in 1957 with his 
counterpart, Admiral Arleigh Burke USN, when Burke ordered the programme to 
proceed.97 Indeed, confiding to a USN Admiral some years later Mountbatten confirmed 
that a Royal Naval officer missile expert was seconded to the US Polaris programme 
from the outset.98 It would appear that Mountbatten wanted to make sure that when the 
Navy had a proposal for a sea-based deterrent they could deliver it to Cabinet Ministers 
confident in the knowledge that both Polaris and nuclear propulsion had already been 
proven as a dependable technology and that moving to a sea-based deterrence was the 
best means of defence as it created uncertainty for the Soviets from where a retaliatory 
attack could be launched. Mountbatten certainly had an eye on a future role for the 
Royal Navy not envisaged in 1957 by Sandys nor the Ministry of Defence, that of 
carrying a sea-borne deterrence. Mountbatten wrote: ‘…I hope we shall now have his 
[Sandys] wholehearted support for the Dreadnought and eventually the Polaris-type 
nuclear submarine’.99 However, to carry a submarine-based nuclear deterrent it was 
vital that nuclear propulsion was mastered in a timely manner. 
 
VI. Neptune: The Zero-Energy Experimental Reactor 
For nuclear propulsion to be mastered, basic reactor physics information relating to light 
water cooled/moderated, highly enriched uranium systems was required to guide the 
design for the first submarine reactor. The Admiralty’s zero energy experimental 
reactor, Neptune, was conceived in early 1956 to assist: ‘…in resolving major 
uncertainties in many factors influencing the calculation of criticality, control, 
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temperature effects on reactivity, and endurance for the power reactor’.100 Rolls-Royce 
was contracted to design and build the reactor at Harwell, the AERE would be 
responsible for the physics programme and the buildings. The basic design specification 
was agreed in July 1956, details of the numbers and grades of additional staff, were 
forwarded to the AERE and fissile material was allocated by the Chiefs of Staff for use 
during 1956/57 to support Neptune.101 It has been noted earlier that the UKAEA was 
eager to involve private industry in developing nuclear power, to support Neptune the 
Authority entered into enabling contracts with Vickers-Armstrongs, Rolls-Royce and 
Foster Wheeler during the summer of 1956. Committees consisting of members of the 
relevant interested parties were formed to coordinate the experimental work and ensure 
there was no duplication of effort.102 
 
Although fissile material had been allocated for 1956/57, the Admiralty had not 
apportioned money to purchase the fissile material. A provision of £298,000 in the 
1956/57 Estimates had been made for all nuclear propulsion services. Under a formula 
sanctioned by the Treasury, the UKAEA estimated the cost to the Admiralty of the 
fissile material at roughly £1,000,000 with a further £50,000 fabrication costs. The 
Admiralty sought to purchase the material outright during the current financial year as a 
cheaper option to hiring as suggested by the UKAEA.103 The Treasury replied agreeing 
to the Admiralty purchasing the fissile material during the current year but would not 
commit the Treasury agreeing to a Supplementary Estimate being submitted. The 
Treasury also advised that the nuclear submarine project raised wider issues and posed a 
number of questions that needed to be discussed such as future requirements for fissile 
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material. The Treasury also questioned the decision to concentrate effort on a nuclear 
submarine asking whether it was likely to unearth: ‘…special problems which would 
not arise for surface vessels and so slow down the rate of research and development in 
this field?’.104 As previously noted, the Admiralty had requested the Treasury to 
sanction spending during 1956/57 to develop a prototype set of machinery for a nuclear 
propelled submarine by entering into a contract with Vickers-Armstrongs.105 Although 
the Treasury gave approval to proceed with the prototype in January 1956, it appears 
that they were now requesting the Admiralty to justify the development of the 
submarine. 
 
Estimates of the cost of fissile fuel were over optimistic during the fifties, possibly as an 
attempt to secure additional government investment into nuclear propulsion for the 
merchant marine. In a memorandum on the Economics and Logistics of Nuclear 
Propulsion for the Galbraith Committee, the cost of fuel oil to the navy in 1956 was 
quoted as 0.53 pence per shaft horse power hour (SHP/Hour). The high cost of fissile 
material and the elementary reactor under development would achieve a cost of 4d per 
SHP/Hour. Captain Sarell argued that by 1965 the lower price of fissile material 
combined with more advanced practice should produce a cost of 1.5 pence per 
SHP/Hour. This cost assumed enriched uranium priced at £12,000 per kilo, however, if 
the price fell to £9000 per kilo as quoted by the UKAEA, the cost would fall to 1.2 
pence per SHP/Hour.106 It is little wonder with figures illustrating increasing fuel oil 
costs in comparison with declining nuclear fuel costs that the Treasury was looking to 
justify spending the research and development costs allocated to the submarine project 
on the merchant marine which would be of more benefit to the country. 
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The Admiralty replied to the Treasury’s request for more information by giving a broad 
outline of the project from designing the test site and facilities in January 1957 through 
to commissioning trials of the submarine in December 1961. There was a prospect of 
the US releasing information on propulsion reactors under the 1956 Civil Exchange 
Agreement however, the Admiralty advised that even if information was received from 
the US they would still have to conduct zero energy experiments for safety reasons. The 
Admiralty argued that it was impossible to reproduce exactly the materials used in the 
US and was therefore important to prove their own materials, adding that there was no 
alternative but to continue with the programme: ‘…any U.S. information which we 
obtain may well result in a slight reduction of our own work, it cannot replace it’.107 
Construction progressed on Neptune which was planned for completion in July 1957; 
however, Rolls-Royce had sub-contracted Neptune’s erection to another firm whom the 
AERE had little confidence in keeping to the programme.108 Although Neptune was 
viewed at the time as a bottleneck in the programme, the timescale from agreement of 
the design to the reactor going critical was a little over sixteen months. Costing 
£233,000, Neptune went critical for the first time at 8:30pm 7 November 1957.109 
 
Neptune was devised to operate at one or two watts and rarely exceeded ten watts hence 
the handling difficulties encountered with “hot” fuel elements was not a problem. The 
design of Neptune allowed for fuel elements and control rods to be quickly assembled 
in a variety of simple configurations to enable calculations to be made and compared 
with other core layouts.110 Evidence from these calculations would determine the critical 
size of the reactor and allow for the most favourable arrangement of the fuel elements 
and control rods. Neptune was one of a variety of reactor physics experiments in 
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progress and it was envisaged to take six months of experiments with Neptune before 
all reactor physics information would be available which were required to finalise the 
core and fuel parameters. Edwards noted that all the early work in Neptune was 
conducted on fuel arrangements corresponding to highly enriched uranium oxide/steel 
elements even though the decision to change to uranium/zirconium had been taken in 
October 1957. Edwards argued that the zirconium plates for Neptune that had been 
ordered as an insurance policy in early 1957 had yet to be fabricated and whilst waiting 
for their delivery it seemed wrong to leave such work unfinished after so much had been 
achieved.111 Neptune operated throughout 1958 and was due to cease operation in June 
1959. After shut-down Neptune was dismantled and kept in storage until a decision 
would be made on its future.112 Neptune would eventually be moved to Rolls-Royce’s 
premises at Raynesway, Derby to continue nuclear physics experiments on future 
advanced cores for the Royal Navy. 
 
By the end of 1957, the Admiralty’s nuclear submarine programme had reached a 
critical stage. Rear Admiral G. A. M. Wilson had been appointed Rear Admiral Nuclear 
Propulsion to co-ordinate the nuclear engineering side of E-in-C’s office and, to give a 
stronger management structure, the Dreadnought Project Team was formed under the 
leadership of Rowland Baker RCNC at Bath. Contracts had been placed for the hull and 
machinery with Vickers-Armstrongs and the UK’s reactor design and fuel elements had 
been agreed upon with enabling contracts established between the main sub-contractors 
and the AERE. The programme was proceeding as expected and the Queen had 
approved the name Dreadnought for the first nuclear-powered submarine. However, 
two unrelated events in 1957, months apart would combine to change the course of the 
programme, and of the Royal Navy’s own nuclear reactor design. 
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With Eisenhower’s approval, American officials were already secretly dealing with 
members of Eden’s Cabinet, including Macmillan, when, as a result of the Suez Crisis 
Macmillan succeeded Eden as Prime Minister in January 1957. 113 Due to their personal 
wartime relationship, within days the Americans proposed a meeting in Bermuda 
between Eisenhower and Macmillan which would attempt to put the strain between the 
two countries over Suez behind them. Macmillan’s main foreign policy objective of 
securing nuclear interdependence with the Americans was something that Eisenhower 
agreed with but had his own political difficulties with Congress. However, Macmillan’s 
chance to change US political opinion came in the October when the Soviets launched 
the first successful satellite, Sputnik. The launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957, had 
caught the Americans unawares and caused panic in some quarters as it appeared that 
the Soviet Union not only had the atomic and hydrogen bombs; but had developed a 
rocket with the capability of delivering them to the American continent. Macmillan 
wrote to the Secretary of State, John Dulles, suggesting the time was right for pooling 
defence resources but refrained from mentioning the McMahon Act at that time.114 
Three weeks later, at a meeting in the White House, Eisenhower surprised the British by 
producing a directive dealing with nuclear collaboration between the two countries. In 
effect, it was the end of the McMahon Act which Eisenhower described to Macmillan 
as: ‘…one of the most deplorable incidents in American history, of which he personally 
felt ashamed’.115 Macmillan had secured the key to his major international policy 
objective of nuclear interdependence with the United States. The “special relationship”, 
as it is commonly known, was about to begin and was to have consequences for the 
Admiralty nuclear propulsion programme, and HMS Dreadnought in particular.  
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Chapter 4: HMS/m Dreadnought 
 
This chapter will examine the importance of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover USN and his 
influence on the Royal Navy’s nuclear propulsion programme; Rickover is universally 
acknowledged as the “Father of the Nuclear Navy” and was renowned for his brusque 
manner and uncompromising attitude towards the highest quality standards. Rickover’s 
management skill in overseeing the design, manufacture and operation of the world’s 
first power reactor is well recognised throughout the nuclear industry. It was these 
attributes, and his personal rapport with Mountbatten, that contributed to the Royal 
Navy’s nuclear development programme by imposing the same exacting standards to 
UK industry as was applied to US industry. 
 
The chapter will also investigate the possible savings to independent research in the UK 
by receiving US nuclear technology information, and Rickover’s offer to the UK to 
purchase a US reactor as a means to expedite the Admiralty’s programme. Anomalies 
have been uncovered in Philip Ziegler’s official biography of Mountbatten and in the 
Broadlands Archive appertaining to MB1/K208A these are addressed in this chapter 
merely for future reference. Finally, the chapter will explore the apparent 
mismanagement of the Dreadnought project and the adoption of a unified project team 
under the management of one leader responsible for the whole programme without 
recourse to the usual Admiralty departmental hierarchy. Overall, the chapter will look at 
the personal relationships that supported Macmillan’s foreign policy objective of 







From the mid-1950s, Rickover had been in contact with representatives of the UK 
nuclear industry. Initially, his contact was with the AERE in relation to the civil nuclear 
programme. Indeed, it is worth noting that in April 1955, during construction of the 
Shippingport reactor, Rickover made a trans-Atlantic call to a British metallurgist to 
clarify a technical point.1 Although the metallurgist is not mentioned by name Sir 
Harold (Monty) Finniston was the chief metallurgist at Harwell, he and his wife became 
good friends with Rickover and his wife. Finniston also hosted Rickover on one of his 
visits to the UK, this close relationship which is unusual given Rickover’s temperament 
and his treatment of other UK nationals, would suggest that Finniston was the 
metallurgist referred to.2 His later contacts were directed more towards the Admiralty 
and those involved with the Admiralty’s nuclear submarine programme. Rickover began 
exploring the state of research and development in the UK, looking at the management 
of the programme, the budget allocated by the Government and the condition of 
industry and their ability to get involved with the demands and standards imposed by 
nuclear engineering. Rickover’s views were paramount to the US Government on 
whether the UK had the technical competency and the capacity to benefit from their 
offer to purchase outright a naval propulsion reactor. It was Rickover’s authority that 
would be the deciding factor on the future of the Admiralty’s reactor design and 
manufacture, and it would fall to Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Mountbatten, as First Sea 
Lord to sway Rickover’s influence in the Royal Navy’s favour. 
 
With the signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement on 3 July 1958, the Admiralty’s 
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme (NNPP) changed dramatically. Article III of the 
Agreement authorised the purchase of a S5W submarine nuclear propulsion plant, the 
US Navy’s latest and most powerful reactor which was being fitted into the Skipjack 
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class and Polaris submarines. The S5W purchase also included the complete propulsion 
machinery set and auxiliary equipment, the Agreement also allowed for the transfer of 
enriched uranium to fuel the plant and the offer to reprocess spent fuel in the US. There 
was, however, a price, not monetary but knowledge-wise. Article III of the Agreement 
was limited to ten years, after which there would be no more transfer of nuclear 
propulsion technology; the shutters would come down isolating the Admiralty from any 
further reactor technology developed in the US, indeed, the transfer of nuclear 
information was further limited by the Westinghouse/Rolls-Royce contract. In effect, 
the purchase of the S5W would give the Admiralty a datum from which to develop its 
own design and advance its own reactor technology independently of the US. 
 
Not everyone in the UK propulsion programme was happy with the 1958 Agreement 
and questions were asked concerning how much information should be requested and 
what kind of technology should be transferred. It was even questioned whether any of 
the technology and information was required given that the Admiralty’s own nuclear 
programme was now so far advanced. It was certainly recognised that accepting US 
assistance would come with restrictions and would limit the Admiralty’s own 
programme. However, the Royal Navy’s priority was to have a nuclear-powered 
submarine at sea, and as soon as possible. But for that to happen, measures would have 
to be taken to change what can best be described as a haphazard management system 
into a singular project team headed by one man with overall responsibility. 
 
I. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover USN 
There is a consensus on what has been written about the UK’s nuclear propulsion 





recorded to have taken place 20 August to 4 September 1956.3 The second visit took 
place 20-22 May 1957 and the third 24 January 1958. Rickover’s first visit followed 
closely after the 1956 amendment to the 1955 Act allowing for cooperation on the civil 
uses of atomic energy. Most of Rickover’s visit was confined to the AERE, Harwell 
where discussions centred on chemistry and metallurgy although he also visited Calder 
Hall and the AEA Industrial Group based at Risley.4 Rickover’s first day in the UK was 
spent at Broadlands, Mountbatten’s country residence. Rickover talked openly and 
when Mountbatten asked his advice on what the Admiralty’s next action should be 
Rickover replied that the Admiralty should buy a reactor from Westinghouse.5 This was 
not the first time Rickover had proposed this line of action, however, he was speaking 
“off record” and nothing developed from the talks. 
 
The 1956 amendment came into force 15 June and allowed the exchange of restricted 
information applicable to civil uses, however, the Act also allowed for information 
relating to the propulsion of naval vessels to be exchanged: ‘…to the extent and by such 
means agreed’.6 It was foreseen that information on military reactors would be 
exchanged through the UKAEA representative in Washington who would then 
disseminate the information back to the relevant departments in the UK.7 However, the 
UK Government, and the Admiralty in particular, were disappointed with this 
amendment due to US political infighting. President Eisenhower had been championing 
closer nuclear ties with the UK since the start of his Presidency but was thwarted by 
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Congress against his minority administration. The Pentagon had sent a draft of the 1956 
amendment to the USAEC, an agency of the US Government established by the 
McMahon Act of 1946 transferring control of atomic energy from military to civil 
supervision. However, the USAEC was overseen by Congress, the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy (JCAE), and the Pentagon had omitted to inform the JCAE. Upon 
discovering that they had not been consulted, the JCAE insisted that the Eisenhower 
administration suspend the new Agreement. ‘As a minority President, and faced with an 
imminent election, Eisenhower had little choice but to agree’.8 However, the previous 
February the Defense Department had asked the Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, 
for his confidential opinion on whether it was legal, under the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, to transfer submarine nuclear technology to other states. He concluded that 
information on military power reactors could be exchanged but declined to offer an 
opinion on submarine reactors. Soon afterwards, Brownell sent a further letter to the 
Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, and the AEC Chairman, Lewis Strauss stating 
that the 1954 Act gave legal authority for the transfer of submarine reactor information 
but suggested that no action be taken without the informal approval of the JCAE.9 
Although Eisenhower agreed to postpone implementation of the 1956 Act, under the 
Brownell’s opinion he had legal justification to transfer nuclear submarine propulsion 
information. ‘On February 5, 1957, he ordered the AEC, DoD and the State Department 
to put into effect the July 1956 Agreement’.10 
 
In May 1955, AERE’s Head of Engineering Research & Development Division, B. L. 
Goodlet, visited the US where he had meetings with organisations interested in nuclear 
programmes. During discussions with Rickover, the Admiral asked Goodlet if the UK 
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had a submarine project to which Goodlet replied that the UK did have a propulsion 
project. Rickover suggested that it would be a pity to cover the same ground and it 
would be beneficial if the US and UK agreed to a joint propulsion programme. Rickover 
advised that if the UK had: ‘…a firm submarine project of our own he was certain that 
we would be given the information on Nautilus provided the approach was made 
through service channels and not through the A.E.C.’. 11 Goodlet noted that our service 
people should know of Rickover’s remarks. Harrison-Smith subsequently wrote to the 
Engineer-in-Chief to inform him of Rickover’s remarks.12 A few days later the 
Controller wrote to Mountbatten to advise that he had approved a power plant of 
between 10,000-20,000SHP suitable for a submarine, he noted that both Harwell and 
the commercial firms: ‘…have stressed the importance of having a specified project to 
work on’.13 This approval was given on the advice contained in an appreciation by the 
Naval Section, Harwell on Nuclear Propulsion in the Royal Navy, (T.S.D.402/55), 
which was forwarded to a sub-committee of the Ship Design Policy Committee 15 April 
1955.14 This would appear to be the first record of Rickover’s offer to help the 
Admiralty and seems to have acted as a spur to formalise the programme by selecting a 
submarine as the first vessel to fit a pressurised water reactor and to state the plant’s 
power parameters. 
 
However, Rickover’s enquiry opens intriguing questions concerning his visits to the UK 
during the mid-1950s. Research has uncovered evidence that Rickover made an earlier, 
unrecorded visit to the UK in December 1954. Apart from the document which 
highlights this fact, there are no references to the visit in any of the files researched and 
no mention has been made of it in previous historical articles on the subject of 
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Rickover.15 In Gordon’s memoir, he recorded in the chapter, ‘My eleven days in 
England with Rickover’, that its purpose was: ‘…to gather all the scientific and 
engineering information that the British Government had accumulated from their own 
extensive nuclear research programs’.16 Gordon noted that he never saw nor heard about 
the report again. For their endeavours, Rickover gave the team an extra day in London 
to complete some Christmas shopping. Gordon stated that the original flight the team 
should have taken crashed at Glasgow killing all the passengers. Given there are no 
“official” records of this Rickover visit and suspecting that Gordon may have confused 
the year, a quick search of plane crashes in December 1954 noted just one in the UK. A 
BOAC Stratocruiser was on a scheduled flight from London to New York when it 
crashed at Prestwick airport (Glasgow) on Christmas Day 1954. Goodlet’s meeting with 
Rickover came just five months after Rickover’s initial visit to Harwell; it must be 
implied from Rickover’s question, and from Goodlet’s position as Head of Research 
and Development at Harwell, that the visit had nothing to do with submarine 
propulsion. A query to the United States Naval Historical Foundation received the 
reply: ‘As [with] most clandestine visits in history, there are usually quid pro quos’.17 
Rickover and his team had a very lucky escape, goodness knows what impact 
Rickover’s death at that time would have had on the US nuclear propulsion programme 
or, indeed, the Admiralty’s own propulsion programme. Despite the intrigue, this visit 
falls outside the confines of the thesis and is detailed here merely to set straight the 




                                                     
15 Gordon, ‘Working for Admiral Rickover’. 
16 Gordon, ‘Working for Admiral Rickover’, p. 14. 





II. What Price Exchange of Information? 
Following discussions with Rickover during his 1956 visit, the E-in-C, Vice Admiral F. 
T. Mason, wrote a precis of Rickover’s comments and views on the exchange 
agreement. Mason was keen that a study be made of all the implications of the exchange 
agreement on the freedom to build a nuclear merchant marine fleet unfettered by 
American strings.18 There is evidence of uneasiness at the Admiralty and the UKAEA 
of accepting US nuclear information carte blanche. Sir Christopher Hinton pointed out 
that, with the UKAEA handling the transfer of submarine information care had to be 
taken regarding their responsibilities not only to the submarine project but also to the 
development of nuclear propulsion for the merchant marine.19 In an undated paper on 
the exchange of nuclear information the author wrote that we are now too far committed 
on the present reactor to make much use of American information: ‘…though it might 
save some time spent investigating blind alleys’.20 The Controller, Admiral Sir Peter 
Reid, was also wary of being restricted by the exchange of information and advised that 
it was important to discriminate in the information the Admiralty obtained from the 
US.21 Sir John Lang later confirmed this view noting that since the amendment allowing 
exchange of information in mid-1956: ‘British work on marine nuclear propulsion has 
advanced, and the exchange of information now made possible is less valuable to us’.22 
Lang echoed Reid’s view that the Admiralty was not presented with a mass of 
information which could have been useful two years previously, but which now might 
only serve to embarrass the Admiralty. 
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Lang proposed to discuss with the Americans and settle on a procedure whereby the 
Admiralty could select what nuclear information they required and decline information 
they already had. This stance, in the upper echelons of the Admiralty seems to be in 
total contrast with Macmillan’s policy of nuclear interdependence. It appears that the 
Admiralty, although keen to accept some nuclear information to allow them to proceed 
on their submarine project with confidence, was equally keen to keep their reactor 
design independent of American control by limiting the information they were willing 
to accept and so be able, as the authority responsible to the marine industry in general, 
to proceed with nuclear propulsion for the merchant marine. The Admiralty felt that the 
UKAEA should avoid any embarrassment to its civil marine programme which might 
be caused by accepting information from the Americans in connection to the submarine 
and might shackle British freedom of action developing nuclear propulsion for merchant 
ships. It was the Admiralty’s view that the UKAEA should specify the information it 
required rather than leave it to the Americans to send what they think it ought to have. 
Strath was concerned that due to the delay since the Agreement was signed the 
Americans may feel obliged to inundate the UKAEA with information.23 A couple of 
days later, in response to the AEC requesting information about Calder Hall, Lang 
informed Strath that he had been prepared to advise Sandys to abandon any agreement 
over the submarine reactor if it involved conditions which may embarrass us over 
marine nuclear propulsion. Lang also noted that the Admiralty was anxious to avoid 
being given information it already had, and that broadly speaking the Admiralty thought 
it had little to learn from the US as regards the reactor for its first submarine.24 This 
does indicate a certain degree of confidence in the design of the Admiralty’s reactor. 
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Whilst Lang’s statement may be true for the reactor physics, there is consensus among 
Royal Navy engineering officers from the period that without the adoption of US 
project management methods and discipline of adherence to engineering standards and 
quality control, introduced by Rickover with the exchange of information, the UK 
would have struggled with the timescale of its own project. A typical observation from 
that cadre of engineering officer is summed up by Colin Farley-Sutton, a member of the 
Dreadnought Project Team from 1960 and an Admiralty Engineer Overseer at Dounreay 
from 1964, who wrote that the project was saved a lot of time and grief because of the 
adoption of Rickover’s management ethos: ‘…and the know-how derived from the US 
having ‘done it’ many times before’.25 
 
A few days later, Lang followed up his letter with a telegram in which he confirmed that 
if the UKAEA was pressed to envisage a package deal to exchange information in 
respect of civil power stations and the USS Nautilus installation, that Strath need not be 
influenced by the threat of non-cooperation on the submarine reactor. Lang envisaged 
that Strath could use the reactor as a bargaining chip but wanted to keep the machinery 
separate as the Admiralty was keen to learn about the air conditioning plant and other 
machinery which might be exchangeable under the military rather than civil 
Agreement.26 The threat of non-cooperation did not occur as the USAEC wrote to the 
UKAEA to inform them that they wanted to proceed independently with the exchange 
of submarine information. A letter was forwarded advising what information the 
UKAEA would provide to the USAEC and what information the USAEC would 
provide in return. This included general information on the design, construction, 
operation and maintenance of submarine reactors and detailed information, within the 
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above categories, on the USS Nautilus plant (including the prototype) and the S5W.27 
By separating the submarine reactor information from the civil nuclear information the 
course was clear for the UKAEA to continue research on merchant marine propulsion. 
Conversely, the Admiralty would receive information which would enable it to compare 
its design to US reactors and discover exactly where they stood in relation to reactor 
development with the US. 
 
Lang was Secretary of the Navy 1947-61, his biography describes him as: ‘…a 
formidable advocate for any policy which he decided to support’.28 Much of his 
correspondence would appear to confirm his cautious nature, wanting to ensure every 
aspect of the problem is known prior to reaching a conclusive decision; Lang could be 
viewed as the consummate civil servant. However, Lang could be construed as having a 
negative attitude towards US assistance. In the correspondence reviewed, Lang merely 
defends the status quo vis-à-vis the UKAEA’s position as sole manufacturer of fuel 
elements and of the proposed merchant nuclear marine project. Lang certainly does not 
come across as a keen supporter of the Royal Navy’s ambition to acquire nuclear 
propulsion in a manner that can be seen in Mountbatten’s and other senior naval 
officers’ correspondence on the subject. 
 
With the exchange of information formalised, Rear Admiral Wilson, prepared for a 
meeting with Rickover to discuss wider issues, including the scope of information to be 
exchanged. Considering many in the Admiralty felt confident that the UK design was 
far enough advanced that there would be little, if any, need for US information, a 
briefing note advised the possibility that Rickover may try to persuade the Admiralty to 
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buy a US reactor.29 It is not clear from the material researched why the prospect of 
purchasing a reactor from the US was brought up, Rickover’s brief comments to 
Goodlet in May 1955 concerning the USS Nautilus, were obviously known to the 
Admiralty but no other overtures are recorded. There were numerous questions being 
directed at AEC staff which concerned Rickover causing him to snap at a meeting that 
detailed questioning was interfering with US reactor work. Rickover suggested that the 
Admiralty and AEA should send a technical delegation to the US to learn from the US 
programme to enable the UK to then decide its requirements.30 It is possible that the 
Admiralty was aware that their questions were not focussed enough and possibly having 
a detrimental effect on Rickover’s staff who were not only dealing with the S3W/S4W 
reactors being fitted into the Skate class but were also dealing with the development of 
the S5W to fit into the USS Skipjack. The Polaris submarine building programme was 
also getting underway in early 1957 creating additional work. The scenario was possibly 
offered up as an option Rickover could make to alleviate the work load of his staff, 
there is certainly evidence from the UKAEA representative in Washington that the list 
of questions appeared to be an attempt to cover all aspects of submarine pressurised 
water reactor plants.31 
 
Despite many in the Admiralty having confidence in their reactor design, what is 
evident from the records is Mountbatten’s interest in purchasing a complete reactor unit 
from the US for installation in HMS Dreadnought.32 This interest possibly indicates 
Mountbatten’s frustration at the slow rate of UK progress, (a reflection of Lang’s cool 
reception towards nuclear propulsion?), or even his eagerness to get a Royal Navy 
nuclear-powered submarine to sea in the shortest possible time-scale. Given his 
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relationship with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke USN, 
Mountbatten was able to call on him for all manners of support; from assistance in 
nuclear training resources for the Royal Navy to briefing the UK Minister of Defence on 
the role of NATO navies in a global war.33 If Mountbatten was to make a case for 
adopting the Polaris missile system to Cabinet Ministers and secure a future for the 
Royal Navy, then the successful and safe implementation of submarine nuclear 
propulsion technology was a priority of the highest order. Whether the power plant was 
British or American appears to have been a secondary concern to Mountbatten. 
 
III. The Offers to Purchase a US Submarine Reactor 
Under the aegis of the 1956 Agreement, Eisenhower ordered the implementation of the 
exchange of nuclear submarine information in February 1957. The UKAEA was quick 
to begin organising a Technical Mission to the US comprising all elements involved in 
the submarine project.34 However, before the visit could be fully organised, 
Mountbatten was strongly urged by Vice Admiral R. F. Elkins to invite Rickover to the 
UK: ‘…His visit to you last year made a deep impression on him and he still talks of 
it’.35 Rickover accepted the invitation and the visit took place 20-22 May 1957, the 
Technical Mission to the US was postponed until Rickover returned to the US. 
Rickover’s visit included a top level meeting at the Admiralty with officials from the 
Admiralty, the UKAEA and industry; arrangements were made for Rickover to visit 
Calder Hall and the premises of the firms involved with the project.36 For their part, the 
Admiralty was keen to learn about the organisation in the US for building the USS 
Nautilus; this was due to increasing criticism from the UKAEA of the Admiralty 
management of the project which had already led to the creation of a post of Rear 
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Admiral Nuclear Propulsion (RANP).37 Indeed, Mountbatten and Reid held a private 
discussion about their organisation with Rickover who was described as being 
particularly forthright in his denunciation of the Admiralty’s organisation.38 
 
As a result of the May meeting, Rickover cancelled the preparations made with 
Washington for the Technical Mission visit and re-arranged the tour to what he thought 
would be the UK’s advantage. The Nuclear Propulsion Technical Mission took place 
10-25 June; at the first meeting Rickover stated that the exchange on the US side would 
be limited to the Idaho prototype reactor, the USS Nautilus (S2W) reactor and the USS 
Skipjack class reactor (S5W). ‘…detailed information would not be passed on SSN 578 
[Skate] class, Seawolf, or any General Electric work’.39 There followed a series of 
lectures on the reactors outlined by Rickover; it is understandable that no information 
would be given on the USS Seawolf , which had a sodium cooled (S2G) reactor, 
however, there appears to be no record of why the Skate class reactor was omitted from 
the exchange of information. There were four submarines in the class and due to 
Rickover’s team being unable to reach a consensus on the best machinery plant layout 
two plants were built, S3W and S4W, and were each fitted into two submarines. The 
only difference between the plants was the design of the Steam Generator and the 
reactor compartment layout.40 The only possible reason for omitting information on the 
S3W/S4W plant was that the US Navy was already planning on taking advantage of 
experience gained from the USS Nautilus (S2W plant) which had shown small plants, 
such as S3W/S4W, were inadequate for high speed. During the visit a trip was made to 
Groton to see the USS Skate fitting out and the USS Skipjack, which was under 
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construction; it is evident the Americans did not bar the British mission from visiting 
the USS Skate. With no information exchanged on the S3W reactor plant it is curious 
that Rickover would later propose that the UK purchase this plant. However, the first 
serious proposal to the UK to purchase a US naval reactor was made 5 October 1957 
when Rickover offered a USS Nautilus plant (to the First Lord, Selkirk) at a cost 
between $11.4M and $15M.41 
 
There does not appear to have been any Ministerial debate on the subject, which seems 
to highlight some political indifference to the programme however, it is recorded by Sir 
Frederick Brundrett, the Royal Navy’s Scientific Advisor, that Eisenhower and 
Macmillan had mentioned the nuclear submarine in conversation.42 In mid-October, 
Mountbatten had arranged for Sandys and other high-ranking officials to go to sea in the 
USS Nautilus as a physical demonstration of a nuclear submarine’s capabilities, it is 
possible that the subject was brought up during the voyage. The merits of the proposal 
were, however, discussed by senior officials within the Admiralty and the MoD. 
Writing to Sir Richard Powell, the Permanent Secretary at the MoD, Lang outlined the 
Admiralty’s views on Rickover’s proposals advising that the acquisition of a reactor and 
the propulsion machinery to go with it would be a better proposition than the purchase 
of the reactor on its own.43 Sir John Carroll, Deputy Controller of the Navy, was 
concerned at the thought of buying a “Chinese” copy and posed the question; what use 
could be made by Rolls-Royce if they were to buy replicas of the USS Nautilus from 
the US?44 Mountbatten also discussed the situation and was advised by Wilson that if 
the Admiralty was to buy a complete propulsion unit then it was imperative that the 
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Americans agreed to the Admiralty negotiating full commercial licences to enable the 
UK to manufacture its own future plants.45 
 
Rickover advised in June that he wanted no more technical visits from the UK, his team 
was already busy with the Skipjack class of submarines and the new Polaris submarines, 
also to be powered by the S5W reactor. Rickover paid another visit to the Admiralty 24 
January 1958, and during the meeting he emphasised how much money and effort had 
been spent in the US in pursuit of nuclear propulsion. Despite information being 
exchanged on the Skipjack (S5W) reactor since June 1957, Rickover offered the UK a 
chance to buy a whole Skate (S3W) class propulsion plant, from the reactor to the 
propulsion machinery. Rickover and Mountbatten had discussed the possibility of 
purchasing the whole machinery set prior to the main meeting and is documented as 
presenting the meeting with a “fait accompli”.46 It is recorded that Mountbatten was 
interested in buying a complete machinery unit as early as 1956; it is therefore highly 
probable that he and Rickover discussed the merits of purchasing a complete machinery 
set prior to the meeting.47 Rickover stated that this would give the Admiralty practical 
knowledge and experience to facilitate their research in the field so when it came to 
building further submarines: ‘…we could stand on our own feet. He did not want to see 
us abandon our project’.48 This is in contrast to Eric Grove’s assertion that there was US 
pressure to abandon the project; in making the offer the US wanted to delay the arrival 
of a competing design and influence British ideas in their direction: ‘thus heading off an 
original competitive propulsion concept’.49 It is a fact that the Dounreay prototype was 
designed to produce 20,000SHP whereas the S5W plant produced only 15,000SHP, as 
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William Crowe noted: ‘The Navy’s scientists at Harwell were developing some original 
ideas which showed considerable promise’.50 The promise of something is one thing the 
successful delivery of that promise is another, there were, after all, problems still being 
encountered. 
 
Crowe was a Commander in the USN at the time of writing his thesis and much of the 
data for Chapter VI, Atoms to Polaris, came from three extensive interviews he held in 
the UK with individuals connected with the project since the early days. Crowe 
concedes that their testimony could not be confirmed in public documents, it is 
unfortunate that the individuals are not named in the bibliography to assist in locating 
the necessary documents in the National Archives.51 However, from the extensive 
records researched no evidence was found of the Americans attempting to coerce the 
Admiralty into abandoning their own research. Crowe notes that some opposition to the 
purchase of the S5W came from highly placed individuals rankled by Rickover’s 
abrasive manner: ‘…the detached observer can hardly resist the conclusion that it was 
inspired by personal dislike rather than sober deliberation’.52 There were high ranking 
officers, such as Vice Admiral Elkins, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, who 
described him as a “spoilt American child”, but it is doubtful that they would have 
allowed personalities to interfere with their professional judgement.53 Indeed, Elkins 
accompanied Rickover on his January 1958 visit to the Admiralty and had fore-warned 
Brundrett that Rickover would suggest that we buy a reactor on favourable terms and: 
‘…that we go on with our own development causing as little interference as possible 
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with his’.54 As seen in the previous sub-chapter, there was indeed opposition to the 
purchase of the S5W and whilst some of this was due to loss of professional control 
much of it revolved around the UK’s independence to operate in the promising 
commercial aspects of nuclear propulsion that was foreseen in the mid-1950s. 
 
Whilst it is tempting to correlate the Admiralty’s reactor research with the UK’s 
development of the hydrogen bomb which led Macmillan to remark that “in some 
respects we are as far ahead and even further advanced in the art than the Americans”, 
the evidence researched does indicate that the Admiralty was having problems with the 
control rods and design of the fuel elements and would benefit from American 
information. It is of interest to note here that the detonation of the UK’s hydrogen bomb 
led John Simpson to investigate the hypothesis that: ‘…the resultant Anglo-American 
agreements were negotiated from a position of British technological strength’.55 Whilst 
this may have been true of the bomb makers which, together with the launch of Sputnik, 
did allow for the eventual repeal of the McMahon Act and signing of the Mutual 
Defence Agreement 1958, it is evident this did not apply to nuclear propulsion. Article 
III which allowed for the transfer of a submarine nuclear propulsion plant also limited 
the exchange of information (and replacement cores and fuel elements) to a period of 
ten years.56 As if to signify US dominance in the area of nuclear propulsion, the transfer 
of nuclear information and technologies in other areas continued. The decision to limit 
this part of the Agreement was political rather than military as it was Congress that 
legislated to allow the UK to purchase the S5W reactor. 
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Given Rickover’s knowledge of UK research, it is difficult to conceive that he saw the 
Admiralty’s research advanced enough to pose a threat to American dominance in the 
field. Indeed, one could question what the potential market for nuclear submarine 
reactors was, given that over sixty years later only six nations operate nuclear-powered 
submarines. The UK’s market would have had small potential for growth with possibly 
only the Canadians and French buying from the UK. Furthermore, none of the private 
correspondence and papers from the officers interviewed hint at any evidence of US 
pressure on the Admiralty to abandon their research. Had such pressure been exerted it 
is doubtful that the officers involved in the project would not have known of it. In 
discussions, the subject of US pressure to abandon Admiralty research was never 
brought up, all interviewees were adamant that the US offer was made on the basis to 
give the UK a datum from which to develop its own independent reactor research 
programme with a degree of confidence.57 The final word on this subject has to be 
Rickover’s; in a letter to the Commanding Officer of the USS Nautilus, Commander 
William Anderson, Rickover wrote: ‘…I did this because of my feeling of urgency 
about the international situation, my admiration for the British, and particularly my 
great liking for Admiral Mountbatten’.58 
 
One part of the offer with the prospect to cause problems was Rickover’s insistence that 
the proposal was based on a commercial contract between Westinghouse and Rolls-
Royce, essentially, Rolls-Royce was to manufacture the fuel elements under licence in 
the UK. Sir Edwin Plowden, Chairman of the UKAEA, wrote to Lang to record his 
opposition to the proposal as it was contrary to the Admiralty/UKAEA agreement on 
the submarine project, ran counter to government policy and was an uneconomical 
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method of meeting the requirement.59 Powell informed Macmillan that Rickover’s offer 
would be discussed at the next Defence Committee meeting and that the possibility of 
Rolls-Royce manufacturing fuel elements needed to be resolved.60 Subsequently, at the 
Defence Committee meeting, the offer was approved in principle and the First Lord was 
advised to urgently consult with the Chancellor, concerning finance, and the UKAEA, 
concerning fuel element production, prior to submitting the proposal to the Prime 
Minister.61 Rickover’s insistence on Rolls-Royce removed the Admiralty’s option to 
choose its own supplier. Up to this point Vickers Nuclear Engineering Limited 
coordinated the project work and Vickers-Armstrongs could have been expected to get 
the bulk of the contracted work on HMS Dreadnought. 
 
IV. Choices and Decisions 
With the offer on the table, there were now decisions to be made whether to accept the 
S3W or request the S5W. There was also an assessment to be made as to whether to 
purchase just the reactor plant and associated equipment, or to include the full 
propulsion machinery set. It has been asserted that: ‘Rickover tried to fob off the British 
with the type of plant used in the U.S.S. Skate,’ but this is untrue.62 Rickover offered the 
Skate machinery plant because it was already proven; however, discussions began 
almost immediately on whether to accept the offer of the Skate plant or whether an 
attempt should be made to purchase the Skipjack plant which better suited the Navy’s 
requirements.63 Brundrett advised Sandys to accept Rickover’s offer of the S3W in 
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principle but to explore the possibility of substituting it for a larger plant, the 
disadvantage being that USS Skate was much smaller than HMS Dreadnought.64  
Mountbatten noted that Rickover’s proposal would cost $22M for the complete plant 
and the requisite training, in contrast US expenditure on nuclear propulsion research and 
development had been in the region of $750M, the savings to the British project is 
evident.65 Mountbatten also noted that there was agreement that the preference was for 
the S5W plant; there was a further discussion with Rickover at which Sandys explained 
that the Royal Navy would prefer to have a submarine with characteristics akin to the 
USS Skipjack.66 The advantages of a single screw and a hull form, as demonstrated by 
the conventionally powered submarine USS Albacore, had been recorded by the Royal 
Navy as early as February 1955.67 At a submarine policy conference in February 1956 it 
had been recommended that the first nuclear submarine should have an Albacore hull, 
the Staff Requirement for HMS Dreadnought was issued 31 October 1957, and had 
similar characteristics to USS Skipjack.68 In fact, the contracts for HMS Dreadnought’s 
hull and machinery had been placed with Vickers-Armstrongs between February and 
May 1957 which indicates how far the Admiralty’s project had advanced.69 Accepting 
the Skate machinery set would have involved a major re-drawing of the submarine’s 
hull to accommodate two shafts, the difference in machinery weights and to take 
account of the lower power; the S3W was rated 6600SHP whereas Dreadnought was 
designed for 15,000-20,00SHP (the S5W was 15,000SHP). Furthermore, the 
Admiralty’s reactor had been designed along similar lines to the S5W so there could be 
little objection concerning doubts UK machinery could be matched to the S5W.70 
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Rickover did not mind which power plant the Admiralty sought from the US and 
appreciated that the S5W was a more attractive proposition. It was advised that the S5W 
could cost as much as $29M and take nine months longer to deliver, however, Rickover 
did advise that the decision over which plant to pursue was one for the Admiralty to 
make, he preferred the S3W as it was a proven design.71 It is apparent from files 
researched that Rickover was happy to support the Admiralty’s request to purchase 
whichever reactor the Admiralty decided upon without further influence from him. 
 
With Rickover’s tacit support secured, the Admiralty conducted an initial appraisal of 
the S3W and S5W reactor plants. Almost immediately the S3W was discounted as it 
was a type of submarine which the Navy did not require which, incidentally, was also 
the opinion of the US Navy which had cut the order of the Skate class due to their 
insufficient speed and capacity to stock the necessary operational equipment. After a 
short discussion it was concluded that due to the differences in the weight of the 
machinery, the S5W reactor plant would be the better proposition. The memorandum 
concluded that some thought be given to the views before a final agreement was sought 
with the US.72 A table produced by the Director Naval Construction Department 
illustrated the basic characteristics of a US/UK Skate, a US/UK Skipjack and 
Dreadnought. The striking differences were endurance at high speed of 2000 hours for a 
US/UK Skate compared to 3000 hours for a US/UK Skipjack, a thirty day and ninety 
day patrol period respectively and a capacity to carry eighteen torpedoes and twenty-
four torpedoes.73 There were two further factors in favour of the S5W; it was designed 
for a single shaft, which would fit into HMS Dreadnought with little modification to the 
hull. Secondly, the Royal Navy’s advanced 2001 sonar, under development at Portland, 
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could be installed rather than sonar with an inferior capability and range acquisition. 
Reid wrote that the S5W would enable the Admiralty to develop a nuclear submarine 
similar to the USS Skipjack’s performance and in some respects surpass it. Reid also 
noted that it could possibly lead to development: ‘…at a later date, of a British 
submarine armed with the Polaris weapon’.74  
 
The other subject requiring a decision was to either purchase the reactor plant and 
associated control equipment only, or to include all the propulsion machinery. The 
merits of procuring the reactor and equipment within the reactor compartment, and of 
procuring all feasible US equipment aft of the forward reactor compartment bulkhead 
were subject to much debate. Mountbatten was in favour of purchasing the full 
propulsion set, as First Sea Lord he could use his influence but ultimately would have to 
regard the advice of the Controller (who in turn would be advised by E-in-C and other 
engineering department heads).  Initially, members from DPT, DNC and DEE 
departments concluded that it would be best if the US was requested to supply the 
reactor plant only, their reasons included; differences in machinery, British design effort 
to date would be wasted and a large number of conventional machinery orders would 
need cancelling. However, RANP thought it unwise to fit British conventional 
machinery without first testing it shore-side.75 During a discussion on the merits of the 
Skate or Skipjack reactors, Rear Admiral A. G. Mumma USN, Chief of the USN Bureau 
of Ships, was reported as being in favour of the Admiralty buying Skipjack but: ‘…also 
expressed a strong opinion that we should obtain an entire plant from reactor to 
propeller’.76 It is noted in the same correspondence that the Staff Engineering Officer 
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(Propulsion) in Washington was against this advice; it would certainly seem at this 
juncture that the engineering advice was going against Mountbatten’s plans. As late as 
May, Mountbatten was advised that it would be helpful to inform Mumma and Rickover 
that the Admiralty would probably order the full machinery set, which indicates that a 
decision had still to be made.77 
 
The Chancellor, Derek Heathcoat-Amory, replied to Macmillan’s request for his views 
and advised that he was prepared to accept the offer of the Skate plant on condition that 
the overall cost would be about £8M, that expenditure over the next three years would 
not exceed what was already planned and that dollar expenditure was kept to a 
minimum. Heathcoat-Amory also advised that Rolls-Royce should not have a monopoly 
on the fuel elements.78 The Chancellor also wrote in reply to Sandys the same day, there 
is no mention of the USS Skipjack alternative in either of the Chancellor’s replies and it 
has to be assumed that he gave his views only on the cheaper, S3W offer.79 It is clear 
that at this stage, when a decision upon which plant to adopt had yet to be made the 
Admiralty was pushing hard on the Treasury for the S5W.80 A decision had still to be 
made when the Ambassador in Washington, Sir Harold Caccia, wrote to the Secretary 
of State, John Dulles to advise that he had been instructed by HM Government to 
enquire whether the US Government was prepared to sell a complete nuclear propulsion 
plant as laid out in the enclosed Admiralty’s memorandum.81 After much 
correspondence between officials and Ministers stating the military advantages of the 
S5W and corresponding savings to be made in research and development, the 
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Chancellor wrote to Sandys to agree to the decision to buy the Skipjack machinery at a 
cost in the region of $23M (approximately £9M) and that the First Lord was to notify 
the US Government accordingly.82 In May, the Technical Chief Executive, Baker, 
chaired a meeting to discuss the purchase of S5W and main propulsion machinery and 
decide on the extent of the machinery to be purchased.83 The US was duly informed that 
the whole Skipjack machinery set was to be purchased with the exception of the 
propeller, shaft and other itemised equipment. In June, the USAEC agreed to an 
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, 1954, in effect this would allow the acquisition 
of the S5W by the UK Government as enacted in the Mutual Defence Agreement, 
1958.84 With political acceptance of the Royal Navy’s requirement for the S5W, and 
commercial discussions proceeding between Westinghouse and Rolls-Royce, the Royal 
Navy could begin to focus its attention on the management of the project which was 
under sustained criticism from all involved. 
 
These events suggest that Mountbatten did meet with resistance to his plan to purchase 
the whole machinery set rather than try to adapt prototype British propulsion machinery 
to the S5W plant, which may have been met with difficulties. In later life, Mountbatten 
seems to have been uncertain if the correct decision had been made, when Mountbatten 
met Jacobsen at Chatham Dockyard in 1977, he asked if he had done the right thing to 
which Jacobsen replied he had.85 Two years later, visiting the Royal Naval Engineering 
College at Manadon, he posed the same question to Hammersley, noting that he had 
gone against the advice of his top engineers Hammersley also replied that he had.86 
However, one “top engineer” had been in favour, Baker, who it was reported, deemed 
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that the Dreadnought project had been a success in part due to Rickover selling Britain 
the S5W and: ‘…second to me for insisting that this S5W be used by us in an 
environment similar to Skipjack’.87 Baker had the final say in the Dreadnought Project 
Team, and it is assumed that Mountbatten took the advice of the meeting Baker had 
chaired and disregarded the dissenters who were possibly looking after the interests of 
their own departments. They had, after all, initially objected to attempts to set up the 
combined engineering project team that became the DPT in late 1957. 
 
V. Mountbatten Corrections 
During research it became apparent that there are anomalies of events in Mountbatten’s 
official biography by Philip Ziegler. By his own admission, Mountbatten had very little 
information in his archives relating to the development of nuclear propulsion. 
Mountbatten’s intention was to write the events from memory and then correct them 
from records at the National Archives and with input from people who had something to 
contribute. Mountbatten forwarded a rough draft of the relevant chapter to Hammersley 
for him to comment on, Mountbatten advised: ‘There is no hurry about a reply as I, 
myself, am off to Ireland for a month at the end of this week’. 88 Mountbatten was 
murdered by the IRA 27 August 1979; his draft to Hammersley went uncorrected and 
parts are in his official biography. Hammersley recorded that he thought long and hard 
about what to do about the letter and its draft enclosure before deciding to do nothing. 
Hammersley regretted his decision as the official biography contains some errors which 
Mountbatten: ‘…would not have known about, and I wish that I had corrected them’.89 
The biography references the draft copy in footnote 40 on page 557 (MB1/K208A) and 
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although not all the draft was used in the biography the errors contained in the draft and 
the biography are addressed here for future reference. 
 
Mountbatten took up his appointment as First Sea Lord 18 April 1955, at which time 
there had been no formal decision as to which type of vessel the first PWR nuclear 
propulsion reactor should be fitted. As discussed in the sub-chapter, “Admiral Hyman 
G. Rickover USN”, an appreciation by the Naval Section had advised that a submarine 
be the first vessel fitted with a pressurised water reactor and had already been submitted 
to a sub-Committee of the Ship Design Policy Committee a few days prior to 
Mountbatten’s appointment. In July, the Director of Plans advised Mountbatten that a 
proposal would shortly be placed before the Board to design and build a nuclear 
submarine, money for the submarine had been included in the long-term defence 
programme.90 As examined in chapter three, the Admiralty’s letter to the Treasury 
outlining the project was sent 8 December 1955 and formal authority to proceed was 
received 6 January 1956. Mountbatten’s notes and Ziegler’s biography refer to a 
meeting at which Mountbatten arranged for a model of a nuclear submarine to be placed 
opposite the Chancellor’s seat, whom they identify as Heathcoat-Amory. Supposedly 
this was the meeting that Mountbatten describes as getting our: ‘…first nuclear 
submarine authorised’.91 Heathcoat-Amory was Chancellor January 1958 to July 1960; 
the Chancellor in 1955 was R. A. Butler with Harold Macmillan taking over the office 
from December 1955 to January 1957, it is possible that Mountbatten was referring to a 
Meeting discussing the decision to purchase the S3W or S5W. As to whether the holder 
of the second most powerful office in Government could be swayed in a momentous 
financial decision by the trinket of a model submarine, even by someone of 
Mountbatten’s stature, is open to debate. The only model referred to in the files is of the 
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Skipjack which was offered to Mountbatten by Rickover in 1958; there is no record as 
to whether Mountbatten received the model.92 There is, however, a model which 
matches Mountbatten’s description in the Office of Naval Reactors, Washington D.C.93 
 
As recorded earlier, it is documented that Mountbatten and Rickover held discussions 
on the merits of procuring not only the reactor plant but also all feasible US machinery 
aft of the forward reactor compartment bulkhead. According to Mountbatten’s version 
of events he presented his case for purchasing the whole machinery set to the 
Committee at the main meeting. On completion of the presentations he advised that he 
would report to the First Lord and get a Board of Admiralty decision on this important 
matter due to the considerable disagreement among the Committee. ‘I was successful in 
getting the complete SKIPJACK propulsion plant including the steam turbine from the 
Americans included in the DREADNOUGHT’.94 It has been presented in this thesis 
from archival evidence that the offer at the 24 January meeting was for the Skate (S3W) 
plant and machinery set. No decision was made on exactly what to purchase for some 
time after when the Minister of Defence and the Chancellor both agreed to the 
Admiralty’s case to purchase the Skipjack machinery and the Foreign Office was 
advised to inform the British Ambassador in Washington, Harold Caccia, accordingly.95  
 
The idea that “Rickover tried to fob off the British with the S3W” has already been 
addressed in this chapter and evidence presented. One further anomaly remains in the 
biography causing confusion over the S3W and S5W plants. The story of Mountbatten 
seeing a newer version (the more powerful S5W reactor) in the Skipjack when he visited 
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in October 1958 after which: ‘…there were no more suggestions that the British might 
make do with Skate’, does not fit in with the narrative and the evidence presented.96 
Mountbatten is recorded as having visited the USS Skipjack during his US/Canada tour 
in October 1958 but this was too late to have any effect.97 The decision to purchase the 
S5W had already been made and the MDA Act, allowing for the purchase of the S5W 
and complete machinery set had already come into law that summer. 
 
In reference to future submarine propulsion units Mountbatten appears to have 
overlooked two basic facts: the UK’s pressurised water reactor and main propulsion 
machinery were already well developed by 1958 and future submarines would have an 
all British reactor plant with Core A based upon the S5W core and a British designed 
main machinery set. There was never any intention to make “Chinese” copies of the 
S5W only to use it as a datum from which to develop the UK’s own pressurised water 
reactor. With no further information on nuclear propulsion reactors forthcoming from 
the US any UK produced copies of the S5W would have soon become moribund and 
obsolete. Mountbatten wrote: ‘…I suggested that we should go on with the SKIPJACK 
equipment for the future’.98 Mountbatten thought that there was a plot to fit British 
designed propulsion plants as soon as he left the Admiralty however, Mountbatten was 
wrong, this was never the case. Hammersley later noted: ‘I do not believe that there was 
any question of Valiant and later Submarines being anything other than all British’, this 
is borne out by the official records at the National Archives and the evidence has been 
presented.99 
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VI. Management and Establishment of the Dreadnought Project Team 
Mason’s precis of his discussions with Rickover in 1956, also recorded Rickover’s 
views on the management of the project. Rickover was emphatic that the organisation: 
‘…required a man with “fire in his belly” […] the remainder of us came under the 
category “quiet and contented cows”’.100 Mason had already been thinking about 
changing the management structure but his discussions with Rickover altered his view 
on how it should be completed, the main recommendation proposed by Mason was the 
appointment of a deputy to oversee responsibility for nuclear propulsion. Mason 
recommended his deputy for Fleet Maintenance, Rear Admiral G. A. M. Wilson for the 
post: ‘I think he would fulfil Rickover’s idea of having “fire in his belly”; certainly he is 
not a “quiet contented cow”’.101 Wilson was appointed RANP in February 1957.102 
However, it was not only Rickover that was critical of the Admiralty’s management of 
the project, the UKAEA was also concerned. 
 
At a meeting of the Atomic Energy Executive (AEX) Lord Portal thought, with the 
possibility of information being exchanged on submarine reactors soon, it would be 
useful to review the progress and organisation of the project. Sir Christopher Hinton 
shared Sir John Cockcroft’s view that a detailed examination of the organisation was 
required before detailed criticism and remedial proposals could be produced.103 It was 
noted that the Admiralty and Vickers-Armstrongs were aware of some weakness in the 
project and it was thought that they would welcome an offer by the Authority to conduct 
an examination of the engineering aspect. Subsequently, Plowden visited Lord Weeks, 
Chairman of Vickers-Armstrongs, to express his uneasiness with the project. Weeks 
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advised that he was confident with the organisation but would welcome advice from 
Risley on the engineering side. Plowden informed Weeks that if the project was to be a 
success a good project engineer should have complete responsibility for management of 
the project. Plowden advised Weeks that he intended to have a senior engineer from 
Risley chair the Advisory Engineering Committee and suggested when he returned from 
the US in March that he might want to hold discussions with Hinton on how Risley 
could help with the organisation.104 
 
The head of the Physics Division, J. V. Dunworth, had held a series of meetings with 
Harrison-Smith and one with Wilson, subsequently he wrote to Basil Schonland, 
Deputy Director of Harwell, with his findings. Within the Admiralty organisation, 
Harrison-Smith and Wilson had no control over Naval Construction (DNC) nor the 
Instrument and Control Group (DEE). Dunworth noted that the DNC and other 
Admiralty Departments would oppose any erosion of their authority: ‘…Harrison-Smith 
has been trying to do a very difficult job without adequate authority’.105 Dunworth also 
reported that the Vickers Group had no proper executive control over its various 
business units and concluded that the Admiralty was not prepared to give authority over 
the project to one man and that the firms were top heavy. By mid-March, the AEX had 
received a report on the submarine project compiled by Hinton at the request of 
Plowden. Hinton cautioned his conclusions: ‘…that the overall organisation is 
unsatisfactory’, was based on information from Rolls-Royce and Admiral Rebbeck of 
Vickers-Armstrongs, no discussions were held with the Admiralty.106 
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Hinton describes the disparate Admiralty organisation thus; the hull of the submarine is 
being designed by DNC whose Department is based at Bath, the propulsion systems 
have to be manufactured to the requirements of E-in-C’s Department also at Bath, 
although E-in-C has his office in London. RANP has recently been appointed and has 
an office in London, Harrison-Smith heads a small team at Harwell involved in 
experimental work which also considers and approves all proposals and designs for the 
reactor which are developed by Rolls-Royce in Derby. The design and construction of 
the power plant is the responsibility of the Vickers/Rolls-Royce Group comprised of 
Vickers-Armstrongs, Rolls-Royce and Metropolitan-Vickers (their offices based at 
Barrow, Derby and London respectively). The shielding was being designed under Dr. 
Forsythe, based at Barrow but his team carrying out the work are located at 
Southampton. Hinton could not see a submarine being developed within a reasonable 
period without an integrated design team composed of members of the three firms and a 
senior member of the DNC Department working in a single office. Hinton advised that 
this integrated team should be responsible to a single senior officer at the Admiralty. 
Wilson noted in his report of his visit to see Hinton, the project was: ‘…being handled 
in far too many places without really effective co-ordination’.107 It can be appreciated 
how awkward it must have been to work between so many different groups at various 
geographic locations, with several managers responsible for the different aspects of the 
project and it goes to the heart of Rickover’s philosophy of responsibility and having 
one person answerable. It was a philosophy that took the Admiralty some time to adopt. 
 
Plowden called to see Lang at the Admiralty and showed him Hinton’s report but did 
not leave a copy. Lang appreciated Plowden’s candour and wanted to discuss with 
Hinton and the Controller measures to adopt to improve the organisation.108 Lang and 
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Rear Admiral Peter Dawnay, the Deputy Controller, met with UKAEA representatives 
to discuss the criticisms and formulate plans to restructure the management. The 
Admiralty members were advised that if the UKAEA was responsible for the project 
they would look to design the whole power plant from a single office as opposed to 
what was currently happening. Wilson too, was looking at means of changing the 
organisation but had only been in post a month and needed time to familiarise himself 
with the administration of the project and the responsibilities of the various component 
agencies. On his return from the Technical Mission visit to the US, Wilson reported to 
Reid that the US displayed a firm cohesive direction in its organisation which was: 
‘…lacking in ours both on the Admiralty and Contractual side’.109 A directive was 
issued by the Controller 16 August with the intention of strengthening the Admiralty 
organisation with the creation of a team of specialists advising on technical and 
production decisions under the authority of a team leader. The leader of the team would 
only have to seek higher authority if there were significant changes affecting costs or 
performance. A Dreadnought Task Group meeting was held 21 August to give effect to 
the directive and a draft Terms of Reference, C.E.4759/57, was circulated 28 August.110 
 
The Admiralty lost no time in moving its personnel and contractors to central locations, 
the same day C.E.4759/57 was circulated, Harrison-Smith wrote to Schonland to advise 
that as part of the reorganisation, personnel not involved with the operation of 
experimental equipment, such as Neptune and LIDO, would be removed from 
Harwell.111 Harrison-Smith and others would move to Bath and Jack Edwards would 
remain as senior naval representative in charge of the remaining RNSS staff. Schonland 
was also advised that a combined contractors’ team was being set up at Derby to design 
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the reactor and its primary circuit.112 Roger Berry was appointed to the Naval Section in 
January 1956 and recalls of his time there that Harwell: ‘…under the direction of Sir 
John Cockcroft, did not appear to be very interested in the Naval Programme’. Berry 
notes his own role at Harwell as maintaining contact with E-in-C’s Submarine Section 
whose interests were the new Porpoise and Oberon class submarines, HTP submarines 
and the development of recycle diesel. ‘…they made it fairly clear that they did not 
want to get involved with nuclear,’ Berry captures, from a junior member’s perspective, 
the apparent disinterest of both the AERE and his contacts in the E-in-C’s 
Department.113 Berry describes Harrison-Smith as pleasant, but aloof, and being away 
frequently for long periods visiting Dounreay and Derby. Berry also commented that it 
was never made clear to him what his responsibilities were and that other members of 
the Naval Section seemed to be doing “his own thing”. Berry’s notes give an insight, at 
a local level, into the apparently muddled management of the Naval Section. The notes 
were written in 2009, and by his own admission Berry did not enjoy his time at Harwell 
noting that it had been a wasted opportunity due to the lack of direction which was only 
resolved with the formation of a unified project team. Berry was associated with the 
programme for many years having moved to Bath as a member of the project team, he 
was later appointed to the Dreadnought Liaison Engineers (DLE) team, under Captain 
Cotman, in the USA. 
 
Now the project organisation was being dealt with, Schonland wrote to Wilson to offer 
some thoughts on how the organisation should be managed and to seek clarification on 
the Authority’s role in the project. Wilson replied that the Naval Board had approved 
the formation of a Dreadnought team which was being centred on the engineering 
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departments at Bath, initially under the management of Harrison-Smith. This would 
enable a project leader to have direct contact with specialist electrical and engineering 
technical advice and have overall control for the project; the team being removed from 
Harwell would form the focus of a new reactor specialist section. Wilson draws 
attention to the formal agreement, C.P.60801/56, between the Admiralty and the 
UKAEA; this letter, dated 8 February 1957, was the document against which Wilson 
felt that co-operation should be measured.114 In his reply Wilson also gave Schonland 
an outline of the Dreadnought organisation in which he reiterated that: ‘…the Project 
Team Leader will be the key man for the whole project,’ however, Schonland disagreed; 
as he viewed the organisation, it was the Deputy Engineer in Chief as the real controller 
of the project.115 It is apparent that the Admiralty and the UKAEA had differing ideas of 
what form the organisation should take and it could be argued that it was the Admiralty 
that was unwilling to adopt the business model required to make the project a success. 
Although not directed at officials in the Admiralty, Wilson’s frustration at the lack of 
progress in the project is apparent when, in relation to waiting for Ministerial/Treasury 
approval to proceed with the purchase of highly enriched uranium he commented: 
‘…vacillation of this kind, which is symptomatic of the uncertainty surrounding this 
project, can only result ultimately in delay in completion’.116 
 
The Dreadnought Propulsion Project Team (DPT) was formed under Office 
Memorandum 214/57, dated 8 November 1957. The memorandum acknowledged that 
the project required a novel approach and adaptation of the normal Admiralty 
organisation, the key responsibilities were outlined, and channels of communication 
highlighted. It was made clear that all departments involved were expected: ‘…to 
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collaborate with the Team and to give full and prompt assistance whenever this is 
requested’.117 The DPT comprised the following sections and responsibilities; DPT1 – 
Dounreay Submarine Prototype, DPT2 – Mechanical Engineering Ship Section 
(Secondary Systems), DPT3 – Rector, DPT4 – Electrical Section, DPT5 – Reactor 
Control Systems, DPT6 – Primary Systems (Excluding Reactor) and DPT7 – Nuclear 
Safety.118 According to official papers, the DPT began work in its full integrated form 
on 18 November however, there appears to have been a delay between its formation and 
it becoming fully functional.119 From private papers and correspondence it is apparent 
that some early members of the DPT did not join at its formation and whilst this could 
be due to the appointments system in the Royal Navy, one member who joined in 
December 1957 gives a different view. Although the Board of Admiralty had instructed 
the Secretary of the Navy to set up the DPT at Bath with staff from three Departments 
there was a delay, which has been described as a rear-guard action by Lang: ‘…who had 
refused to sanction the provision of office furniture etc for a project he deemed to be 
unnecessary’.120 On reflection it has to be questioned why the Admiralty set up the DPT 
with a Captain as team leader, even on a temporary basis. Initially, Harrison-Smith was 
appointed team leader (possibly to provide continuity) he was soon to be relieved by 
Captain Terence Ridley. A Captain in the Royal Navy is a rank below “one star” and it 
could be argued, would not have the authority to demand the resources required from 
the other departments. Wilson was a “two star” (Rear Admiral) rank but his role within 
the organisation was subject to review.121 Under Wilson’s planned reorganisation it was 
he who controlled the team leader and the firms, the team leader had no control over the 
firms only the Admiralty Departments.122 It is evident from the files researched that the 
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Admiralty thought the organisation as conceived would suffice to address the criticisms 
of the organisation’s failings, it manifestly did not.  
 
Although the organisational changes had yet to bed in, the Admiralty still received 
strong criticism from all participants, including naval officers. Sir Frederick Brundrett 
wrote to Mountbatten to inform him that he had received: ‘…very bitter criticism that 
the Admiralty organisation for handling this business is deplorable’.123 The same day, 
Lang received a letter from Plowden strongly condemning the weakness of control and 
direction given by the Admiralty.124 Whilst some of the criticism was possibly due to 
delays in getting the DPT functioning properly, it was surely that the control of the 
organisation did not seem strong enough to manage the project and elicit the required 
assistance of the other Departments. To address Plowden’s criticisms, Lang held 
discussions with Reid and the relevant Admiralty Departments after which he wrote to 
Mountbatten and Selkirk wanting an opportunity to explain the conclusions reached and 
their proposals. Essentially, the key feature of their proposals was: ‘…the concentration 
of executive control of the project in a Chief Executive who possesses the technical 
qualifications, status and driving force necessary for the discharge of the functions 
proposed for him’.125  Lang and Reid subsequently held discussions with Strath in 
which they advised that it was the Admiralty’s intention to appoint Rowland (Roly) 
Baker as Chief Executive. Baker was a Chief Constructor in the RCNC, a civilian rank 
equivalent to Rear Admiral, importantly, it was envisaged that the Chief Executive 
would have direct access to: ‘…the Director of Naval Construction, Engineer-in-Chief 
and Electrical Engineer-in-Chief in any case where there is a deadlock in his dealings 
with these Admiralty Divisions’.126 A meeting was held the following day with Strath, 
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members of the Admiralty, Rolls-Royce and Vickers-Armstrongs, Lang allowed the 
firms to take away the proposals and asked them to send their opinions. In early 
January, Baker, whose appointment was yet to be approved by the Treasury, was being 
introduced to the component parts of the organisation such as members of Vickers-
Armstrongs and the Chief Engineer at Risley. Baker’s formal appointment and the 
organisation for control of the DPT was circulated in Office Memorandum C.2/58, 
finally, the Admiralty had someone ultimately responsible for the whole nuclear 
submarine project.127 
 
VII. Purchase of the S5W Reactor 
As with any piece of quality-controlled engineering there is a question of inspection 
and, crucially, competency. With the signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement 3 July 
1958 the Admiralty was able to purchase the S5W reactor, however, questions soon 
surfaced surrounding inspection of the equipment to be supplied and the competency of 
the people doing the work. During initial negotiations, the UKAEA stated that in order 
to be satisfied that the plant was safe they would require a competent US organisation to 
inspect the equipment and supply certification that it was to specification. However, the 
Admiralty drew the UKAEA’s attention to Rickover’s statements to the Joint 
Congressional Hearings on the amendment to the US Atomic Energy Act during which 
Rickover made it clear that he did not visualise the US Government having 
responsibility with regard to safety. In buying the reactor on a commercial basis, 
Westinghouse would make a nuclear core for the UK in the same factory as the 
American cores and the UK would provide inspectors to examine the various items and 
choose whether to accept them. ‘When they accept delivery, if anything goes wrong it is 
their business. We will be out of it as a government […] and have no further 
                                                     





responsibility’.128 The problem was that the S5W was being built to American 
standards, so the necessary documentation and data needed to be supplied for the 
equipment to be inspected against. In reply, the UKAEA advised that Rolls-Royce and 
Westinghouse should provide the necessary inspection procedure for the Admiralty to 
arrange independent inspection by either an organisation such as Lloyds or the 
Admiralty’s own engineering surveyors.129 Wilson advised Reid, Baker and others that 
accepting the machinery from the US was a UK responsibility and therefore, it was 
important to urgently select the inspection staff and put them through a suitable course 
of nuclear training before they proceed to the US.130 
 
Baker headed a team to Washington to obtain information on the S5W to enable the 
design of HMS Dreadnought to be completed from a shipbuilding point of view. HMS 
Dreadnought would eventually be constructed of an entirely UK designed front end 
encompassing a new bow array sonar, torpedo discharge system and other unique 
British advancements. The after end would require a complete redesign to accommodate 
the S5W reactor, the propulsion machinery and the auxiliary machinery as it was 
intended that the machinery arrangement would be identical to the USS Skipjack 
layout.131 During these discussions, Baker was advised that the Naval Reactors Branch 
would not make available the Safety Committee report on the reactor or any information 
on discussions between them and the AEC Safety Committee. They would, however, 
provide Westinghouse with sufficient documentation: ‘…to enable the UK Safety 
Committee to make its own assessment’.132 Although there would have been issues 
                                                     
128 TNA, AB 8/791, Technical assessment: Dreadnought reactor, 1957-59, Letter, Peirson to Farmer, 18 
July 1958. 
129 TNA, DEFE 69/749, Letter, Peirson to Wilson, 23 July 1958. 
130 TNA, DEFE 72/45, Letter, RANP 26/7/58, 24 July 1958. 
131 TNA, AB 8/791, Minute, White, 18 September 1958. 
132 TNA, AB 16/2742, United States of America – United Kingdom collaboration on submarine reactor, 





pertaining to intellectual property rights, design rights, and other commercial 
considerations, this decision was to be a handicap to UK designers. With no design 
philosophy to indicate how the present design was reached or what areas of research had 
been abandoned, all the UK had to go on was their research and the S5W as purchased. 
The Admiralty was getting the absolute basics to give a foundation to develop its own 
generic reactor design, they were certainly not getting the entire US knowledge and 
competence they would have liked to receive. Indeed, from the beginning the US had 
refused to offer any critique of the Admiralty’s nuclear propulsion programme as this 
could have been interpreted as the UK benefitting from US nuclear knowledge.133 
 
With the purchase of S5W, it was the Admiralty’s intention to continue development 
based on the current design of the Dreadnought machinery except for the core and 
control mechanisms: ‘…and any other items where advantage can be taken by adopting 
the American design’.134 This statement indicates a high degree of confidence in the 
Admiralty’s own design and corroborates Professor Jack Edwards’ opinion that the UK 
would have built its own reactor, independent of US influence, albeit would have taken 
some two years longer. ‘It would not have been as good as Skipjack […] but it would 
have been entirely of our own design and would not have made us so dependent on the 
whim of the US Congress on the passage of further information to us’.135 Although 
Edwards’ views are given with the hindsight of forty years, they do illustrate that not 
everyone associated with the project was keen to see their hard work apparently 
abandoned in favour of the American S5W and chimes with Crowe’s observations 
concerning opposition to the purchase of S5W. It is apparent from the memorandum 
however, that the designers were struggling with certain aspects of the core design and a 
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safe and reliable control mechanism for the reactor, (hafnium was a rare metal and in 
short supply in the UK). This was possibly one of the reasons why Mountbatten pushed 
for American technology so it would advance HMS Dreadnought’s commissioning. 
 
Rolls-Royce was appointed as the Admiralty’s agent 11 August 1958 and two days later 
was authorised to open negotiations with Westinghouse to purchase the S5W and 
associated machinery.136 So that the US nuclear propulsion programme was not 
interrupted, Rickover required Westinghouse to establish a separate organisation known 
as the Westinghouse Special Atomic Programme (WSAP). One of the most contentious 
points was Rickover’s absolute refusal to allow Rolls-Royce to sub-contract the 
manufacture of the fuel elements; in effect this meant the UKAEA which had the UK 
monopoly on their production. The UKAEA released the Admiralty from its obligation 
to have them manufacture the fuel elements should: ‘…the Admiralty want to make 
other arrangements’.137 Lang wrote to Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, to 
forewarn him that because of Rickover’s insistence on Rolls-Royce manufacturing the 
fuel elements there would need to be a Ministerial decision on the future policy for fuel 
element manufacturing.138 The Admiralty asked the UKAEA to give an assurance that 
any information passed to them from Westinghouse would only be used for defence 
purposes. The Atomic Energy Executive discussed whether Westinghouse information 
would prevent them from certain commercial activities and decided that if Rolls-Royce 
manufactured the submarine fuel elements the Authority would not require this 
information from Westinghouse.139 After much negotiation, a draft supply contract and 
licensing agreement had been drawn up with a break-down of costs totalling more than 
$29M. This equated to a little more than £10M which was higher than the £8M 
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authorised by the Chancellor in February and resulted from the decision to proceed with 
the S5W rather than S3W reactor and to purchase compatible US propulsion 
machinery.140 The draft agreement allowed fuel elements to be manufactured by others 
after three years effectively ending Rolls-Royce’s monopoly. Lang recommended that 
the Government should endorse the Agreement and Rolls-Royce be allowed to 
manufacture fuel elements.141 The Government accepted that the Admiralty should 
agree to the draft contract, the Admiralty signified their acceptance by forwarding a 
letter of intent to Rolls-Royce advising that a contract would be placed once the 
Westinghouse/Rolls-Royce contract and Licensing Agreement had been endorsed by the 
Government142 
 
When Rickover received the supply contract and Licensing Agreement, he objected to 
the Licensing Agreement stating no one, even he, had the authority to negotiate a 
Licensing Agreement and would not consider the supply contract until the Agreement 
was withdrawn.143 The Licensing Agreement with Westinghouse would have been 
important for two reasons; firstly, exchange of information would have continued for 
the ten years the supply contract was in force thus, the Admiralty would get information 
on improvements in the core design or of any problems encountered. Secondly, 
Westinghouse would have conducted certain research, development and testing for 
Rolls-Royce on repayment.144 Selkirk wrote to Macmillan to advise him that the US had 
insisted on excising large parts of the Licensing Agreement, under which future reactor 
development information would have passed to the UK. Although this was a huge 
disappointment, Selkirk advised that enough remained of the Agreement to make it 
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worthwhile. Selkirk noted that renegotiation was an option to allow future collaboration 
on reactor development; however, it was not an opportune time as Rickover was due to 
visit within a few days and Selkirk wanted to be able to tell Rickover that the 
Government agreed to the contract whilst he was in London.145 In reply, Macmillan 
expressed disappointment that the possibility of future reactor collaboration was much 
reduced, no doubt it was not what he envisaged for the policy of interdependence but he 
agreed to the proposed changes on the understanding they were accepted by the US 
Authorities.146 
 
One major advantage of withdrawing the Licensing Agreement was Rolls-Royce would 
be entitled to manufacture future naval reactors on information received under the 
supply contract without payment of royalties as previously envisaged thus enabling 
substantial future savings in dollar expenditure. Rolls-Royce and Westinghouse reached 
agreement 10 February 1959 which was acceptable to the Admiralty and US 
Authorities. The following day Macmillan approved the contract and the Presidential 
determination, required under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, was made 5 March.147 For 
their money the Admiralty would receive one S5W reactor with a Type 2 core including 
zircaloy fuel elements and hafnium control rods with the associated machinery sited in 
the reactor compartment. The engine room equipment included main turbines, turbo-
generators and a comprehensive list of auxiliary machinery. The total cost which 
included technical and manufacturing assistance, training, shipment etc amounted to 
$29,243,369 which was spread over six years, 1959-1964.148 
 
                                                     
145 TNA, PREM 11/2635, Letter, Selkirk to Macmillan, 28 January 1959. 
146 TNA, T 225/1193, Note, Macmillan to Selkirk, 9 February 1959. 
147 DNP 2, NP184/2011, Agreement Concluded, Contract Signed, p. 51. 
148 TNA, T 225/1191, Development of nuclear submarine, including purchase of machinery from USA: 






Article II of the Agreement allowed for the exchange of information and paragraph five 
in particular related to the: ‘research, development and design of military reactors to the 
extent and by such means as may be agreed’.149 However, although the Admiralty saw 
this paragraph as having the potential for a much wider scope of transferring nuclear 
information, it proved in practice not to be the case. Information flowed through the 
Westinghouse/Rolls-Royce contract under the authority of the USAEC and was 
essentially confined to design and plant instruction type information. Despite attempts 
to open further discussions with the US, the Admiralty was rebuffed by Rickover who 
held a rigid interpretation of the Mutual Defence Agreement focussed on Article III, the 
Bilateral Treaty: ‘…by which Britain was restricted to purchase one set of Reactor and 
Propulsion Machinery only for DREADNOUGHT and “know-how” to permit design 
and manufacture in the future’.150 Writing some years later, Captain E. P. C. Kelly, 
observed that paragraph five had boiled down in practice to the Westinghouse/Rolls-
Royce contract (a new contract between Rolls-Royce and Associates and Electric Boat 
Division of General Electric covered the work linked to Dreadnought’s first refuelling). 
‘It has become evident over the years that this is the limit and with the completion of 
DREADNOUGHT’S refuelling, the flow of information ends’.151 The intentions of “by 
such means as may be agreed” written in paragraph five of Article II would never meet 
the Admiralty’s expectations as it would never be countenanced by Rickover. 
 
VIII. Final adjustments 
The combined contractors’ team that had been set up at Derby in the autumn of 1957 
consisting of engineers from Rolls-Royce, Vickers-Armstrongs and Foster Wheeler 
formed the nucleus of a new company, Rolls-Royce and Associates Ltd. Formed 6 
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February 1959, Rolls-Royce had the controlling stake in the new company with fifty-
two percent of the shares, Vickers-Armstrongs and Foster Wheeler held the remaining 
shares equally.152 Baker called a meeting to clarify the new company’s functions so 
contracts for HMS Dreadnought and her machinery could be finalised. It is clear from 
the Minutes that there was disagreement between the parent companies over Rolls-
Royce and Associates’ functions. Whilst it was agreed that Rolls-Royce and Associates 
would not manufacture any equipment, the Vickers-Armstrongs representatives were 
adamant that Rolls-Royce and Associates should be a design company only whereas the 
Rolls-Royce representatives argued that Rolls-Royce and Associates would also have a 
procurement function. Previously Vickers Nuclear Engineering Limited had managed 
cooperation between Barrow and Derby and the question was asked who now, would 
coordinate the work. Baker wrote: ‘The meeting then degenerated into a coalition of 
intransigence’.153 A further meeting was held at which the three parent companies 
agreed to a procurement function for Rolls-Royce and Associates, it was envisaged that 
the Admiralty would place a contract with the shipbuilder, Vickers-Armstrongs, who 
would be instructed to place a sub-contract with Rolls-Royce and Associates for the 
reactor compartment. Rolls-Royce and Associates in turn would place sub-contracts for 
the detailed design and procurement of the main components of the reactor 
compartment with the parent companies as far as the Admiralty would allow.154 The 
building of a submarine is a complex undertaking and a nuclear-powered submarine 
more so, therefore a further memorandum sought to clarify the relationship between the 
companies. Vickers-Armstrongs (Shipbuilders) was contracted to build the submarine, 
Rolls-Royce held the contract to obtain the reactor and propulsion machinery from the 
US and proposed to use Rolls-Royce and Associates as their managers. Vickers-
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Armstrongs (Engineering) was sub-contracted to install the machinery whilst Rolls-
Royce and Associates and Westinghouse retained technical engineering control of the 
installation.155 In place of Westinghouse, at Dounreay, Foster Wheeler was responsible 
for all the engineering components of the reactor compartment excluding the core and 
control rods. However, disagreement over Vickers-Armstrongs responsibilities and 
Rolls-Royce and Associates’ responsibilities continued for some time; at Dounreay the 
Admiralty thought Rolls-Royce and Associates should be selected as contractor with the 
Chief Engineer a member of that company. It was expected Rolls-Royce and Associates 
would sub-contract to Vickers-Armstrongs (Engineering) the operation of the plant and 
site machinery.156 Whilst there may have been some ill-feeling at Rolls-Royce and 
Associates gaining the Westinghouse contract to the detriment of Vickers-Armstrongs, 
from the correspondence researched, these disagreements must be viewed as a means of 
delineation and clarifying each company’s responsibilities. 
 
The industrial element of the programme had been addressed as had the Royal Navy 
organisation with the formation of the DPT. One other area to attend to was oversight of 
the supply contract in the US. Captain D. A. Cotman and a team of fifteen naval 
engineers, constructors and draughtsmen were appointed to HMS Saker, Washington, to 
oversee the transfer of technical information and inspect manufactured equipment 
coming off the production line. As Dreadnought Liaison Engineer, Cotman and his team 
would work from Westinghouse offices at Pittsburgh and Electric Boat offices at 
Groton.157 The majority of the DLE team, with Rolls-Royce and Associates staff, were 
based at Pittsburgh; Westinghouse was providing the reactor plant and the propulsion 
machinery. A smaller DLE team, with staff from Vickers-Armstrongs was based at 
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Groton. Roger Berry had responsibility for overseeing all mechanical equipment 
procured for HMS Dreadnought by Electric Boat that did not form part of the main 
propulsion or reactor plant package. Other DLE members were Dick Brown (Electrical) 
and Mr. K. Foulger (Construction).158 Apart from overseeing the procurement side of 
the contract, the DLE team at Groton was also responsible for transferring the vast 
amount of supporting documentation to the DPT. Colin Farley-Sutton could be 
described as Berry’s opposite number for it was he, in DPT 2 section, that received the 
technical information from Berry pertaining to practically all the mechanical items not 
forming part of the propulsion system and reactor plant. Farley-Sutton’s job was to 
interpret US naval and industrial details and practices into UK systems and practices, so 
they could be used for ship’s drawings, handbooks and other documentation such as 
maintenance schedules.159 The Royal Navy was just one of the organisations involved in 
the Dreadnought programme receiving technical information transferred from the US; 
Dreadnought’s crew also required reliable and accurate information for training, 
operation of the equipment, maintenance and fault finding. 
 
In March 1959, the first of sixteen officers and thirteen senior rates were appointed to 
HMS Dreadnought. Lieutenant Commander B. F. P. Samborne was appointed 
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Peter (Spam) Hammersley was appointed 
Engineering Officer and Lieutenant Commander R. R. Squires, First Lieutenant. The 
keel for HMS Dreadnought was laid 12 June 1959, the fact that Prince Philip performed 
the keel laying ceremony (an unusual event for a member of the Royal Family to 
perform) reflected the importance the Government now attached to nuclear propulsion 
and, after much initial secrecy, was a means of raising awareness of submarine nuclear 
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propulsion to the general public.160 The nuclear propulsion project by mid-1959 was 
well organised, the DPT had settled into their work and there was one final 
organisational matter to attend to. With Baker now in control of the DPT the post of 
Rear Admiral Nuclear Propulsion was discussed and was dissolved upon Wilson’s 
retirement in December 1959. It was decided that future responsibility for nuclear 
propulsion lay with Director General Ships (DG Ships), Rear Admiral R. S. Hawkins.161 
By February 1961 it was reported that Electric Boat and Westinghouse had more than 
fulfilled their contractual obligations and delivered the majority of the machinery which 
had already been landed on the submarine, the main part to be delivered was the core.162 
 
In more ways than one HMS Dreadnought was a first in many respects. Her bow 
mounted sonar array, Type 2001, was more advanced than any sonar yet developed and 
a priority espionage objective of the Soviet Union.163 A Water Ram Discharge system 
for firing torpedoes was also highly advanced; both these systems were to be fitted 
without the usual prototypes and trials which could have delayed completion by a 
further eighteen months.164 HMS Dreadnought was far in advance of any submarine, 
other than the US Skipjack class, Professor Louis Rydill, designer of Dreadnought’s 
hull, has written of the five milestones in submarine design. First was the Holland, 
tested for the US Navy in 1899; the second milestone was the U35 class with the 
emphasis on surface performance to allow surface transit using diesel engines. The third 
milestone was the type XXI with the emphasis now on streamlining and increased 
battery size. The fourth milestone was the USS Albacore hull form, a radical redesign of 
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the pressure hull. The fifth was USS Skipjack, the result of combining the Albacore hull 
with nuclear power.165 As noted, only six nations have reached the fifth milestone in 
submarine design. Finally, as if to emphasise the importance of HMS Dreadnought to 
the nation, she was launched by HM the Queen at Barrow and to underline her 
significance to the Royal Navy the date chosen was 21 October, Trafalgar Day. 
 
By the end of the following year, despite numerous strikes threatening to delay her 
commissioning, HMS Dreadnought was complete and on 12 November 1962, her 
reactor went critical for the first time.166 The following month HMS Dreadnought was 
ready for sea trials, however, with a sensationalist headline, The Times reported that 
HMS Dreadnought was delayed sailing. Although the loss of “primary” communication 
with the bridge can be a problem, the possible real reason for delaying sea trials was at 
the bottom of the article which reported a contributory factor to the postponement was 
heavy weather. ‘Heavy seas were breaking over the tugs and a 45 m.p.h. wind was 
blowing from the south-west’.167 HMS Dreadnought sailed on her maiden voyage in 
Morecombe Bay the same day as The Times report; in April she successfully completed 
her sea trials and was handed over to the Royal Navy at sea at a depth of 150ft.168 HMS 
Dreadnought was commissioned at Barrow 17 April 1963, finally, the Royal Navy had 
its own nuclear-powered submarine and a fleet was following. HMS Valiant was in 
build and HMS Warspite was on order. 
 
The “special relationship” between the US and UK is rarely understood, badly reported 
and often ridiculed in parts of the media. However, despite poor reporting and a lack of 
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understanding, the US/UK “special relationship” is more than the portrayal of the US 
President as the leader of the western world with a lickspittle Prime Minister pandering 
to his whim. The Mutual Defence Agreement was the culmination of Macmillan’s 
foreign policy objective of achieving interdependence with the Americans whereby 
nuclear technologies and information would be exchanged, pooling research and 
development as equal partners. The Agreement came about against the geo-political 
backdrop of the Soviet invasion of Hungary, demonstrating its determination to 
militarily intervene in the home politics of countries under its sphere of influence, and 
the demonstration of its technological lead in ballistic rockets with the launch of 
Sputnik. Macmillan had been keen to restore US/UK relations after the debacle of the 
Suez crisis and in Eisenhower he found a willing partner who shared his objective. John 
Baylis wrote of the “special relationship” that successful negotiation of the MDA was 
not only down to the roles of Eisenhower and Macmillan, but also what he called a 
“transatlantic advocacy coalition” consisting of nuclear scientists, defence and 
intelligence officials. Baylis argued that these men: ‘…also played a part at the 
operational level in achieving and subsequently shaping the kind of relationship which 
developed’.169 Michael Goodman has also written on the subject of Anglo-American 
relations and has gone further noting that atomic intelligence exchanges continued after 
World War II and these developed into a relationship, based on a modus vivendi which 
was signed 7 January 1948. This agreement established nine areas of collaboration from 
which, Goodman argues all further developments in exchanging nuclear information 
can be traced. ‘The achievement of Macmillan’s “great prize” therefore, was based on 
the foundations established through atomic intelligence’.170 
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This chapter has demonstrated that personal relationships mattered greatly. Macmillan 
and Eisenhower had worked together during World War II, but the Mutual Defence 
Agreement was/is more than a political relationship as Baylis argued. Mountbatten 
enjoyed a very close relationship with his opposite number in the US Navy, Admiral 
Burke, which helped immensely with the smooth introduction of Polaris to the Royal 
Navy. However, the one relationship to have had the most dramatic impact on the 
Admiralty’s nuclear programme was that of Admiral Rickover and Mountbatten, of 
which it has been written that: ‘The introvert iconoclast from the Ukraine fell under the 
spell and aura of Queen Victoria’s grandson’. 171 Whatever the language used to 
illustrate their relationship, it should not be underestimated, especially in the context of 
the UK’s nuclear submarine programme. There is much more entwining the US and UK 
than a common language, in his introduction to A History of the English-Speaking 
Peoples Vol 1, Churchill described them as: ‘…those independent nations who derive 
their beginnings, their speech, and many of their institutions from England, and who 
now preserve, nourish and develop them in their own ways’.172 Given so much 
commonality between the two countries and the deep military and nuclear collaboration 
of World War II, perhaps it was inevitable that a “special relationship” of some sort 
would develop. 
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Chapter 5: Nuclear Training and Dounreay 
 
Prior to getting HMS Dreadnought to sea, there was much to be done in relation to 
education and training. This chapter will focus attention on the academic and practical 
training Royal Navy officers and ratings received to equip them with the necessary 
information to operate a pressurised water reactor power plant. The Royal Navy was at 
the forefront of this new technology and had to design its own training requirements, 
these were closely aligned to US Naval experience and practices. It would not only be 
the officers and ratings that required training but also Admiralty civilian staff. Vickers-
Armstrongs, Rolls-Royce, Foster Wheeler and Rolls-Royce and Associates would all 
require some of their staff training on different aspects of manufacturing techniques. 
Dockyard workers who would be required to defuel and refuel nuclear submarines 
would also receive special training in the procedures for handling the core. 
 
One major problem caused by the purchase of the S5W plant was that HMS 
Dreadnought would be completed before the Dounreay Submarine Prototype (DS/MP). 
One of the main purposes of the Dounreay prototype was for training Royal Navy 
personnel on operating the reactor using Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and 
being able to deal with any crisis with Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). This 
important training facility would not now become available until sometime after HMS 
Dreadnought’s commissioning and with no plant to allow practical training of personnel 
in the UK the Royal Navy would initially be dependent on the US Navy for training the 
first cohort of its nuclear submariners. This chapter will study the importance of 
Dounreay’s role as the prototype plant for evaluating maintenance techniques, as a test 





were raised over the expense and whether the Royal Navy required a prototype plant, 
however, Dounreay would quickly prove its worth during its commissioning. 
 
I. Training Facilities 
Whilst the Admiralty nuclear submarine project had been in existence since early 1946 
and had been substantially expanded since 1954, it was not until 1956 when attention 
turned towards training the personnel that would operate and maintain nuclear reactors. 
The Controller wrote to Mountbatten advising consideration be given to the offer of 
training facilities in the US for engineer officers and the formulation of a training policy 
to take advantage of various courses available at Harwell and Oxford and Manchester 
universities, with the aim of creating a pool of trained officers and ratings.1 At that time, 
officers, Admiralty staff and members of Vickers-Armstrongs and Rolls-Royce joining 
the Naval Section at Harwell were attending the reactor school there as part of taking up 
their duties, the training was mostly connected with gas-cooled, graphite-moderated 
reactors. In the spring of 1957, a memorandum was produced to discuss the scope of the 
exchange agreement within which it questioned the possibility of Royal Navy personnel 
training in USN establishments. Initial discussions were held with interested 
departments and some ideas formed of the likely format that training should take. 
However, following the Technical Mission’s visit to the US in June 1957, it was 
decided from the information obtained of the US Navy’s training methods that the 
Royal Navy’s ideas would have to be radically developed. Wilson produced a paper in 
which his proposals were discussed at a meeting in December; there was a consensus 
that further study of the US system was required before a firm policy could be 
submitted.2 A visit by training experts to the US was in the process of being planned 
when Rickover’s offer to purchase a US reactor was made, a view was taken that rather 
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than prejudice the early negotiations no further action would be taken for the time 
being. At a meeting attended by the Second Sea Lord, 25 April 1957, a decision was 
made to proceed with a training policy without further recourse to US training methods. 
 
With the formal offer to purchase a US Naval propulsion reactor made in January 1958 
it would soon become obvious that, if the Royal Navy took up the offer, their training 
regime would not be enough to get the officers and ratings qualified in time for HMS 
Dreadnought’s launch and sea trials. It was recognised in the current circumstances that 
the US was not able to assist with training and the Admiralty would examine what 
training facilities could be organised in the UK, however, they may have to raise the 
matter later if it proved necessary.3 When the Mutual Defence Agreement was signed 
there was no reference to US assistance in training HMS Dreadnought’s crew, despite 
efforts to amend paragraph A of Article III, it was quite simply a transfer agreement. 
Once again, Mountbatten would have to ask favours of his counterpart, Admiral Burke. 
Between 16-20 October 1958, Mountbatten held discussions with Burke, which at some 
point also included Rickover and the Bureau of Personnel Chief, Vice Admiral H. P. 
Smith. At this meeting it was agreed that Rickover and Smith should put some 
proposals together as to how they could assist the Royal Navy in training an adequate 
number of personnel for HMS Dreadnought. It has to be understood that although all 
navies will require various professional branches such as engineering, executive and 
supply to man their ships, the educational standards required, and the training given will 
differ with each navy as to the equipment fitted and depth of knowledge required to 
operate/maintain it. There were certainly discussions on the subject before selecting 
which branches of the Royal Navy would be best suited to receive US training. As 
Mountbatten noted: ‘It would be a great disaster if we made a mess of your lovely 
                                                     





equipment through failure to understand how to work it’.4 Yet again, this tripartite 
relationship reaped rewards for the Royal Navy. Rickover wanted to assist making HMS 
Dreadnought a success and saw little difficulty, if authorised by Burke, in training 
Royal Navy personnel in US Navy submarines.5 
 
On his return, Mountbatten lost no time and wrote to Vice Admiral Smith to outline the 
problems he now envisaged by completing HMS Dreadnought ahead of Dounreay and 
the possible embarrassment that could ensue if the Royal Navy commissioned HMS 
Dreadnought but did not have the personnel qualified to take her to sea. Mountbatten 
asked Smith for the US Navy’s complete training programme for officers and ratings, 
including syllabuses and specimen examination papers.6 A short while later, 
Mountbatten received a letter advising him that Rickover had arranged with Vice 
Admiral Smith to take ten Royal Navy personnel for practical training onboard US 
Navy submarines.7 However, the number of personnel that required training exceeded 
by some margin the training billets initially offered, a minimum of sixteen officers and 
thirteen senior rates appointed to HMS Dreadnought would eventually travel to the US 
to receive practical training.8 In anticipation of Royal Navy personnel receiving 
practical training in the US a meeting was held to discuss the educational standards and 
requirements of the prospective students.9 The Director Naval Education Services, 
Instructor Rear Admiral J. Fleming noted the high academic standard of US Naval 
ratings attending the New London Nuclear School, it was agreed that only Artificers 
were of an educational standard that would benefit from training in the US. It was 
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envisaged that seaman officers would require a twelve-month course to bring them up to 
the academic and technological standards of the equivalent US naval officer, it was also 
advised that engineering officers should be of either “dagger” or honours degree 
standing.10 The meeting recognised that due to the time-scale, HMS Dreadnought’s key 
personnel would have to start their training in January 1959. Wilson also noted that 
educational standards would have to be raised; given the trend towards nuclear power it 
was essential that the scientific standard of naval cadets should be raised without delay 
and that all junior officers should receive thorough training in scientific subjects.11 
Apart from the millions being spent on HMS Dreadnought, the purchase of the S5W 
and the building and infrastructure of the Dounreay prototype, the Admiralty would also 
have to spend money on the shore training establishments. 
 
To train the personnel required to man the envisaged fleet of twelve submarines it was 
not just a case of preparing courses and examinations, there would also be a requirement 
to build laboratories, classrooms and later, simulators as well as accommodation messes 
and other ancillary offices. In the early days of the nuclear programme, naval officers 
and scientists who were seconded to the Naval Section at Harwell attended civilian 
training courses at Imperial College, Queen Mary College and Harwell. It became 
apparent that these courses were not going to meet the Navy’s requirements; the courses 
concentrated on gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors and focussed on design 
principles, they could not offer operational experience. The courses were also limited by 
the number of places available and their timing; in particular the colleges could not meet 
the security requirements of the submarine nuclear plant, the Royal Navy would have to 
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train its own people.12 One further aspect, unique to the submarine plant that required 
addressing, is the fact that the submarine would operate away from support services that 
would normally be available to land-based reactor operators. It was evident that the men 
responsible for operating a nuclear power plant under those circumstances would: 
‘…have to possess such a thorough understanding of the theory underlying the plant’s 
behaviour, that they are capable of both reasoned and instinctive action in all 
circumstances’.13 
 
II. Off to School 
The first bespoke training for Royal Naval officers was an introductory course of two 
weeks duration, intended for officers of all specialisations taking up appointments in the 
nuclear field. Announced in Admiralty Fleet Order, AFO 2022/58, on 22 August 1958, 
the first course started 20 October in HMS Collingwood, the Naval Electrical School at 
Fareham.14 Soon afterwards, the Department of Nuclear Science and Technology was 
formed at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich in January 1959. Professor Jack 
Edwards, the senior RNSS scientist at Harwell since January 1955, was appointed to the 
Chair of the new Department and would initially divide his time between Greenwich 
and Harwell to clear up outstanding work from the run-down of the Naval Section.15 
The Department was established to educate naval officers in nuclear science and 
technology with the remit to keep in touch and up to date in nuclear technology 
developments. Although it would be four years before HMS Dreadnought would 
commission, Edwards noted that the timing of the first courses was governed by the 
requirement to produce academically qualified officers in nuclear technology, so they 
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were ready to take up the practical training opportunities in U. S. Navy nuclear 
submarines prior taking up their own appointments to stand-by submarines under 
construction.16 However, with the purchase of S5W, HMS Dreadnought was due to 
commission two years earlier than anticipated and this would have an immediate impact 
on the Admiralty’s training programme. Based on a report by a fact-finding mission to 
the US in January 1959 to look at training, the Admiralty decided in February that HMS 
Dreadnought’s crew must be available to go to the US in two batches. The first would 
commence training in April and the second batch in October. In doing so the Admiralty 
recognised the undesirable fact that the officers and ratings selected would not receive a 
satisfactory level of nuclear training before their departure.17 Apart from these groups 
the Admiralty was confident that the remaining groups would receive a reasonable level 
of academic and technical instruction prior to their practical training in the US. It is 
worth commenting here that Rickover was keen to extend his influence to cover the 
Royal Navy’s selection process for aspiring nuclear submariners, however, this offer 
was politely declined by Mountbatten as constitutionally impossible. ‘Can you imagine 
the scene in Congress if a British Admiral were selecting U. S. N. personnel…’?18 
 
The training these early nuclear engineering officers received is typified by the 
experiences of Lieutenant Commander Peter Hammersley (later Rear Admiral). 
Hammersley was appointed the first Engineering Officer of HMS Dreadnought and has 
written of his training as one of the Royal Navy’s first nuclear engineers.  As noted 
previously, Hammersley was appointed to HMS Dreadnought in March 1959 however, 
he had been advised of this appointment in 1957. Hammersley left his appointment in 
the conventional submarine, HMS Tiptoe, and attended Imperial College, London in 
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August 1958 for a one year post graduate course in nuclear engineering where he and 
the other students learnt a lot about gas-cooled, graphite-moderated “nuclear power 
stations”, Hammersley recalls he received an excellent grounding in nuclear technology 
upon which he was able to build. On completion of study at Imperial, Hammersley 
(with CERA T. Faulkner and CPO Mechanician I. Maryon) was appointed in October 
1959 to the USS Skipjack based at Groton, Connecticut. In the US, Hammersley and the 
two Chief Petty Officers would receive practical training and experience on a S5W 
submarine reactor. The designated Commanding Officer of HMS Dreadnought, 
Lieutenant Commander B. F. P. Samborne, had been appointed to the USS Skipjack in 
May 1959 and had already completed his training. Royal Navy officers, such as HMS 
Dreadnought’s newly appointed First Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander R. Squires, 
and ratings that were appointed to the USS Skate and other submarines of that class, 
would receive their training on the S3W reactor or S4W reactor plant, whichever was 
fitted.19 Rickover had decreed that Royal Naval officers should not “keep watch” on any 
power plant except under supervision of a qualified USN officer. The Commanding 
Officer of the USS Skipjack, Commander Bill Behrens, said that if he was satisfied that 
Hammersley was competent, he could take charge of watches on Skipjack.20 After five 
months understudy Hammersley satisfied Behrens and qualified, not only did he keep 
watches, Hammersley also had new USN officers understudying him.21 
 
With Hammersley at Imperial was Lieutenant Commander John Grove who would be 
appointed as the first Electrical Officer of HMS Dreadnought. On completing his 
studies at Imperial, Grove was appointed in October 1959 to the USS Skate, also based 
at Groton, to continue his training. In May 1960 Hammersley returned to the UK and 
                                                     
19 See appendix for list of Royal Navy Officers and Ratings trained in USN submarines. 
20 W. W. Behrens later became a Vice Admiral and Oceanographer of the US Navy. Upon retiring he 
assisted in setting up the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, (NOAA). 





began work at Barrow with HMS Dreadnought building. During their time with the US 
Navy, Hammersley and Grove realised that although it was normal in those days to be 
appointed Engineering Officer and Electrical Officer respectively, it would be 
unworkable on a nuclear-powered submarine. The Engineering Officer was responsible 
for the reactor and the Electrical Officer responsible for the reactor control systems. 
They decided to combine the engineering and electrical departments with a 
departmental head and deputy. As Grove had six months seniority he became the Senior 
Technical Officer and Hammersley became his deputy, the Marine Engineering Officer, 
this organisation of the “Back-Aft” engineering department has continued to this day in 
Royal Navy submarines although the titles have slightly changed.22 During his time at 
Imperial, Hammersley met Mountbatten twice and Rickover once in London, he met 
Rickover twice more during his time on the USS Skipjack. Hammersley considered that 
Rickover had done a great deal to help the British and was able to call on him in 
Washington to thank him before returning home. Hammersley formed the opinion that 
Rickover was a rude and difficult man but was convinced: ‘…that the Free World owes 
a lot to him for the preservation of peace throughout the time of the Cold War and I am 
glad that I went to see him’.23 This is a view held by many who worked for and knew 
Rickover. 
 
Initially two courses were run at Greenwich, the Nuclear Reactor Course of two terms 
duration and the longer Nuclear Advanced Course of three terms duration. Both courses 
are preceded by a term of the Nuclear Preparation Course which served as an academic 
refresher for mathematics, chemistry, thermodynamics and other subjects prior to 
advanced study of nuclear engineering.24 It must be noted that some students selected 
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for nuclear training would have already completed basic training at Dartmouth followed 
by an engineering degree or diploma at the Royal Naval Engineering College, Manadon 
and joined Greenwich direct from successful completion of submarine course at HMS 
Dolphin. These officers would have been in continuous education since starting school, 
other officers, however, would have served in conventional submarines or surface 
warships and would possibly have benefitted from the academic preparation. Unlike 
many university courses Edwards recorded that the students at Greenwich had a 
diversity of professional experience and their ages ranged from twenty-three to thirty-
five.25 Training at Greenwich was also provided for personnel from other specialist 
Departments of the Admiralty such as the RNSS and the RCNC, as well as staff from 
private industry. 
 
The Nuclear Advanced Course was designed for officers that would participate and 
ultimately take responsibility for a nuclear project (such as Admiralty scientists who 
would not serve onboard an operational submarine), in the case of Royal Naval officers 
this would extend to the safe operation of a submarine’s nuclear plant. A Master of 
Science degree was awarded on completion of this course. The Nuclear Reactor Course 
was designed for officers who would have direct responsibility for the operation of the 
Royal Navy’s nuclear power plants. This course’s syllabus differed in that it 
concentrated on current nuclear power plants and their operational considerations.26 A 
further three months of practical training would follow at Dounreay when it 
commissioned. The Department at Greenwich also provided a number of shorter 
classes; the nine-week Nuclear General Course was intended for seaman officers 
appointed to nuclear submarines and the first six weeks were deemed suitable for 
dockyard engineers with responsibility for maintenance and refuelling nuclear 
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submarines. A three-month Nuclear Radiation Protection Course offered instruction in 
radiation monitoring equipment, health physics organisations and administration in 
health and safety matters. A Nuclear Introduction Course gave a simplified overview of 
reactor theory and plant principles which was suitable for officers in a support role. 
 
Until the mid-1950s, ratings’ mechanical training had been scattered around the 
Portsmouth area and farther afield in Chatham and Devonport, these included 
professional courses for the different mechanical trade branches of Artificer, 
Mechanician and Mechanic. Typically, a Mechanic would join the Royal Navy with 
little formal educational qualifications but would show an aptitude for engineering; an 
Artificer would join the Royal Navy, as an engineering apprentice, with educational 
qualifications in science and mathematical subjects, his career path would be one of 
rapid promotion to Petty Officer once his trade training was complete. The Mechanician 
was a Mechanic who was selected after his Leading Hand’s qualifying course where his 
course grades merited further training to the same level as the Artificer and consequent 
better promotion prospects. 
 
To consolidate all mechanical and professional courses in one area, HMS Sultan at 
Gosport opened as the Royal Navy’s Mechanical Training Establishment 1 June 1956. 
With the nuclear submarine programme gathering pace, nuclear propulsion training was 
transferred in 1960 from HMS Collingwood to what was now known as the Marine 
Propulsion Machinery School, HMS Sultan. Investment started to flow and in 
November 1961 the Rutherford building was opened to further facilitate nuclear 
training.27 Rutherford building contained offices, classrooms and five laboratories for 
teaching metallurgy, water treatment, reactor instrumentation and control, physics and 
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mechanics, and nuclear physics. Initially, two courses were established, the Nuclear 
Propulsion Long Course and Nuclear Propulsion Short Course; the Long Course was of 
twenty-three weeks duration and aimed at the technician level (Artificers and 
Mechanicians). This course was mainly comprised of theoretical training which would 
give the trainee sufficient knowledge and awareness of the reactor plant to enable them 
to progress to practical training at Dounreay. On completion of Long Course, the 
technician would receive a further ten weeks of specialisation training. Electricians 
would attend HMS Collingwood for instruction in Health Physics instrumentation; some 
mechanical ratings would learn about water chemistry and some would attend a special 
welding course. The Short Course, as the name implies, was of ten weeks duration and 
aimed at Mechanics and Sick Berth Attendants, the emphasis of this training was less 
theoretical, and more plant based. On completion of this course the trainee would 
receive another week of specialisation training. Vickers-Armstrongs and Rolls-Royce 
and Associates took advantage of the courses being run at HMS Sultan sending staff for 
training, eventually Cammell Laird and the dockyards would also send staff there for 
instruction.28 Reactor Panel Operators and Nuclear Chiefs’ of the Watch had to pass the 
Long Course before progressing to Dounreay for Nuclear Submarine Operator Training. 
This training consisted of eight weeks classroom and five weeks watch keeping, other 
ratings watch keeping aft would have to pass the Short Course prior to practical training 
at Dounreay. Their training at Dounreay comprised five weeks classroom and three 
weeks watch keeping.29 
 
The money that the Admiralty was investing in the men’s training would require them 
to commit to a number of years’ service. It was envisaged that Artificers, Mechanicians 
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and Sick Berth Attendants serving in nuclear submarines would be expected to give a 
minimum return of five years’ service and four years for other ratings. In view of the 
longer training HMS Dreadnought’s ratings would receive it was decided that they 
should serve a minimum of seven years.30 This was possibly to reflect the sea-training 
the men were to receive in US submarines; however, it can be argued that because HMS 
Dreadnought’s machinery was one-off purchased from the US, the Artificers and 
Mechanics selected to serve on her could be seen as specialised having to operate and 
maintain US rather than UK machinery. It would cost the Admiralty time and money to 
re-train ratings to operate and maintain UK propulsion machinery that would be 
standard in the next class of submarines, therefore it would make economic sense to 
keep ratings trained on HMS Dreadnought’s machinery specific to that submarine. The 
length of return of service certainly reflects the importance the Admiralty attached to 
nuclear training and their expectations of the men trained. 
 
III. Practical Training and Jason 
To support the work of the Department of Nuclear Science and Technology, a low-
energy training reactor was installed at Greenwich. The building chosen to house the 
reactor was the historic King William Building, designed by Sir Christopher Wren and 
housing the famous “Painted Hall”. It has been noted wryly that this was the only 
reactor building designed by Wren.31 Although the Ministry of Works had been advised 
that the training reactor was completely safe, a draft letter to the Admiralty wanted 
assurances that there was no risk of radiological contamination to the historic building. 
Somewhat sardonically, the author of the letter wrote: ‘Presumably you will seek the 
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advice of a technically qualified scientist’.32 The estimate for housing the original 
reactor in the basement and concreting the floor above was put at £16,560. There is a 
scarcity of information relating to the original reactor, only a reference to the existing 
sub-critical reactor which would be removed in preparation for installing a new training 
reactor. 33 By September 1961 it was apparent that the original reactor was to be 
replaced by a 10KW “Jason” reactor, specially designed for training nuclear engineers 
which had been operated by the Hawker-Siddeley Nuclear Company at their site at 
Langley, Buckinghamshire. Jason was shut down 19 June 1961 and dismantling was 
completed by October, the re-building work at Greenwich commenced 8 March 1962. 
Work on Jason was completed 24 September when mechanical commissioning started.34 
Jason went critical for the first time in November and continued as an instructional aid 
for students at Greenwich until shortly before the college closed in 1998.35 With the 
expansion of nuclear engineers required to crew the new Polaris submarines the Nuclear 
Science and Technology Department at Greenwich needed to increase the frequency of 
courses and the facilities to train these engineers. Up until 1963 there were two, 
sometimes three courses running concurrently at Greenwich, from the 1964-65 
academic year there would be four, occasionally five courses, each year. The 
Department’s classrooms and laboratories had cost £34,000 during 1959-60 and the 
proposed expansion, moving the chemistry and physics laboratories included a similar 
amount of work. The estimate for this work, £68,500, shows a considerable financial 
commitment from the Admiralty in training its nuclear engineers.36 
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Given the importance of this historic building and the nature of the research equipment, 
it is surprising that there was no debate on the subject in Parliament, although there is a 
reference in a Parliamentary Report of natural uranium fuel being supplied to 
Greenwich.37 From this period, there is only one mention in Hansard of a reactor at 
Greenwich and this was during a debate on Greenwich Hospital and Taverners’ 
Foundation. The member for Islington North, G. W. Reynolds MP, on discussing the 
income the Foundation received in rental from the Royal Navy noted that apart from the 
location and surroundings: ‘The new tenants would have the use also of a wide range of 
useful assets, including […] a nuclear reactor’.38 If Parliament was not debating the 
siting of a reactor in a historic building, The Times was reporting that a training reactor 
was being sited in Greenwich although, as one would expect of that period, the 
reporting is factual. No editorial comments or letters to the editor were found. It was 
hoped to research local newspapers from the period to see if there was any debate on 
Jason being sited at Greenwich but during 2018 the Greenwich Heritage Centre was in 
the process of being moved. Of the articles found on the training reactor, it was reported 
as part of the Navy’s £2,500,000 expenditure on research and development a low-power 
training reactor was to be installed at Greenwich 27 February 1962, a larger report 
appeared when the press was invited into the Nuclear Department at Greenwich and 
shown around Jason, indeed, images of the control panel and the reactor were produced 
on the pictures page of that day’s edition.39 
 
As recorded earlier, ratings passing the Long Course at Sultan would go to Dounreay to 
attend a thirteen-week course with eight weeks being classroom based. During this 
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period students would visit the submarine hull to find and trace the various systems and 
would sit two intermediate and one final exam.40 In the late 1960s, the classroom 
element also included training on a simulator which closely resembled the manoeuvring 
room, this early use of a simulator afforded a safe environment to allow students to 
become familiar with the various panels and conduct standard and emergency 
evolutions before keeping watches on the prototype reactor at Dounreay. Practical 
training was formed of three phases; general watch keeping in all the machinery spaces 
and on all panels in the manoeuvring room, (where the reactor, electrical generation and 
propulsion systems were controlled) whilst the reactor was critical. The second phase of 
variable power watch keeping covered pre-critical routines, taking the reactor critical, 
plant start-up, modes of propulsion, plant shut-down and connection/dis-connection of 
shore supplies. In the third and final phase, students would deal with various machinery 
drills which ranged from loss of main turbines to reactor scram and recovery.41 Ratings 
on the shorter course would also visit the hull to find and trace systems and sit exams 
before moving onto practical training on the reactor plant. The shorter three weeks 
practical training covered watch keeping in the machinery spaces and on the electrical 
and propulsion panels in the manoeuvring room. Apart from the courses described 
above, a four-week Health Physics course was also offered at Dounreay for medical 
officers and technicians as part of their Long Course prior to joining their submarines. 
This course gave students a period to practice reactor chemistry sampling techniques 
and other Health Physics procedures as well as experience of the equipment carried 
onboard and operating conditions they would encounter.  
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Practical training at Dounreay was the first time that officers and ratings training was 
combined. Training in the classrooms and on the simulator was normal day work; 
however, practical training was conducted on the prototype in a three-watch system. On 
successful completion of training at Dounreay all students faced a further two to three 
months’ training onboard their respective submarines before their final examination to 
become fully qualified in their watch keeping position.42 Continuous training is a part of 
service life as new and modified equipment is introduced or improved procedures are 
developed for operating equipment. In 1971, a new manoeuvring room simulator, 
“FASMAT”, was opened in HMS Neptune at Faslane.43 The nuclear engineer, as do all 
submarine officers and ratings, spend their careers between time on operational 
submarines and time in a shore billet. After a period ashore (typically two years), on 
moving to a new submarine the officer/rating will once more re-familiarise themselves 
with the equipment and operating procedures before being examined to gain their watch 
keeping certificates. The Polaris submarines operated a two-crew system whereby the 
“on-crew” conducted maintenance and took the submarine to sea on exercises and 
patrol; the “off-crew” assisted with the maintenance and then took leave and attended 
courses. After a period of approximately four months the crews would change over, this 
necessitated additional training of the off-crew nuclear watch keepers to bring them 
back to the required standard prior to going on-crew. The “FASMAT” trainer took some 





                                                     
42 N. B. M. Clack, ‘Practical Training of Nuclear Submarine Power Plant Operators’, Journal of Naval 
Engineering, Vol. 19, Book 1, (Jun., 1970), 25-30 (p. 25). 






IV. Dounreay Submarine Prototype (DS/MP) 
As noted previously, Treasury approval for a shore-based prototype was received by the 
Admiralty in January 1956.44  The next question was where to site the reactor, two 
possibilities were discussed, Windscale in Cumbria, and Dounreay on the north coast of 
Scotland. Dounreay was the site of the UKAEA’s fast-breeder reactor situated on 360 
acres of a disused Royal Navy Air Station; as such it was deemed the most suitable site 
for the prototype. In September, the Controller authorised the project to proceed, the 
First Lord added his approval a few days later commenting: ‘...that it was unfortunate 
but necessary to build at Dounreay’.45 An Admiralty letter was sent to the Treasury 
advising them of the decision to site the prototype at Dounreay. The Admiralty 
informed the Treasury of the economic sense in building the prototype on land adjacent 
to an establishment already operated by the UKAEA which was also large enough to 
allow expansion.46 This programme envisaged the planning of the Dounreay site and 
facilities starting January 1957, building work beginning January 1958, with plant and 
machinery installation starting in March 1959. The installation of equipment was to be 
completed within a year and commissioning trials of the prototype begun by June 1960. 
HMS Dreadnought’s keel laying was planned for January 1960 and launch in June 
1961, her commissioning trials were to begin in the December. Dounreay had three 
main tasks, i) to operate and test submarine prototype machinery and advise on methods 
of improving the plant, ii) to advise on component design and maintenance procedures 
and iii) to train officers and ratings.47 
 
It can be seen from the provisional programme that it was originally planned for 
Dounreay to be operating approximately two years in advance of HMS Dreadnought, so 
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any problems encountered with the reactor design or operation could be solved or re-
engineered prior to fitting into the submarine. The Admiralty would share UKAEA 
facilities on the Dounreay site, with the UKAEA providing transport infrastructure, 
workshops, laboratory and health services, housing and security police. There would be 
no capital costs to the Admiralty for these services but there would be an annual charge. 
The UKAEA was willing to act as the Admiralty’s agents and design all the building 
and civil engineering work using their own contractors. This made economic sense 
given the remoteness of Dounreay and the shortage of accommodation in the area for 
contractors. The Admiralty expected the cost of establishing Dounreay to be around 
£1,775,000, the total research and development cost for the submarine programme was 
estimated at £12,050,000 between 1956 and 1961, (excluding approximately £7M for 
the submarine).48 
 
The Treasury, with an eye on the possibility of reducing the costs of the programme, 
had asked the Admiralty what effect the 1956 amendment to the 1955 Agreement would 
have on the programme, the 1956 amendment covered the exchange atomic information 
for civil uses which would also allow the release of information on naval propulsion 
reactors.49 The Admiralty stated their case strongly advising that there was no clear 
indication of when the information would be released, it was their experience (and that 
of the UKAEA) that the US would not offer information if there was to be no reciprocal 
original information to be exchanged. The uniqueness of the materials used and the 
problems of producing them with the same chemical and radiological qualities as those 
in the US meant that the materials produced in the UK also had to be proven. The 
Admiralty argued that they had to continue with the project as quickly as possible so as 
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not to fall further behind noting that: ‘…although any U.S. information which we obtain 
may well result in a slight reduction in our own work, it cannot replace it’.50 Although 
Treasury authority for the nuclear submarine project had been received in January with 
an agreed expenditure for 1956/57 of £300,000, the Admiralty wrote to the Treasury to 
sanction a sum of £588,000 during that year. Of this money, £238,000 was to be spent 
at Harwell and other components of the UKAEA and £350,000 would be spent on the 
development of the prototype machinery at Dounreay. The main propulsion machinery 
amounted to £84,000, the reactor vessel £43,000 and the research rigs and heat transfer 
experiments £225,000.51  
 
The main contractor for the Dounreay installation was Vickers-Armstrongs 
(Engineering) who had responsibility for the design of the whole machinery. Rolls-
Royce was responsible for the reactor design and associated equipment comprising the 
core, fuel elements, emergency cooling system, thermal shield and fuel handling 
equipment. Foster Wheelers had the task of designing most of the equipment in the 
reactor compartment such as the reactor pressure vessel, steam generators, main 
circulating pumps and the primary piping and valves.52 When completed, the Dounreay 
naval establishment was comprised of an administrative block containing offices, an 
accommodation centre (Scapa House), class rooms and the main building which housed 
the reactor prototype, workshops and auxiliary machinery. The reactor plant had to be 
designed to fit inside the envelope of the submarine’s pressure hull and to be installed 
during the submarine’s build. Therefore, the prototype was to be built into a structure 
that would simulate a section of the submarine pressure hull. The reactor compartment, 
housing the primary system, was a twenty-eight feet cylinder thirty-four feet long 
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enclosed by ribbed bulkheads.53 The submarine propulsion machinery was housed 
within the building and laid out as it would be on a submarine but without being 
enclosed by a pressure hull. A pumping station was built on the foreshore with enough 
capacity to provide cooling water to the prototype 250 yards away. A water tank of 
2000 tons capacity was built around the reactor compartment section, allowing 
emergency cooling by means of convection should the seawater circulating system 
fail.54 It is evident that the Admiralty and its contractors were taking measures so that 
the prototype plant and machinery would be operated in conditions as realistically as 
possible so that it ensured any operating data or system function would be replicated on 
the submarine. 
 
V. Dounreay’s Future Questioned 
During this period there was concern within the Admiralty that the Prime Minister, 
Chancellor and the Defence Minister were not fully committed to the nuclear submarine 
project. The Prime Minister wrote to the First Lord, the Earl of Selkirk, asking for a 
brief history of the atomic submarine; when was it first authorised, how far had research 
and development progressed, to what operational use would the submarine be put and 
its future role in the Navy. Macmillan noted: ‘I am afraid that I cannot recollect how 
this undertaking began’.55 It is quite apparent that the Admiralty viewed this Minute 
with a measure of distrust as to its motives. In the Minute, the Admiralty single out 
Macmillan’s referral to the submarine in the singular which reflected his view of the 
development as an isolated project. The Admiralty took the position to offer only the 
information requested and a draft memorandum was discussed prior to releasing it.56  
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Selkirk replied with a robust argument on the operational use of nuclear-powered 
submarines (referred to in the plural), their stealth and their endurance capabilities. 
Selkirk also advised that the Dounreay site was nearly complete and important 
modifications had been included in the design of the prototype plant from information 
received from the US.57 The modifications Selkirk refers to would have included the 
decision to proceed with uranium/zirconium fuel elements. 
 
Shortly after Selkirk’s memorandum the USS Nautilus paid a visit to the UK and held a 
VIP day at sea, as noted in chapter four, Sandys, was amongst those who went to sea. 
The USS Nautilus’s visit coincided with the Royal Navy exercise “Rum Tub”, 14-19 
October, in which surface and submarine elements of the Royal Navy were pitched 
against the USS Nautilus. No doubt Sandys would have debriefed Macmillan on his 
return to London, he was recorded as saying in the Daily Telegraph that: ‘…this 
submarine represents in the sphere of naval warfare a revolutionary advance as great a 
change from sail to steam’.58 Mountbatten certainly thought that Sandys was a keen 
supporter of the project prior to his trip in the USS Nautilus which he was looking 
forward to, with Sir Frederick Brundrett also an advocate of HMS Dreadnought, 
Mountbatten felt confident that it would be extremely difficult for the Government to 
cancel the project.59 Indeed, as noted in chapter three, from the moment of Sandys’ 
appointment Mountbatten had endeavoured to create a good working relationship with 
him using his influence and contacts to that affect, there can be no doubt that these 
occasions did have a positive impact on Sandys’ relationship with Mountbatten. 
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By January 1958 the site foundations had been laid, roads constructed, and building had 
commenced, machinery installation would start in May. The financial estimates looked 
good for Dounreay, the total for the site works and machinery amounted to £1.83M, an 
increase on the September 1956 estimate of just £55K. This would appear to indicate 
that the Admiralty had a firm grip on the financial side of the prototype.60 However, 
early 1958 brought new challenges resulting from Rickover’s offer to sell to the UK a 
complete submarine propulsion unit, would Dounreay now be necessary? Plowden’s 
view was that all work specifically directed at the development of the submarine reactor 
should cease immediately without waiting for Rickover’s proposals to be completed. 
Plowden had also been advised that Rolls-Royce had already removed their design 
teams from the Dreadnought project. It should be remembered that apart from the heavy 
workload connected with the expanding civil nuclear generating programme, there was 
the fire at the Windscale plant in October 1957. Therefore, the UKAEA was under 
pressure to reduce some of its commitments to the Admiralty’s work, to which the 
Admiralty was sympathetic. Plowden and Lang agreed to cease work on the submarine 
reactor and to discuss the current programme at Harwell.61 It had also been decided 
separately that all work already committed at Dounreay was to continue, however, the 
administration building, canteen and houses would be deferred. 
 
A meeting was held to discuss the future of the programme, in seeking Cabinet approval 
to purchase Skipjack machinery the Admiralty had advised that it would result in a 
reduction of the project’s research and development effort. No doubt the Treasury 
would be looking for substantial savings, the Admiralty was wise to this possibility and 
Lang advised: ‘It would be prudent to give some prominence to research which was 
                                                     
60 TNA, DEFE 7/2055, Memorandum, M.618/5/57, 14 January 1958, appendix II. 
61 TNA, POWE 14/1157, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority: Admiralty submarine programme, 





being discontinued rather than that which we hoped to continue’.62 It was recorded that 
work on the facilities at Dounreay were progressing and that it would be imprudent to 
stop work without the US responding favourably to the request for machinery. 
Dounreay was also thought to be essential for any future submarine development in the 
UK, therefore, it was decided to complete Dounreay as presently designed (with British 
machinery) and to include the primary circuit as this had already been ordered and was 
in manufacture. The Admiralty wrote to the Treasury with an outline of the revised 
programme, reiterating their intention not to “Anglicise” the S5W reactor plant but 
rather develop the Dounreay plant with the lessons learnt from the US plant. Thus, in 
justifying the continuation of research and development at Dounreay, the Admiralty 
would make full use of the efforts already expended in developing the site. Importantly 
for the Treasury, the Admiralty highlighted the £500,000 savings in research and 
development during 1958/59 and about £700,000 in each subsequent year leading up to 
development and fabrication of their own S5W fuel element, ‘…the emphasis in work 
that is continuing is very much on development rather than research’.63 This line is 
rather telling as it indicates that the Admiralty was confident that enough research has 
been done and that development would progress from the successful incorporation of 
US knowledge and the nuclear engineering skills the UK was mastering. 
 
A re-phased development programme was set out in August detailing what was to 
continue and what was to cease. Rolls-Royce had carried out important design studies 
of the Dounreay reactor pressure vessel and advised that it would accommodate the 
S5W core.64 The design and production of the machinery would continue at Dounreay, 
with the exception of the reactor core and control mechanisms which would only 
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proceed once experience had been gained of the US design.65 In fact, it was reported 
that the British plant planned for HMS Dreadnought and the S5W shared almost 
identical operating and performance characteristics therefore, the Admiralty was 
confident of the Dounreay plant operating with a S5W core. Indeed, one of the reasons 
behind the Admiralty’s decision not to “Anglicise” the S5W was they thought that: 
‘…the British design is considerably in advance of the American in certain respects, 
particularly those of silencing and shock’.66 The Admiralty’s policy at Dounreay could 
now be summarised thus; i) the design principles governing Dounreay’s machinery 
were mainly based on US development so lessening the research and development cost; 
ii) manufacture of the machinery was well advanced and therefore, would not be an 
exact replica of the S5W with the exception of the core and control mechanisms as 
advised previously and iii) future submarine machinery would be all British design 
based predominantly on the Dounreay plant and further developments from it thereby 
reducing UK reliance on US machinery with the possible development of higher power 
rates.67 Professor Edwards noted in his paper on the initial problems of the pressurised 
water reactor design that it was a great disappointment to all that the first reactor to be 
fitted into a Royal Navy submarine would not be British, but it was satisfying to know 
that much of the work of the team was being embodied in the machinery to be installed 
at Dounreay. ‘The work carried out to the end of 1958 was therefore of considerable 
value’.68 Considering that in some respects the British design was in advance of the 
S5W and that the Dounreay plant was fully utilised apart from the core and control rod 
mechanisms, it is perhaps understandable that the Admiralty team felt great 
disappointment at the decision to buy the S5W. 
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Edwards, however, noted in the same paper that whilst the decision to purchase the 
S5W gave the UKAEA some relief and accelerated the completion of HMS 
Dreadnought, it was at the expense of the prototype which inevitably ran into delays. 
Vice Admiral Sir Ted Horlick perhaps best summed up the delays incurred at Dounreay. 
Despite the quality and dedication of the teams involved it was not the reactor theory 
but engineering in its broadest sense which provided the delays, the requirement to 
handle and fabricate new materials, the design of new welding techniques and their 
acceptance standards had to be acquired. ‘…working to tighter tolerances, 
specifications, and requirements for quality assurance together with very high standards 
of cleanliness; all this had to be learnt the hard way – by experience’.69 Most notably 
however, whereas great attention to detail was given to the primary system, little 
attention was given to the secondary plant as it was regarded as established technology. 
In effect, the reactor plant was designed to fit into the envelope of the submarine’s 
pressure hull and the secondary machinery: ‘…was rather taken for granted’.70 Taking 
for granted the secondary systems and not giving them the due diligence that was given 
the primary system was not only a UK oversight, there was possibly the same mentality 
in the US that ultimately led to the loss of the USS Thresher (a nuclear-powered 
submarine fitted with a S5W reactor) on 10 April 1963. It should also be noted that 
many of the elements installed at Dounreay had never existed and there was no 
experience of operating such a plant. The lack of experience and the difficulty of access 
would have made operation and maintenance of the machinery problematic; this led to 
delays installing the machinery which required significant redesign and modification. 
 
Dounreay also suffered from management problems during its build programme. 
Vickers-Armstrongs had a separate technical organisation for electrical work which 
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meant that there was no person in overall control of the project, this was totally at odds 
with Rickover’s much quoted concept of responsibility which he made at the enquiry 
into the loss of the USS Thresher.71 The Admiralty insisted that one man was put in 
overall control, but he was deemed unsuitable by the Admiralty although they could not 
immediately criticise the appointment. A new man was eventually appointed, and a 
complete reassessment of the project was conducted which, by the end of 1961, was 
completed and a new system put in place.72  The company had been lax in their time and 
cost estimating, and financial control; they also suffered from their fair share of strikes 
at the site. ‘This was a case where a unique project had to be grafted into an 
organisation notable for its conservative and traditional attitudes’.73 The Admiralty 
however, conceded that Vickers-Armstrongs was the firm best equipped technically to 
undertake the project which was now considered satisfactory. The Admiralty also had 
criticism for the UKAEA which they thought had been uncooperative with their 
estimating. Admiralty justification for continuing with Dounreay had been accepted but 
these engineering problems were not the only delays, there were still material concerns 
to overcome. 
 
One other problem to overcome was obtaining zirconium and hafnium of a purity that 
was not available in the UK. Although this material was included in the purchase of the 
complete machinery for HMS Dreadnought, there was no material available for 
Dounreay. A contract was placed through Rolls-Royce with I.C.I. to purchase from the 
US 1700 pounds of hafnium crystal bar and the 42 tons of zirconium sponge associated 
with its production. The estimated cost was £248,500, even then the Admiralty was not 
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satisfied that the material would be delivered in time to meet Dounreay’s programme.74 
A UK company, Magnesium Elektron Limited, had a pilot plant for producing hafnium 
in the UK; the Admiralty approached the company to provide insurance against failure 
of supplies from the US. If the company managed to fulfil the order the Admiralty also 
saw it as a means of becoming self-sufficient. Resulting from the purchase of the S5W 
and the use of hafnium the Admiralty decided not to ask the UKAEA to investigate 
other possible control materials, silver, cadmium and indium, which would result in a 
£212,000 saving over four years. This reflects a certain confidence in the Admiralty that 
they would receive the hafnium at the purity they required, it was also an 
acknowledgement that hafnium was a far superior neutron absorber than the other 
materials, as discussed in chapter three. It was certainly a means of illustrating to the 
Treasury that the Admiralty was willing to curtail research expenditure. 
 
VI. A Very Serious Snag 
Due to delays in 1958/59 it had been recognised that it would have been untimely to 
determine the arrangements for running the Dounreay prototype, however, by early 
1960 the Admiralty had concluded that the time was right to discuss the matter with the 
firms involved. Once the prototype had been commissioned, the Admiralty envisaged 
that a naval Commanding Officer with a small team would be responsible to the 
Admiralty for the running of the establishment. However, it was their intention to select 
a contractor to maintain and operate the prototype plant and machinery and that the 
contractor would appoint a Chief Test Engineer responsible to the Commanding 
Officer. The Admiralty required the Chief Test Engineer to be: ‘…a person of the 
highest calibre, possessing the necessary technical and administrative ability […]. He 
must also meet with the approval of the A.E.A’.75 Building continued during 1960/61 
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and safety reports were assessed at each milestone. In a letter to the Treasury requesting 
the release of funds it was advised that: ‘…there are no known serious snags ahead on 
either the nuclear or conventional machinery side’. 76 There was, however, a caveat 
advising that Dounreay was a development project and subsequent testing could still be 
a source of trouble. As things turned out this was a prescient warning, the Admiralty 
was soon to run into a very serious snag. As the Admiralty’s main contractor 
responsible for Dounreay, Vickers-Armstrongs site manager, Noel Davies was selected 
as Chief Test Engineer in 1962. In 1964, Rolls-Royce and Associates’ site manager, 
Hugh Eaglesfield, was appointed Chief Test Engineer. It was during this important 
period that responsibility for Dounreay would pass from Vickers-Armstrongs to Rolls-
Royce and Associates as the Admiralty’s operating contractor. Farley-Sutton noted, 
both men would be at the heart of the eventual success of the prototype project.77  
 
The UKAEA’s participation in the prototype included assisting in the commissioning, 
calibration and operation of the plant, advising on the subsequent operation of the plant 
and its use as a test facility, and examination of irradiated fuel elements and limited 
examination of irradiated components. One further important area of responsibility was 
obtaining chemical and metallurgical information on the corrosion problems of the 
ferritic circuit.78 This last task was crucial, the prototype primary system was identical 
to HMS Dreadnought’s, the main difference was the core being manufactured under 
license in the UK by Rolls-Royce. However, one other important difference was the 
primary circuit of the prototype was manufactured in part from chrome-molybdenum 
and a nickel based heat resistant alloy known as Inconel, in contrast, HMS 
Dreadnought’s primary circuit and pressure vessel were manufactured from stainless 
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steel. The decision to use chrome-molybdenum and Inconel rather than austenitic 
stainless steel resulted from the lack of data on stress corrosion, irradiation damage, 
hydrogen embrittlement and other related issues. Despite a growing awareness of 
stainless steel metallurgy, its susceptibility to chloride stress corrosion outweighed low 
alloy steel’s relatively higher corrosion rate and slight susceptibility to hydrogen 
embrittlement.79 There is little doubt that cost also played a part in this decision. 
Edwards notes that later the US began to give attention to low alloy steels to reduce 
capital costs, Rickover was interested in the use of chrome-molybdenum but advised 
against using untried materials in a submarine. It was also noted that the Americans 
made no criticism of employing Inconel which both navies regarded as an established 
material and Rickover was known to favour. 
 
The auxiliary primary circuit consists of small bore pipework and although making 
welds in non-ferrous metals is difficult, the use of Inconel was working satisfactorily. 
The welds were: ‘…properly and independently tested, had been radiographed and had 
withstood deliberate over-pressure on many occasions’.80 However, in September 
during pre-criticality testing when the primary circuit was hot and pressurised a number 
of leaks appeared in the small bore pipework and within weeks the number of leaks in 
the Inconel welds had risen to twelve. Although a major investigation was implemented 
to discover the cause of this failure it was apparent that: ‘With one thousand six hundred 
and fifty-eight nickel alloy welds in the DSMP primary plant and no clear solution in 
sight, the decision was taken early in 1964 to renew all nickel alloy piping and fittings 
in chromium-molybdenum low alloy steel’.81 This serious problem had repercussions 
for the submarines building, Horlick noted that replacement in stainless steel for the 
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prototype had been considered, but the second submarine had more pressing needs on 
the limited supplies. HMS Valiant’s primary circuit had already been fitted and was 
deemed to be suspect so would require removing. The third submarine, HMS Warspite, 
and the Polaris submarines were all to be fitted with Inconel primary circuits; the 
decision was taken for these submarines to revert to stainless steel circuits. Some 
redesign work was anticipated, and it was advised that manufacture and installation of 
the new stainless steel circuit would cause a delay of fourteen months in HMS Valiant’s 
completion. The only recourse to mitigate the delay was to purchase supplies from the 
US, an approach that was reliant on the US having stock available and a willingness to 
release material to alleviate the delay anticipated. It was estimated that changing from 
Inconel to stainless steel would add £500,000 to the £19.6M for HMS Valiant and 
between £100,000 and £500,000 for HMS Warspite, there would also be a small 
unspecified additional cost to the Polaris submarines as these were not yet laid down.82 
The Inconel problem at Dounreay more than justified the prototype’s requirement and 
its worth to the fledgling nuclear fleet as the defect could be rectified or re-engineered 
before fitting into a submarine where rectification would have been more problematic, 
and expensive. 
 
This problem was being discussed between Admiralty and Treasury officials in mid-
November, President Kennedy was assassinated 22 November 1963, and out of respect 
it was decided to delay approaching Rickover. The first attempt to purchase stainless 
steel did not bode well, Theodore Rockwell (Rickover’s Technical Director) advised 
that no progress could be made until the material requested corresponded more closely 
to two sets.83 These sets were required for HMS Valiant and HMS Warspite however, it 
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can be appreciated that the two British submarines were based on the Dounreay 
prototype and that there would be subtle differences between what the Admiralty 
required to fit-out the submarines and the original sets manufactured for HMS 
Dreadnought (Skipjack). In the New Year, Sir Solly Zuckerman, the Chief Scientific 
Adviser, wrote to Rickover to indicate these differences and to allay any concerns he 
may have that the Admiralty was over-bidding their requirements. The request was for 
the minimum amount of material to fit-out the two submarines with an allowance of ten 
to fifteen percent for spares.84 An export licence was soon granted enabling the contract 
to be placed and, as if to highlight the limitation of the 1958 Agreement, the draft 
application included words to the effect that with Rickover’s authorisation the UK could 
buy improved Dreadnought valves. Rockwell objected advising that whilst he would not 
exclude the possibility if absolutely necessary: ‘…to attempt to stray beyond 
Dreadnought type valves in the application would create difficulties’.85 Although there 
were many impediments in getting Dounreay commissioned and in building the new 
submarines, through the early identification and resolution of this material issue alone 
the prototype had proved its worth from the offset. 
 
Finally, at 03:10 7 January 1965, after nine years of delay and frustration the first 
British submarine reactor went critical for the first time. Farley-Sutton described it as: 
‘…a marvellous, and chastening, and surprisingly calm moment’.86 
 
VII. HMS/m Valiant 
The first submarine to be commissioned with the British reactor fitted with Core A was 
HMS Valiant, she was commissioned into the Royal Navy 18 July 1966. During 1960, a 
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comparative study had been conducted of the relative merits of the S5W plant with that 
intended for Dounreay, this resulted in HMS Valiant’s plant differing from the 
Dounreay plant however, some of the recommendations were not adopted until the 
Swiftsure class later in the decade. The major changes implemented were; i) the 
fabrication of the primary circuit and major components in stainless steel; ii) the use of 
a low alloy steel reactor pressure vessel lined with stainless steel; iii) the secondary 
plant was simplified to reduce the number of valves and fittings; iv) provision of a 
circulating water cross-connection between the main engine and turbo-generator 
condensers; v) designed for improved access and vi) a reduction of the number of 
remotely operated valves in the reactor compartment.87 To assess the capability of the 
submarine and her equipment during a prolonged period at sea HMS Valiant was tasked 
to undertake a dived transit to Singapore. The voyage would see all machinery operating 
in various climatic conditions, from the cold winter waters of the North Atlantic to the 
warmer climes of the Indian Ocean, enabling a full assessment to be made of the effect 
of high sea water temperatures on machinery performance. 
 
At 11:30 30 January 1967, HMS Valiant slipped from the depot ship, HMS Maidstone, 
at Faslane and made passage down the Clyde, she dived the following day and began 
her journey south during which time the crew conducted machinery evolutions and 
training drills. Travelling deep and at high speed she passed Madeira a few days later, 
by Valentine’s Day she rounded Cape Agulhas at the bottom of South Africa and 
entered the Indian Ocean. HMS Valiant spent 19-24 February at Mauritius before 
continuing to Singapore where she went alongside another depot ship, HMS Forth, 6 
March. HMS Valiant conducted exercises with the Far East Fleet and the Seventh 
Submarine Squadron to give them experience of working with, and against, a nuclear 
                                                     





submarine. Unfortunately, she had to return to Singapore early due to a gearbox defect. 
HMS Valiant began her return journey on the evening of 29 March. Once more, HMS 
Valiant dived and began a deep fast transit returning to Faslane 25 April, she had 
steamed 26,000 miles at an average speed of 20 knots she had missed just one 
commitment, the exercise off Singapore.88 During this prolonged period at sea and 
unsupported it was inevitable that there would be defects with the machinery and other 
equipment, the reactor plant however, performed to expectations. 
 
As Horlick had noted, not as much attention had been given to the secondary machinery 
as had been given to the reactor plant. The secondary machinery too, was new to the 
fleet and nearly all the secondary propulsion defects: ‘…pointed directly at the 
questionable design and inadequate quality control of many items of the conventional 
propulsion and Ships Service equipment’.89 It was believed that the greatest lesson 
learnt from the voyage was that conventional machinery should be built to the same 
high standards and quality as the nuclear plant. Indeed, as noted above, the loss of the 
USS Thresher in 1963 was attributed to a failure of a brazing joint in her sea water 
system (a secondary system). The loss of the USS Thresher caused the US Navy to 
modify their reactor operating procedures, this information was passed to the Admiralty, 
so they too would benefit from the lessons learnt however, once the Rolls-
Royce/Westinghouse contract expired, the Royal Navy would no longer profit from US 
reactor operating experience.90 Following the loss of the USS Thresher, the US Navy 
instigated a quality assurance programme called SUBSAFE which included more 
vigorous quality control and testing of secondary machinery during manufacture. 
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The Royal Navy introduced a similar system known as First Level which deals with 
aspects of reactor safety and containment, equipment and systems that are essential to 
the watertight integrity of a submarine, and personnel safety. In the Royal Navy system, 
all material employed in First Level equipment is subject to a Quality Assurance 
Statement of Requirement (QASOR) which lays down the material specifications and 
tests which must be adhered to. Any deviation from any of the stated requirements 
would have to be agreed and a concession raised and placed with the necessary 
certification documentation in a quality assurance document pack which should remain 
available for the whole time the equipment is in service. The quality assurance 
documentation is inspected when the equipment is receipted into stores and again by 
ship’s staff when the equipment has been issued for fitting into a submarine. It is this 
system that ultimately controls the materials used in submarine equipment. When HMS 
Valiant was ordered in 1960 the Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) was still three years 
hence and it was certainly not on the political horizon. However, following the PSA, the 
reliability of the primary and secondary plant fitted in HMS Valiant took on a new 
importance as it would also be the plant fitted to the new Polaris submarines. Therefore, 
this was an important assessment of the plant’s capability, the quality and reliability of 
the plant and of the secondary machinery was paramount if the credibility of the 
deterrence was to be proven and maintained. 
 
This chapter has examined the great strides the Admiralty made in getting officers and 
men educated and trained in the operation of pressurised water reactors. Although initial 
training for officers was conducted through somewhat inadequate courses at university, 
Royal Naval courses were soon established at Greenwich and HMS Sultan, Gosport 
based mainly on the US Navy’s curriculum. Classrooms, workshops and eventually 





fleet, and a system of examinations founded. With Dounreay still under construction 
and the prospect of HMS Dreadnought completing two years ahead of schedule with the 
purchase of the S5W, there was certainly pressure to get sufficient men academically 
trained to take advantage of US courses. Pre-training in the UK was essential if Royal 
Navy ratings were not to be at a disadvantage to benefit from the same courses as US 
Navy ratings at Groton and it is apparent that effort had been made to ensure this did not 
happen.91 
 
The Treasury had seen the purchase of S5W as a means of saving money on research 
and development to which the Admiralty had cut a number of experiments and 
associated research once the contract was signed. The Treasury had also hoped for 
savings at Dounreay, however, this overlooked the fact that all the conventional 
propulsion machinery and associated auxiliary system were British designed and built, 
and that the majority of the reactor plant was also of British design. The Admiralty had 
already warned the Treasury that attempts to “Anglicise” the S5W plant would involve 
a tremendous amount of redesign and cause serious delays.92 The Admiralty’s reasons 
to continue with the British design of PWR 1 at Dounreay using the US core and control 
system was, in the end, justified as it allowed cores of greater power and greater 
endurance to be designed and back-fitted to submarines already in commission. 
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Chapter 6: Future Developments 
 
Dounreay’s objectives were; to formulate the starting-up procedure and assessment of 
safety and operational problems; to evaluate problems relating to nuclear plant 
maintenance, and: ‘To provide a test platform for newly developed auxiliary 
arrangements and materials’.1 Importantly, for future development, Dounreay was to 
provide comprehensive trials data associated with running a pressurised water reactor 
with varying loads which would allow correlation to be made between nuclear physics 
and heat transfer theories and the results obtained in practice. The data could then be 
evaluated, and the findings would allow improvements to be made in shielding design, 
efficiency in the core and increased output. Long term planning for an improved core 
started before the initial Dounreay core (based on the S5W) went critical. 
 
As previously discussed, the reactor and primary systems at Dounreay were a British 
design; the core and control rod mechanism were of American design and were 
incorporated into the Dounreay plant. This chapter will investigate the consolidation of 
the knowledge transferred from the US and the subsequent improvements in UK core 
designs which resulted in higher power ratings and longer endurance. The secondary 
propulsion machinery at Dounreay was designed for 20,000SHP and would allow for an 
increased power output without having to build a new prototype. With core 
development, the UKAEA would still be required to assist in some of the programme, 
however, Rolls-Royce, now with their own nuclear experience, negotiated for 
references to design rights and patents not to be included in the new development 
contract.2 Rolls-Royce wanted the opportunity to commercially use their inventions and 
designs emerging from their development work, a view unacceptable to the Admiralty 
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and the UKAEA. This chapter will also look at other types of reactor design, experience 
with the S5W gave the UK confidence to investigate other types of nuclear reactor for 
application in submarines although ultimately, they were not adopted. 
 
I. Core Development 
With the knowledge that the US exchange of nuclear propulsion information would 
cease soon after HMS Dreadnought’s reactor had gone critical the Admiralty 
immediately started looking towards future core development. The Admiralty had 
requested UKAEA assistance in operating Dounreay, examination of the fuel elements, 
consideration of engineering designs submitted to the Admiralty and general research 
and development support. The UKAEA Industrial Group, based at Risley, wrote 
Memorandum 687(R) which outlined their future work for the submarine reactor 
development programme. Stage I involved the start-up of HMS Dreadnought’s and 
Dounreay’s reactors including safety assessments. Stage II of the programme was to 
develop a new core for Dounreay with increased power, longer life and to investigate 
alternative control materials to hafnium. Judging this last line of investigation, it can be 
assumed that the Admiralty still had concerns about future availability of stocks of 
hafnium, it is doubtful they were looking to reduce costs knowing that hafnium was a 
far more effective absorber than the other materials so far tested. It was proposed that 
Stage II work would include safety assessments, shielding work and the rebuilding of 
Neptune for in-pile experimentation, the estimated cost for this work was put at 
£1,198,000 between 1961 and 1964. 3 This equated to 114 years of manpower effort 
from the Industrial Group alone which indicates a sizeable commitment from the 
UKAEA. Commenting on Stage II, Rear Admiral R. S. Hawkins, who was responsible 
for nuclear propulsion, considered that given the machinery at Dounreay is designed to 
                                                     





take 20,000SHP advantage should be taken of increasing core power as development 
proceeds. Hawkins also noted that insofar as the UK was aware, there was no current 
development in the US beyond the 15,000SHP of the S5W therefore, assuming there is 
still a staff requirement to develop submarine plants of higher powers: ‘…there appears 
to be full justification for undertaking this work in the U.K’.4 It was inconceivable that 
having produced so many types of reactor in a short period that Rickover would stop 
trying to improve the core or indeed, build new types of reactor. Rickover had in fact 
been given formal approval for a feasibility study into a reactor plant for an aircraft 
carrier in November 1951 which led to the keel laying of the world’s first nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier in 1958, the USS Enterprise commissioned in 1961 and was 
fitted with eight A2W reactors.5 
 
As part of an initial assessment of future core requirements, staff of Director General 
Ships reviewed the case for the pressurised water reactor and concluded that the future 
programme should concentrate on this type of reactor. With the possible exception of 
the boiling water reactor, the pressurised water reactor was considered the only type 
presently available which was inherently simple and easy to operate.6 In this paper, staff 
divided the proposed Stage II development into two parts, Stage IIA was to develop a 
core to enable the full power of the Dounreay machinery to be utilised. Stage IIB was 
more ambitious and aimed at investigating a longer life core and reduced water pressure 
possibly leading to partial boiling: ‘…and developing towards the boiling water 
reactor’.7 Both the pressurised water reactor and boiling water reactor are light water 
reactors with advantages and disadvantages associated with each, however, in principle 
they operate much the same. The pressurised water reactor uses the primary coolant to 
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heat the water in the steam generator from where the steam is piped to the turbo-
generators and main turbines before being condensed and fed back to the steam 
generator. The primary system and secondary system associated with the pressurised 
water reactor plant are independent of each other whereas the boiling water reactor does 
not have separate systems. The boiling water reactor is designed to allow the water to 
boil in the core, the resulting steam is directed to the turbine to generate electricity 
before being condensed and returned to the reactor.8 
 
One may argue that the pressurised water reactor is the better proposition in a submarine 
because the primary circuit is enclosed within the reactor compartment, in contrast the 
boiling water reactor would produce steam in hitherto secondary systems in the 
machinery spaces thus making containment of any accident that more difficult to 
achieve. It would be prohibitive to site all the secondary parts of the steam machinery 
(the turbo-generators, main turbines, condensers and feed pumps) within an extended 
reactor compartment boundary, it would mean more automation just as the Admiralty 
was trying to reduce the number of remotely controlled valves in the reactor 
compartment. Baker had highlighted the boiling water reactor’s unsuitability to 
submarine steam plants because of the contamination of the air ejector system, he also 
noted that the designer would have to overcome the inherent instability of a rolling and 
pitching submarine which, in extreme circumstances, may uncover the fuel elements 
thus leading to possible overheating of the fuel elements.9 
 
In a memorandum to the Controller, the Director General Ships, Sir Alfred Sims RCNC, 
envisaged that a future programme would develop a competent body of engineers and 
scientists and prove the UK’s ability to provide a longer life core with greater output. 
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The development programme would be conducted in cooperation with the UKAEA and 
Rolls-Royce and Associates which would utilise knowledge gained from Westinghouse, 
Sims stated that if the core life was doubled it would save £6M throughout the life of 
each submarine.10 In effect it would mean longer periods between refitting a submarine 
and a reduction in the refuelling costs associated with docking the submarine. If the 
Treasury sanctioned the programme it would necessitate rebuilding the zero energy 
reactor Neptune, which was defueled and dismantled when the decision was taken to 
purchase the S5W. It was stored by Rolls-Royce at their Derby premises, the estimated 
cost to rebuild, fabricate a new core and for the fissile material totalled £3.9M during 
1960/61. The Controller, Admiral Sir Peter Reid, expanded on and formally submitted 
the memorandum to the Admiralty Board asking a series of rhetorical questions 
considering the aims of a five year Core Development Programme. Whilst focussing on 
the requirement for the UK to develop its own core and establish a body of nuclear 
knowledge, the Controller envisaged that at the end of the programme the UK would 
have closed the gap in its competency. 
 
The conventional propulsion machinery for Dounreay and HMS Valiant (and follow-on 
submarines) was designed to develop 20,000SHP in contrast to the conventional 
machinery of the Skipjack class which was geared to the S5W power output of 
15,000SHP. By developing a core to match the potential of the conventional machinery 
the Controller reasoned that the exercise would: ‘…give us the assurance of our ability 
not only to design a P.W.R. plant but to design a reactor to meet a specific power 
requirement’.11 The Admiralty Board gave their formal approval in mid-October but 
urged that pressure should be brought to bear on Rolls-Royce to contribute financially, 
either directly or indirectly towards the development costs. It was also suggested that 
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the UKAEA be investigated for possible contributions to support development as they 
too would benefit from the programme.12 By successfully developing their own core the 
Admiralty would not only justify Rickover’s judgement in the UK’s ability to stand on 
its own merits in nuclear engineering, it would also release the Royal Navy from the 
power constraints of the S5W reactor, albeit the operational advantages of the increase 
in power would be minimal. Most importantly, one may argue from their viewpoint, 
would be the possibility for Admiralty scientists to return to the US within a few years 
with their knowledge and experience and attempt to reopen the doors of nuclear reactor 
information exchange. 
 
II. Amended Access Agreements 
With the signing of the Westinghouse/Rolls-Royce contract, 10 February 1959, the 
UKAEA’s participation in the nuclear submarine programme had altered, to clarify their 
position and their future participation Baker convened a meeting to discuss the 
UKAEA’s role. Baker thought the Admiralty and the contractors could explain to the 
UKAEA their methods of working and the division of responsibility in the nuclear 
submarine programme. All the parties could then discuss the part the UKAEA could 
play and agree upon their role. The UKAEA considered their role was to give a service 
to the Admiralty and not give direction to Admiralty contractors.13 The UKAEA would 
examine the engineering proposals for Dounreay, comment on them and make a safety 
assessment of the plant, they would also assist the Admiralty in setting up the operations 
team and would provide training within the scope of their facilities. The UKAEA would 
also provide for examination of fuel elements within the existing facilities at Dounreay 
and would advise on facilities required for reprocessing used cores and reprocess them 
if required. Baker advised that for the time being, the US had considered it not 
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worthwhile reprocessing used cores but thought they might start within the near future. 
It was agreed at the meeting that the UKAEA would investigate the disposal of 
irradiated cores should reprocessing be considered not worthwhile. This was a financial 
consideration, there had been discussions on the practicality of reprocessing used cores 
since 1957, and it was known that the US had successfully completed reprocessing a 
zirconium core that year and that the procedures would be available to the UK.14 
 
In the earlier stages of research and development, Access Agreements had been signed 
in 1956 between the UKAEA and the firms involved, however, since the Westinghouse 
Agreement Rolls-Royce considered that there was no necessity for them to enter into an 
Access Agreement with the UKAEA for the proposed future development. In 1956, the 
UKAEA was the sole source of nuclear experience and information, Rolls-Royce and 
Associates now argued that they too had nuclear experience stemming from their 
Westinghouse contract.15 In reply, Baker’s Deputy, Captain Terence Ridley, thought 
Rolls-Royce was taking a narrow view trying to protect Westinghouse information from 
the UKAEA which, Ridley argued, could be written into any future contract or Access 
Agreement. ‘…whatever one may think of A.E.A., their peculiar position makes it 
inconceivable that Rolls-Royce and ourselves could ignore them entirely for the next 
ten years’.16 Rolls-Royce expressed the view that the caveats concerning design rights 
and patents included in the original 1956 contract, C.P.101/55, should not apply to the 
Dounreay core and should cease after signing the Westinghouse Contract in February 
1959. The Admiralty would not accept these conditions and insisted on their retention in 
both contracts.17 Rolls-Royce’s senior chief executive co-ordinating the nuclear effort, 
H. L. Barman, thought that these should be renegotiated. In connection with the Access 
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Agreements, the Admiralty wrote to the three firms involved to advise that the 
UKAEA’s participation in the nuclear submarine development programme needed to be 
revised following the assistance given by the US which necessitated new Access 
Agreements being concluded. The letter gave details of the UKAEA’s future 
participation and a specimen of the Access Agreement was attached for the firms’ 
approval.18 
 
The first part of the letter was sent to Barman at Rolls-Royce, R. P. H. Yapp at Vickers-
Armstrongs and C. E. H. Verity at Foster Wheeler. The second part was addressed 
solely to Rolls-Royce and referred to the firm’s concerns highlighted in Barman’s 
earlier letter, the Admiralty reiterated that information passed to Rolls-Royce and 
Associates by Westinghouse was a result of that firm acting as the UK Government’s 
agents and the disposition of design rights between the Admiralty and the UKAEA was 
a matter for them. Finally, Rolls-Royce’s reference to the possibility of entering into a 
commercial licence agreement with Westinghouse was unlikely as the last time it was 
proposed the US Government was not in favour of it. There were to be many letters and 
drafts of the Access Agreement before the wording was agreed on and acceptable to the 
UKAEA and Rolls-Royce. It would appear from the letters that both the UKAEA and 
Rolls-Royce were intent on getting the other party to acquiesce to their version of the 
patents and design rights. Captain Ridley noted sardonically: ‘Many thanks for the latest 
instalment in this thrilling serial […] when I try to read the latest draft the words swim 
before my eyes and become meaningless’.19 It is clear that towards the end of 
negotiations people were becoming weary with the process of rereading draft copies. 
Eventually however, the final draft was sent to Rolls-Royce and the UKAEA for 
signature at the end of December 1961. 
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III. Core Development Programme (CORDEP) 
The main reason behind the research and development programme known as CORDEP 
was the Admiralty’s intention to make good the gap in their knowledge of reactor 
design caused by the purchase of the S5W. In a letter to the Treasury it was advised that 
the result of this “corner cutting” would leave the Admiralty dependent upon the US – 
Admiral Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, and Rickover could change their minds at 
any time, and they would not be in office for ever. It was also possible that the US 
Government could make things more difficult as administrations change.20 Despite a 
limitation of ten years being written into the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, in this 
and other papers researched the Admiralty appear to stick to the possibility that there 
would be an opportunity to continue or renegotiate the Agreement. However, it was 
always Admiralty policy to proceed independently once all possible information had 
been gained from the 1958 Agreement. The Admiralty’s continuous references to 
“possible further assistance from the US” must be seen as a means of demonstrating to 
the Treasury that efforts were still being made to save expenditure on research and 
development by gaining future assistance from the US. Knowing that future research 
would be conducted independently was the rationale behind the CORDEP programme 
as it was only through independent endeavour that the Royal Navy would manage to 
build its own nuclear submarine fleet. After deliberation by the various Admiralty 
departments, Admiralty Memorandum S.10007/60 was ready for submitting to the 
Treasury in early 1961. However, the Under Secretary of Finance at the Admiralty, J. 
M. Mackay, was not content with the memorandum and sought to change the emphasis 
prior to presenting it for approval. Mackay thought the memorandum protested too 
much about the Admiralty’s right to a research and development programme and dwelt 
too much on the thorny issue of “dependence on America”. Mackay argued that the 
                                                     





memorandum: ‘…instead of allaying criticism, may well stimulate attack, especially 
with the incentive to save £10M’.21 Mackay proposed to submit a memorandum which 
focussed on the resumption of the research and development programme that was 
curtailed which would complete the Admiralty’s pressurised water reactor knowledge, 
produce worthwhile economies and put the Admiralty in a position to trade with the 
Americans. Lang agreed with Mackay that his alternative draft should be put to the 
Board for their consideration. 
 
Mackay’s version of the memorandum was eventually forwarded to the DRPC for their 
consideration 26 April 1961. It appears that the DRPC advised the Admiralty to contact 
the US for advice on the proposed programme, the Minister of Defence, Harold 
Watkinson, wrote to the US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, similarly, the 
First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Caspar John wrote to Admiral Arleigh Burke. The 
Admiralty received interim replies to the letters which agreed that the programme was a 
sensible proposition, indeed the letter advises the Treasury that: ‘The U.S. Navy in 
particular have given assurance of their support, and there is no reason to think that the 
final U.S. reaction will be any different’.22 It is possible that these letters were sent in 
order to satisfy the Treasury that efforts were still being made to elicit assistance from 
the US but inevitably, the man who would ultimately advise McNamara would be 
Rickover, and his views on future assistance were well known to the Admiralty. The US 
Navy would be able to offer very little support if the US Government did not also 
sanction some form of assistance programme. Acknowledging that they were waiting on 
a final reply from McNamara, the Admiralty sought approval for six months of funding 
estimated at £3M which included costs for fissile material. 
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By reply, the Treasury thought there were arguments for starting the programme but 
what worried them was the lack of indication of how much assistance the Americans 
were prepared to offer that may reduce costs and increase efficiency. Reluctantly, the 
Treasury agreed that the Admiralty could make a start on the project, limited to £2.15M, 
on the understanding that their commitments were kept to a minimum until the US 
made known its policy on further assistance.23 The Ministry of Defence responded to 
the Treasury’s concerns by noting that they had drafted a letter for Sir Solly Zuckerman 
to send to the US enquiring when we might expect further information concerning the 
position of the AEC and US Navy to our plans : ‘…alias in both cases Admiral 
Rickover’.24 Despite a number of letters expediting a formal response from the US the 
reply from McNamara on 9 April 1962 was not promising. The AEC Chairman had 
informed McNamara that based on the information provided, the proposed UK 
programme of research and development: ‘…should significantly assist in increasing 
your competence in the nuclear propulsion field’.25 This is a very non-committal 
statement from the US and is a reiteration of the main intention of the 1958 Agreement 
namely, that the UK would stand independently and progress from the knowledge 
transferred under that agreement. Despite McNamara advising that the letter was an 
interim response he thought that: ‘…something more definite will reach us before 
long’.26 No further reference was found to McNamara’s reply and it can be assumed that 
Rickover refused all requests for further assistance or advice, indeed, Baker observed 
that: ‘…we have gained enormously from the Agreement […] but all we seem to get 
now or seem likely to get in the future are “restrictive fringe effects”’.27 In fact, it is 
recorded in the same Minute that the Admiralty commenced the Polaris programme on 
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the basis of their existing nuclear knowledge. ‘During the negotiation of the Polaris 
Sales Agreement we were warned by the Americans that they could give us no further 
nuclear information’.28 
 
The Treasury, the Cabinet and certain elements within the Admiralty began to face the 
reality of the 1958 Agreement and resign themselves to the fact that there would be no 
further assistance from the US. A joint communique was released by the US and UK 
Governments 21 December 1962, announcing the Nassau Agreement by which the UK 
was to purchase the Polaris missile system from the US, after negotiations the Polaris 
Sales Agreement was signed 6 April 1963. From the autumn of 1962, in the files 
researched there appear to be no further references from the Treasury to the Admiralty 
concerning US assistance in their nuclear propulsion programme. 
 
IV. Nuclear Development (Submarines) – NuDe(S) 
In December 1961, the finance branch at the Admiralty wrote to the Director General 
Ships, Sir Alfred Sims, requesting he put a figure on the extent of Admiralty 
commitments to the NUDES programme at the end of March 1963.29 This is the first 
reference found in the files researched to the NUDES programme; confusingly it is used 
in conjunction with CORDEP until the final reference to the latter programme in 
September 1963.30 As discussed previously, Stage I of the development programme 
included the construction and operation of the UK manufactured S5W core (Core A) in 
the Dounreay prototype, Stage II (now referred to as NUDES I) related to the future 
development of an improved reactor core with higher power output and longer life. To 
achieve this objective, the Admiralty’s proposal was: ‘…to increase the length of the 
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core, increase the amount of fissile material and incorporate improved alloys and 
shielded burnable poisons’.31 Burnable poisons are an effective neutron absorber and are 
used in nuclear engineering to reduce initial reactivity, they become less effective as 
core burn-up progresses thus counteracting the fall in reactivity as the fuel is used up.32 
Begun in 1961, the programme required the Core B design to be agreed upon and frozen 
by mid-1965. This date would allow the programme to fit in with the predicted burn-up 
of Core A at Dounreay, allowing time to manufacture a core for Dounreay. The 
UKAEA was confident if no further delays were experienced in the experimental 
programme then the data from the intermediate, and final non-destructive inspections 
should provide confidence in the selection of the Core B fuel element parameters.33 
 
Although the development programme had been given limited financial authorisation to 
proceed by the Treasury in October 1961, uncertainties concerning Admiralty estimates 
of about £10M had prevented Treasury approval of the overall programme estimate. In 
the spring of 1963, the Admiralty wrote to the Treasury advising that the total estimate 
of the programme had fallen to £9.89M and enclosed the expenditure to date and 
estimated costs going forward. This information satisfied Treasury concerns and 
approval was given.34 However, as with most estimates the figures are liable to 
fluctuations; in their next report to the Treasury the Admiralty had to advise that due to 
wage increases and a rise in fuel costs the estimates had risen by £460,000, although 
they did point out that this figure was still within the original £10.5M envisaged.35 By 
August however, the cost had risen to £10.74M due to price changes in fissile material. 
In December 1966, it was reported that Core A had achieved a seventy percent burn-up, 
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allowing time for refit and core change it was envisaged: ‘…that Core B would go 
critical in the early autumn of 1968’.36 Core B was installed at Dounreay during 1967 
and initial criticality at zero power was achieved in June 1968. It was taken critical at 
low power in August and then operated at high power for the first two years to give 
confidence in the design prior to manufacturing the first production core for HMS 
Swiftsure which had been ordered in October 1967.37 Core B objectives were achieved, 
the core operated for just under four years before final burn-up, a substantial increase on 
the two years achieved with Core A. 
 
The Ministry of Defence (Navy) (MoD (N)), had decided early in the NUDES I 
programme that so long as there was a nuclear submarine fleet there would be a 
requirement for a supporting research and development programme.38 In early 1965, the 
MoD (N) wrote to the Treasury with a progress report of the NUDES I programme and 
to advise that they had decided to provide funds from this programme for a team of 
three Rolls-Royce and Associates personnel to: ‘…maintain a continuous review of the 
whole NuDeS programme’.39 Funding of £54,000 was allocated in July 1964 to focus 
on noise reduction by examining two possible types of core in the new reactor plant and 
to provide a planned, costed programme on which to base proposals for the 
development of such a plant. The MoD (N) sought Treasury sanction of this preliminary 
investigation to the end of December 1965 at a total cost of £145,000 covered by the 
existing £10.74M budget. Much to their alarm, the Treasury replied: ‘…it seems to us 
that your programme is tantamount to a project study for a major new programme’.40 
The Treasury requested that the MoD (N) give an assurance that the investigations 
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referred to in their letter implied no commitment to a new development programme. The 
Admiralty was able to confirm that their continuing investigations did not commit them 
to a new programme, however, in a follow-up letter they did advise that nothing should 
be done to hinder the Navy in making the best judgement in reducing noise levels. The 
MoD (N) recognised that when proposals were submitted they would require careful 
scrutiny in consideration to the budget available and the possibility of modifying 
submarines already in service.41 The Treasury, satisfied with the information provided, 
sanctioned their proposals but by January it was envisaged that the investigations would 
not be completed until March with costs now expected to be £200,000.42 The letter also 
gave the Treasury an outline on the status of the preliminary proposal for a new research 
and development programme which had been considered by the Board. The proposals 
had to be finalised and the investigations would need to be completed, the MoD (N) 
advised the costs could still be met from the allocated budget and sought the Treasury’s 
approval to continue. Although the Treasury agreed to the proposed increase, there was 
to be another increase in the final estimate for the NUDES I programme, Director 
General Ships sought £11.5M to cover wage increases and the delays caused by the 
introduction of the Polaris programme, he also wanted to avoid any impediments to the 
contractor’s work.43 The Treasury, replied that if the MoD (N) could justify the 
importance of finding the extra expenditure within the existing defence budget they 
would sanction the £11.5M to complete NUDES I.44 
 
V. NUDES II – FLIP – ANP 
From the preliminary investigations being conducted under NUDES I finance, it was 
apparent that the MoD (N) was considering two designs for their future programme to 
                                                     
41 TNA, ADM 1/29746, Letter, RP/311/65, 18 May 1965. 
42 TNA, ADM 1/29746, Letter, S.3630/61, 14 January 1966. 
43 TNA, ADM 1/29746, Paper, NRDB/P(66)33, 18 October 1966. 





develop Core C. Option one, an integral pressurised water reactor, designated NR3 and 
option two, designated NR4, a supercritical water cooled system. Although the main 
objective was a reduction in noise levels also to be included were economic incentives, 
development potential, ease of maintenance and simplicity in refuelling.45 The MoD 
(N)’s proposals had been endorsed by the Nuclear Sub-Committee of the Weapons 
Development Committee, a draft submission from the Deputy Chief Scientific Advisor 
(Projects) to the Secretary of State, Denis Healey, seeking his agreement to commence 
Phase I was circulated for endorsement or comment by the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
Secretary.46 The draft submission observed that the S5W was ten years old and it was 
now possible to consider radical improvements in a number of areas, such as 
performance and noise. It was estimated that Phase I of NUDES II would take three 
years at a cost of £5M which would cover three designs. The first two have been briefly 
described above, the third design was from the AERE which envisaged using plutonium 
cermet fuel plates, this option was being considered because it was thought that the 
UK’s current stockpile of enriched uranium for use in reactor cores would be exhausted 
within ten years. The cost in reopening the high enrichment diffusion plant at 
Capenhurst and the possible problems in procuring fissile material from the US 
stemming from pressure to place the export of nuclear material under international 
safeguards meant the UK was looking at means of overcoming these possible 
difficulties. It was noted in the draft that plutonium fuel costs could be fifty percent 
lower than enriched uranium costs. 
 
In Rolls-Royce: the nuclear power connection, Lambert wrote that the proposal for Core 
C did not proceed beyond the preliminary design stage because attempting to achieve all 
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the objectives set for the plant was deemed too great and is dismissed as remaining as: 
‘…no more than a paper proposal.’47 One file researched indicates that Core C was 
more than merely a paper proposal, the work submissions to the MoD (N) in support of 
the NUDES II contract amounted to nearly £1.25M over three years between 1966 and 
1969 covering all aspects of the steam raising plant from fuel technology to improving 
the properties and quality of the reactor pressure vessel. The work was conducted on 
behalf of the MoD (N) between Rolls-Royce and Associates and the Yarrow Admiralty 
Research Department.48 
 
A report by the Defence Equipment Policy Committee (DEPC) gives a historical 
narrative of the future development programme to October 1973 which ultimately 
sought funding for the design of a new plant, provision of a second prototype at 
Dounreay and continuation of the Secondary Plant Improvement Programme (SIP). 49 A 
reference in the report is made to a MoD (N) paper, WD(NS) 1/68, which recommended 
in addition to the programme of improvement of the present pressurised water reactor, 
known as the Primary Plant Improvement Programme (PIP), that effort should be 
devoted to defining the role and material parameters of a new generation of submarine 
(dubbed SSN0Y).50 Another recommendation was to continue investigatory work for a 
new design of propulsion plant on the lines of NUDES II. This programme was 
subsequently renamed in 1969 the Forward Looking Investigatory Programme (FLIP) 
and was renamed once more in April 1972 the Advanced Nuclear Plant (ANP). Another 
MoD (N) paper quoted in the DEPC report, DEP 28/72, sought endorsement of the 
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doctrine that the saturated water reactor was best form of future plant; that a new shore 
prototype was essential to the development programme; and that funding of the design 
programme should be continued. Approval had been sought for an expansion of the 
FLIP programme for a period of three years, 1972/3-74/5 and for the SIP programme to 
be extended by one year to 1974/5. The ANP programme entailed investigating a 
saturated water reactor plant capable of producing 40,000SHP; the associated SIP 
programme was preparing secondary machinery and equipment which would meet the 
new reactor requirement. 
 
The DEPC report noted that further development of Core B was clearly a possible 
alternative to development of the saturated water reactor but cautioned that further 
improvements to noise and shock vulnerability was limited. The cost of pressurised 
water reactor development was dependent on the maximum power requirement and the 
following systems were identified: a) a ten percent increase in power (20,000SHP) with 
no prototype testing, estimated development cost £18M-£20M; b) a ten to forty percent 
increase in power (25,000SHP) prototype testing using the existing DS/MP, estimated 
development cost £35M-£40M and c) a greater than forty percent power increase with 
testing conducted at a new shore prototype, estimated development cost £50M-£55M.51 
Development of the saturated water reactor of whatever power and a new shore 
prototype was estimated to cost £60M-£65M, this was clearly a more expensive 
programme for the MoD (N) than the PIP programme which was to become Core Z. 
The Future Generation Submarine (FGS) team investigating the requirements of SSN0Y 
preferred option required 25,000SHP, however, the report concluded that whilst the 
saturated water reactor was the more expensive option it had considerable long term 
advantage and potential for further development. It would give increased power, 
                                                     





enhanced nuclear safety, reduced noise and reduced vulnerability to shock. The report 
envisaged freezing the main parameters, health physics and reactor compartment layout 
in April 1974, core design freeze and order mid-1977 and core load mid-1980. There is 
a great amount of detail in the report with technical comparisons made between the two 
plants (Annex E) which determined that the greater advantages lay with the adoption of 
the saturated water reactor. The report concluded that the FLIP programme has achieved 
its objective in identifying the reactor system most suited for marine propulsion in the 
1980s and invited the Naval Projects Board (NPB) to endorse the DEPC report that 
recommended future development be based on the saturated water reactor plant. As 
such, approval was sought to extend the ANP programme to July 1984 involving 
expenditure of £55.2M from April 1974. Approval to extend the SIP programme to 
April 1978 at a cost of £7M from the same date was also sought. 
 
In November 1973, Rolls-Royce and Associates placed a contract, NA/3/2107/900/Sqs, 
with Yarrow Admiralty Research Department for the design of secondary machinery 
plant suitable for an ANP of integral design. 52 The prototype plant would be known as 
DSMP 2 and sited adjacent to the present Dounreay prototype plant. The contract 
specifically called for a design which would be fully representative of a submarine 
secondary plant of similar power to allow predictions to be made of plant performance 
and chemistry effects. It was agreed that the proposed design should closely follow the 
basis of the Advanced Secondary Plant Reference Design (ASPRD) currently being 
progressed under the SIP programme. This work progressed until April 1976 when 
MoD accepted Rolls-Royce and Associates advice to terminate work associated with the 
integral reactor plant and direct effort towards improvement of the dispersed pressurised 
water reactor fitted in current submarines. The termination report provides details of the 
                                                     






status of the system design in May 1976 but affords no reasons for the cancellation of 
the ANP saturated water reactor programme; another file associated with this work, 
ADM 317/205, is closed and attempts to gain access were unsuccessful, the file is now 
listed as “officially missing”.53 
 
VI. Core Z 
Core Z, the final core update for PWR 1, was the result of the Primary Plant 
Improvement Programme (PIP) which had two objectives defined by MoD (N), to 
increase core-life and to improve main coolant pump performance. In January 1969, 
Rolls-Royce and Associates published cost and timescale estimates for the PIP contract 
intended to replace the NUDES II contract.54 The design of Core Z took three years and 
nine variants were analysed before the mock-up was tested in Neptune, the design was 
agreed upon in mid-1972 to allow manufacture and delivery to Dounreay 8 April 1974. 
Core Z went critical for the first time 16 December 1974, however, during testing: 
‘…some performance issues were identified, which invalidated the full-power safety 
case’.55 A major programme was undertaken to understand the problem and determine 
means of resolving it, there were also implications for submarines in commission with 
Cores A and B. A solution was forthcoming and fitted to Core Z at Dounreay and over 
the coming years the modification was fitted to the operational submarines. The burn-up 
of Core Z began in earnest in June 1976 and was finally shut down on 20 June 1984: 
‘…having exceeded its expected lifetime by a useful margin’.56 
 
It must be appreciated that Core Z is fitted to three submarines still in commission and 
as a result little or no information has been released concerning the PIP programme. 
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Many of the NUDES II files and those of the PIP Programme in the National Archives 
catalogue are advised as closed and retained by the Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority. From the manufacture of the first Dounreay core through to the success of 
Core Z, and beyond to PWR 2, a small cadre of reactor core designers have increased 
the power output and extended the life of a core constrained by the physical limitations 
of the reactor pressure vessel. As Hill noted, they have done a superb job which: 
‘because of security constraints, will only be fully appreciated by a small number of 
people in the company and in the MoD’.57 
 
VII. Reporting the Nuclear Navy 
Before the cultural changes of the 1960s, when the “Establishment” and authority in 
general began to be questioned and challenged, reports in the press and other media 
followed the conventions of the day reporting facts and informing the general public. 
There was no analysis or informed expert opinion which one would expect in today’s 
media, as such during the 1950s and early 1960s, although a few details on the 
Admiralty’s nuclear submarine programme were reported in the press, these were 
mainly confined to debates in Parliament. Typical of such factual reporting was an 
article on the press being invited to see the Jason reactor at the Royal Naval College, 
Greenwich as described in chapter five. There was no further comment about its 
location in an iconic Grade 1 listed building nor of its siting within Greenwich; research 
failed to uncover any correspondence relating to this event in the local or national press. 
 
The Admiralty did not hold any public relations event for the nuclear submarine project 
when approved by the Treasury in January 1956 however, reports did start to appear in 
the national press later that year commenting on the LIDO reactor becoming critical and 
                                                     





starting shielding experiments for the nuclear submarine programme.58 Further reports 
appeared in The Times and other papers throughout 1957 advising that good progress 
was being made with the design of the British pressurised water reactor and of various 
contracts being awarded. During 1958, as negotiations were taking place with the US, 
reports appeared of Rickover’s visit to the Admiralty and of the eventual purchase of the 
S5W as part of the Mutual Defence Agreement but little else was forthcoming. It was 
only in 1959 that other media interest began to take notice. The unusually high profile 
event of Prince Philip performing a keel laying ceremony for HMS Dreadnought, was 
not only reported in The Times and on the BBC Home Service but it was also recorded 
by British Pathe and distributed to cinemas across the country.59 A shorter news cast 
was released by Reuters, possibly for overseas markets; in the days when few 
households had television, these newsreels would have ensured that a mass audience 
would have known about Britain’s nuclear submarine programme. 
 
The building and fitting out of HMS Dreadnought was marked by a number of walk-
outs and strikes by various Trades Unions, some were for a short period whilst others 
lasted weeks; these were reported in national and local press and indicate that all aspects 
of the programme were covered; a dispute involving the Boiler Makers Society 
prompted the headline: ‘Atomic submarine may be delayed’.60 On 10 July 1962, both 
the Birmingham Daily Post and the Newcastle Evening Chronicle reported on another 
walk-out at Barrow of 128 electricians involved in a demarcation dispute. Throughout 
the UK the local press was as active as the national press in reporting on the progress of 
HMS Dreadnought; the Aberdeen Evening Express wrote an article on the imminent 
conclusion of the purchase of the S5W reactor plant, 23 February 1959. An article 
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appeared in the Liverpool Echo, 12 November 1962, noting that HMS Dreadnought’s 
reactor had gone critical for the first time and a couple of weeks later the Belfast 
Telegraph reported on HMS Dreadnought sailing from Barrow to Rothesay for sea 
trials, 26 January 1963. However, reports were not limited to the submarine, the crew 
was also subjected to media attention. A report in March 1959, announced the name of 
the Commanding Officer designate of HMS Dreadnought, Lieutenant Commander B. F. 
P. Samborne (and of Hammersley as Engineering Officer), the report also noted that 
sixteen officers and thirteen senior rates had been selected for nuclear training.61 On 23 
April 1959, the East Kent Gazette reported that four officers and eight ratings were 
going to the USA for nuclear sea training. The Coventry Evening Telegraph reported 10 
June 1960, that HMS Dreadnought would carry its own medical staff, something that 
other submarines did not do. With the advent of Polaris, a new reality had to be 
confronted by all crewmen, whether or not to receive bad news on patrol. Being unable 
respond to a bereavement or other such domestic crisis whilst on patrol, the Daily 
Mirror reported on this heartbreak choice for families in its 28 June 1969 edition. It is 
apparent from these reports that the Admiralty was providing information to the media 
in order to raise public interest in all aspects of the nuclear submarine programme. 
Some reports, however, were not reliant on the Admiralty providing the material. 
 
In the late 1950s, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) came to prominence 
demonstrating against the UK’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. From the CND files 
researched at the London School of Economics, little was found on the subject of 
nuclear submarines, only the written questions posed to the Defence Minister, Denis 
Healey, 16 September 1964, concerning the four Polaris submarines. It is possible that 
because of the apparent “lack of interest” in nuclear submarines by CND during this 
                                                     





period and indeed, the UK’s embarrassing security issues during the 1950s and early 
1960s (Klaus Fuchs, the Cambridge Spy Ring and the Portland Spy Ring to name the 
most infamous) that the physical security of nuclear submarines does not appear to have 
been taken as seriously as information security by the Admiralty. There were security 
breaches, and these were reported upon, The Times and the Belfast Telegraph both 
reported in early March 1962, on an inquiry into how the word “Rag” had been painted 
(probably by students) on the side of HMS Dreadnought whilst at the Devonshire Dock, 
Barrow. Later that year, it was reported in the Birmingham Daily Post that CND 
protestors had managed to gain access to the casing of the USS Nautilus whilst at 
Portland, 16 July 1962, the protestors were later released by police without charge. 
Although these incidents would have been embarrassing to the Admiralty, they do show 
that, whilst not questioning the apparent lack of security in their articles, the press were 
willing to report on any story connected to nuclear submarines. 
 
The launch of HMS Dreadnought by the Queen in 1960, was a very important moment 
for the Royal Navy and one could argue for the country, as such the ceremony was 
broadcast by BBC television on the morning of the launch and recorded for the BBC 
Home Service so households without television could also listen to the event. After the 
launch of HMS Dreadnought, the subject of nuclear submarines increasingly became a 
topic of debate on radio and on television. A few days later, capturing the public’s 
interest, the BBC broadcast a programme detailing the advances made in submarines, 
through personal reminisces, since the first submarine commissioned in 1901.62 HMS 
Dreadnought’s commissioning ceremony on 17 April 1963, was also widely reported 
throughout the UK. In the US, there appear to have been no reports in the Washington 
Post nor the New York Times, not even around the Groton area of Connecticut, with its 
                                                     





strong connection to Dreadnought. This was possibly due to the fact that the USS 
Thresher was lost at sea 10 April 1963, and American focus was inevitably on the 129 
men who lost their lives and on investigating how such a disaster had occurred. 
However, the commissioning was reported later throughout the US in places such as 
Kansas and Michigan.63 Due to limited time researching the Library of Congress online 
archives, no references were found to the Mutual Defence Agreement nor HMS 
Dreadnought, this was possibly due to the search criterion used. No doubt, with more 
time and resources to research, documents and press articles on the subject may come to 
light at the British Library and the Library of Congress. 
 
Throughout 1963, there were steady press reports and newsreel films of various aspects 
of HMS Dreadnought’s sea trials and of the launch of the Royal Navy’s second nuclear-
powered submarine, HMS Valiant, which was performed by “Mrs Peter Thorneycroft”, 
the Defence Minister’s wife, as recorded by the newsreel.64 Reports about nuclear 
submarines continued through the 1960s, but these articles started looking at the 
complications that began to appear such as the Inconel problem at Dounreay which was 
reported in The Times. Hairline cracks found in some of HMS Dreadnought’s steel 
plates, were reported in both The Times and the Daily Mirror as was the subsequent 
decision to buy US steel because UK producers could not supply the right material. 
Interestingly however, there was no sensationalism that is associated with today’s media 
indeed, when HMS Dreadnought was in dock for investigation of the cracks, it was 
reported that a fire broke out in the control room but: ‘It was soon put out by the 
crew’.65 Despite these reports, articles still appeared which catered to the public interest, 
the BBC produced programmes provoking debate on naval power and of the nuclear 
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deterrent. After the signing of the Nassau Agreement, BBC television broadcast a NBC 
special 22 January 1963, featuring the USS George Washington. The programme gave 
the UK public an insight into the future national deterrent based on Polaris. Many 
reports were produced with the assistance of the MoD (N), the BBC Home Service 
broadcast a programme 28 August 1966, ‘Down Your Way’, featuring HMS Valiant. 
Another submarine, HMS Resolution, was the title and featured in a Radio 4 broadcast 7 
May 1969. It must be apparent that gaining access to an operational submarine to 
produce a programme or write an article would require a large amount of planning. 
 
Members of the media attempting to visit a submarine would have been involved in 
months of negotiations and possibly back-ground checks before setting foot onboard. 
The Admiralty, and later the MoD (N), would have requested a summary of their 
intentions and would have sought some editorial control over what was allowed to be 
reported/broadcast. The articles and programmes were by no means sterile reports but 
features such as submarine and machinery operating parameters would have been 
strictly off limits. Filming in certain areas would have been prohibited and in areas 
where approved the camera shot would have been posed so as not to capture 
instrumentation and equipment in the background. No doubt the Admiralty saw the 
reporting of nuclear submarines in a positive light and did use them for recruiting 
purposes; the numerous firms involved in building nuclear submarines also used them 
as advertising for apprentices. Where firms were also involved with supplying industry, 
they too used their participation in nuclear submarines to project the image of the 
company being at the forefront of technology. The Royal Navy continues to this day to 
allow limited media access to submarines, this openness with the media is the antithesis 





difficult line to balance with operational security being paramount, but it is because 
media access is limited that submarines maintain their mystique with the general public. 
 
VIII. Project Cost 
A memorandum prepared for the DRPC gave a total through costing of £32.16M from 
1958 to 1965, for HMS Dreadnought and the Dounreay prototype.66 The First Lord 
broke these figures down for the Prime Minister noting £18.5M was projected to be 
spent at Dounreay and £8.85M on purchasing the reactor and machinery from the US.67 
The last record researched of Dounreay’s estimates noted that the £26.5M held firm but 
was dependent on reaching criticality in September 1963, however due to the Inconel 
problems encountered and the costs incurred in rectifying them, criticality was not 
achieved until January 1965.68 The Naval Estimates for 1963-64 indicate a build cost 
figure for Dreadnought of £18M, it is fair to assume that the whole nuclear propulsion 
project had cost in the region of £40M-£50M. It begs the question that apart from the 
development cost, exactly what did the Government get for its money? Excluding guns 
and certain other equipment, the following build costs are taken from the same Naval 
Estimates for comparison: HMS Dreadnought £18,055,000, the guided missile 
destroyer HMS Devonshire £14,080,000, the Leander class frigate HMS Leander 
£4,630,000 and the Oberon class submarine HMS Olympus £2,500,000.69 
 
Cost comparisons between different classes of warships and submarines do not take 
account of the dissimilar operations they undertake therefore it is difficult to assess a 
vessel’s “value”. The warship can be used in multiple roles away from its primary 
function such as reaction to natural disasters and humanitarian missions; a warship’s 
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presence can impose economic sanctions or even engage in limited diplomatic disputes 
such as the Icelandic “Cod Wars” of the early 1970s. The warship can engage in limited 
hostilities and if required escalate the fighting. However, the submarine is ill-suited to 
most of these roles and can only be employed to threaten, as encapsulated by the role of 
the deterrent submarines, or commit acts of violence. It could be argued that seven 
conventionally powered submarines could be purchased for the price of one nuclear-
powered submarine; however, many would contest that this would be a false economy. 
This thesis has shown that the nuclear-powered submarine is not limited in terms of 
endurance and capability as is its conventional counterpart; its “value” in the role of 
national deterrent cannot be sufficiently expressed, the threat of using nuclear weapons 
to prevent major war is certainly controversial but its success cannot be denied.  
 
It is implicit from this chapter that with core improvement comes improved safety, 
simplicity of operation and ease of maintenance. The safety and reliability of the PWR 1 
reactor plant, and its successor PWR 2, can be realised by the fact that the Continuous at 
Sea Deterrent (CAS-D) of the Polaris and Trident submarine patrols has been 
maintained for fifty years. It is one thing to have a safe and reliable nuclear power plant 
however, full advantage can only be grasped if its secondary machinery is as 
dependable. The Royal Navy was producing a steam raising plant (the pressurised water 
reactor) just as it was designing its surface warships to be powered by gas turbine and it 
has been seen that initially not enough design effort was accorded to the secondary 
machinery as it was deemed a proven technology. All good engineering lessons learn 
from past mistakes, new ideas are taken forward and good design is improved upon. 
The electrical generating power of a nuclear power plant allowed for the introduction of 
new technologies especially those in the field of air purification which allowed the crew 





The striking improvements in submarine technologies can best be characterised by Vice 
Admiral Sir Arthur R. Hezlet CB DSO DSC (Flag Officer Submarines 1959-1961) who 
wrote: ‘If the old fashioned U-boats overall submerged performance is represented by 
m, then the Type XXI would be 10m, the Walther boat 40m and the nuclear submarine 
at 5,000m’.70 HMS Trenchant, the oldest of the Trafalgar class submarines still 
operational was commissioned 14 January 1989, that is a testament to the core 
designers, the build quality and the performance of the PWR 1 reactor, including its 
associated secondary machinery. It is also testament to the Royal Navy marine 
engineers, artificers and mechanics whose skill and professionalism keep a nuclear-
powered submarine operational for thirty or more years. 
  
                                                     







During a debate in the House of Lords on the Naval Estimates concerning the possible 
means of submarine nuclear propulsion, Viscount Hall, First Lord of the Admiralty 
1946-51, noted: ‘Some United States Navy planners go as far to say that, just as the 
carrier superseded the battleship, so might the Dreadnought of the deep, the future 
submarine, become the capital ship of the future’.1 It was prescient that Hall evoked the 
name Dreadnought during the debate. In naming its new, nuclear-powered submarines; 
the Royal Navy eschewed previous famous submarine names such as HMS Upholder 
and HMS Seraph, and gave their new submarines the names of famous battleships 
which reflected the Royal Navy’s opinions on the status of these vessels.2 Beginning 
with HMS Dreadnought, the battleship design that revolutionised naval warfare in 
1901, HMS Valiant and HMS Warspite soon followed with the Polaris submarines 
carrying the names of Resolution, Renown, Repulse and Revenge. The nuclear-powered 
submarine is the “hunter-killer” envisaged by Mountbatten and the carrier of the 
national deterrent. The historians, Peter Hennessy and James Jinks wrote of Royal Navy 
submarines: ‘Their world spans the front line of national defence (surveillance and 
intelligence gathering) to the last line (nuclear retaliation as the country’s near 
unthinkable ‘last resort’)’.3 The nuclear-powered submarine is the capital ship of 
today’s Royal Navy, all this has been made possible with the successful development of 
nuclear propulsion. However, as discussed with evidence provided from files at the 
National Archives and elsewhere, at its inception the nuclear propulsion programme 
suffered from low priorities, indifferent management and inadequate resources. 
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I. Political Problems and Indifference 
An expert on Anglo-American relations, John Baylis, has argued that during the period 
the McMahon Act was in force there was an “epistemic community” of military 
personnel, intelligence officers, government officials and nuclear scientists on both 
sides of the Atlantic who maintained a close working relationship: ‘…which was of 
crucial importance in breaking down the barriers to collaboration which were erected 
after World War II’.4 Such examples have been presented; in chapter three it was noted 
how, during the technical team visit to the US in 1957, a piece of reactor grade hafnium 
came into their possession once it was known that they did not have any for testing. In 
chapter four it was noted that Rickover made a trans-Atlantic call to a British 
metallurgist (probably the Harwell metallurgist, Finniston) to clarify a technical point.5 
These examples indicate that, whilst comprehensive data was not exchanged, low level 
nuclear information was exchanged to the benefit of both parties. Politically however, 
full exchange of nuclear information would have to wait until Eisenhower replaced 
Truman as US President and Macmillan became Prime Minister, both men had enjoyed 
a close working relationship during World War II. Soviet success with the launch of 
Sputnik, which alarmed the US, was the catalyst to the repeal of the McMahon Act; 
Timothy Botti, who has written on Anglo-American relations, observed: ‘…the 
Eisenhower administration accomplished more in Anglo-American relations in two 
months than American officials had in the previous twelve years’.6 
 
It is evident from the files that the nuclear submarine project, whilst under political 
scrutiny by the First Lords of the Admiralty, only became of interest to politicians when 
the US made the offer for the UK to purchase a submarine propulsion plant. Even then, 
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the purchase was viewed as a possible means of reducing expenditure on the project. 
From 1946 onwards, it is fair to view this period as one of political indifference. It was 
only in the early 1960s however, with the cancellation of the stand-off Skybolt missile 
system and the signing of the Nassau Agreement and Polaris Sales Agreement that 
British politicians grasped the potential of what nuclear propulsion offered – a sea based 
deterrent. Macmillan advised the Queen, that his philosophy was to rid the UK of land-
based rockets, the best thing was to move the deterrent out to sea: ‘…in a submarine, is 
out of sight’.7 Political use of the nuclear-powered submarine would continue to 
develop as the expanding submarine activity of the Soviet fleet increased the need for 
vigilance and new threats emerged. 
 
II. Technical Considerations 
The level to which engineering standards needed to be raised by all groups involved in 
the nuclear propulsion programme has been identified and presented however, it can be 
argued that it was not the purchase of the S5W reactor technology per se that was of 
most benefit to the programme, but the introduction of US standards and techniques. 
Many of the officers interviewed have referred to the US nuclear engineering 
philosophy and the establishment of innovations such as the rip-out and tag-out systems 
for controlling system and machinery configurations which helped to secure nuclear 
propulsion in the Royal Navy.8 Captain Farley-Sutton’s views are recorded in chapter 
four, Rear Admiral Hammersley has also advised: ‘…that one of the greatest benefits 
was adopting the philosophy of test groups and safety management’.9 This was also the 
view of Professor Jack Edwards who wrote: ‘…that the US deal embraced standards of 
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controls in quality, procedures and safety that we were only just beginning to appreciate 
as being absolutely essential to ultimate success’.10 The organisation for developing a 
nuclear propulsion plant was dispersed and only became a coherent whole on the 
formation of the Dreadnought Project Team with the Technical Chief Executive, 
Rowland Baker, controlling all aspects and the team based at one location, Bath. It was 
this team and its adoption of US standards and practices which they disseminated to 
other parties involved in the project that made the development of nuclear propulsion in 
the UK a success. 
 
The Ministry of Supply and its successor, the UKAEA, in authorising the work carried 
out at the AERE Harwell, would have had a responsibility to account for money it spent 
on research and development and to recover costs wherever possible. With limited 
enriched fuel available in the UK and hazards identified in the Hanford water-cooled 
and graphite-moderated reactor in the US, the UK concentrated its research on gas-
cooled and graphite-moderated reactors. The experience gained at Calder Hall had 
indicated that by building power stations with larger outputs it should be possible to 
produce electricity more cheaply than at Calder Hall.11 These were viewed as having the 
potential to compete with coal-fired generating stations and a means of retrieving some 
of the costs incurred in development. This concentration of effort on the design of gas-
cooled and graphite-moderated reactors to the detriment of water-cooled and water-
moderated reactors certainly delayed development of the Royal Navy’s first nuclear-
powered submarine. Indeed, as noted in chapter two, Harwell’s chief engineer, H. 
Tongue, was against research into light-water reactors due to their limited thermal 
efficiency which would restrict further development. Therefore, it was not only the lack 
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of enriched uranium that was a barrier to developing the pressurised water reactor, the 
cost to the UKAEA’s budget of developing a reactor that was perceived to have limited 
potential for further development was also a determining factor and hence, a restriction 
to the Royal Navy’s nuclear submarine programme. 
 
III. The Military Situation 
Attention has been given to the challenges the Royal Navy faced in developing nuclear 
propulsion and this thesis has explored the reasons for requiring submarines with a high 
endurance however, the threats and challenges the Royal Navy faced were fluid 
throughout the Cold War. At the start of the project, the main maritime concern to the 
UK was the threat posed by the “fast submarine”. As discussed in chapter one, this 
threat initially revealed itself in the submarine developments of World War II (Fast 
Battery Drive and High Test Peroxide submarines) which the UK and US knew the 
USSR would fully exploit. Stalin was already planning the creation of the world’s most 
powerful submarine fleet: ‘…using captured German models and scientists to that 
end’.12 Given the UK’s reliance on maritime trade and the near success of German U-
boats during the two World Wars, the Royal Navy sought to counter this threat by 
making the detection and destruction of enemy submarines the priority of its submarine 
flotilla. 
 
The UK’s proximity to the Barents Sea, its bases in the Mediterranean and its ability to 
patrol the Greenland – Iceland – UK (GIUK) gap, all natural choke points for Soviet 
submarines transiting to the US eastern seaboard, amounted to less transit time and a 
longer period in the patrol area for Royal Navy submarines than their US counterparts. 
This would be of great benefit to the US and it would certainly make military sense for 
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the Royal Navy to assist in detecting Soviet submarines as they were leaving their 
bases, especially high priority targets such as ballistic and cruise missile submarines. 
The authors, J. J. Tall and Paul Kemp, explored this possibility arguing that it was not 
hard to see why the US would want its traditional ally to join the “nuclear propulsion” 
club, especially by 1967 with the introduction of the Yankee class (SSBN), Charlie 
Class (SSGN) and Victor class (SSN): ‘…all of which added immense power and 
flexibility to the Soviet submarine fleet since they represented a step change in 
technology’.13 It has been shown that the datum given by the purchase of the S5W 
reactor plant, the improvements brought about by core developments, machinery rafting 
and other engineering innovations allowed Royal Navy submarines to maintain their 
technological advantage over the Soviet opposition throughout the period discussed. 
 
IV. The Nuclear Propulsion Legacy 
There is one legacy that cannot be ignored and that is the waste that has been produced 
and stored since the inception of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme. Since 1965, 
Dounreay has operated five different submarine reactor cores, the Shore Test Facility 
(PWR 2) finally shut-down 21 July 2015. The process of decommissioning and disposal 
of both prototype reactors is ongoing with the site being cleared of fuel elements.14 The 
disposal of sixteen SSNs and four SSBNs has been more problematic, concern for the 
environment and the geographic limitations of the British Isles have added to the 
impetus to find an effective solution. All submarines decommissioned are currently laid 
up; four SSBNs and three SSNs at Rosyth Dockyard and the remaining thirteen SSNs at 
Devonport Royal Dockyard’s 3 Basin (Courageous is open as a museum ship). The 
majority have had their cores removed but a number are waiting for dock availability to 
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allow defueling to proceed. However, decommissioning is progressing, Swiftsure has 
recently completed a successful docking period at Rosyth to remove low level waste 
and Resolution is currently undergoing the same process. 
 
From the purchase of the S5W plant, the Royal Navy’s legacy has been one of 
continuous improvement in core endurance and power which has, and will lead, to 
considerable savings in through-life costs for a submarine. Core A, which was based on 
the S5W core, went critical in January 1965 and completed its burn-up at Dounreay in 
1967; the improved Core B went critical in August 1968 and completed its burn-up in 
early 1972.15 The final core improvement for PWR 1, Core Z, went critical at Dounreay 
in December 1974 and completed its burn-up in June 1984 which indicates just how 
much endurance the core designers had built into the PWR 1.16 With PWR 1 at the 
limits of its development potential a new PWR 2 was designed and Core G first went 
critical in July 1987 completing its burn-up in December 1996, from a nuclear-powered 
submarine requiring a refit to refuel every three to four years the submarine would 
require only one refit to refuel during its lifetime.17 Submarines fitted with the improved 
Core H will never require refuelling during their predicted thirty-plus year life; the 
savings in cost and to the environment (in the form of used fuel elements) are 
significant. Furthermore, with regards to protecting the environment, the new generation 
of PWR designed and built for the new Dreadnought class SSBN (PWR 3) will not 
require a shore prototype as this work is now done by computer modelling. With the 
requirement to refuel eliminated, platform availability is also improved as a submarine 
will no longer be required to dock for periods of three to four years, it could be argued 
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that this increased availability will require fewer submarines to accomplish the 
operational commitments dictated by government. 
 
Arguably, the enduring legacy of nuclear propulsion has been the Royal Navy’s ability 
to maintain the UK’s Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CAS-D) through the Polaris and 
Trident armed submarines. HMS Resolution sailed on the first Polaris patrol 15 June 
1968 she was joined in the task by HMS Repulse in the spring of 1969. On 14 June 
1969, the Royal Navy’s Polaris submarines formally took over the primary deterrent 
role from the RAF’s V bomber force.18 This year will mark fifty years of continuous 
sea-based deterrence, achieved primarily through the successful introduction and 
development of nuclear propulsion, in part due to the generosity of US assistance in 
selling the S5W to the UK. It is, without doubt, the politicians that gained most from 
this legacy despite their initial lack of involvement. Without the timely development of 
nuclear propulsion, it is very doubtful that the UK would still be a nuclear power. 
Ballistic missiles are large weapons and require a submarine with a displacement and 
enough generating power to accommodate them. Without its nuclear deterrence it is 
equally doubtful that the UK would have kept its permanent seat at the UN Security 
Council and could continue to exert its diplomatic and political influence on its major 
ally, the United States. As Ernest Bevin is quoted as saying: ‘…I don’t want any other 
Foreign Secretary of this country to be talked to or at by a Secretary of State in the 
United States as I have just had in my discussions with Mr. Byrnes’.19 
 
V. Research in the “Secret (Nuclear) State” 
The “Secret State” is a rather nebulous term with its connotations of dark and sinister 
actions outside the control of Parliament; a definition more suited to conspiracy 
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theorists. In the UK, most people would associate the term with government intelligence 
services, MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, the more erudite would include the “Whitehall 
Mandarins” of the Civil Service or as Roger Verrier described them: ‘…the Permanent 
Government’.20 However, there are other areas where government departments do not 
court publicity which could be included in a definition of the Secret State; anything to 
do with nuclear matters would naturally fall into this category as would parts of the 
Armed Forces such as the Submarine Service (on which governments rarely comment). 
Nuclear matters and submarines constitute the topic of this research and examination 
into the subject has shone a light into an area where little academic work has been done. 
Research of this kind is helped where privileged access to unreleased files can be 
granted, also of great service are introductions to personnel involved in the subject who 
are willing to assist in the research; clearly, it is difficult to arrange this type of access. 
Government departments and other bodies engaged in nuclear matters are very guarded 
in their dealings with members of the public who purport to be interested in their work 
for academic or other purposes. A great deal of trust is placed in the researcher who is 
given access to unreleased documents to respect the original security caveat and be 
sensitive to the information contained therein. As Arnold noted, access to unreleased 
files does not give the historian permission to publish but they do add an extra 
dimension and deeper understanding to their research.21 
 
It was noted in the Introduction sub-chapter on Nuclear Historiography, that due to the 
secrecy surrounding the subject matter and possibly due to the controversy surrounding 
nuclear issues not many people have tackled the subject. Professor Margaret Gowing 
and Lorna Arnold were employees of the UKAEA, Katherine Pyne was an employee of 
the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). Gowing was the official historian for the 
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UKAEA and was later assisted in her work by Arnold; Pyne became the official 
historian of the AWE after collaborating with Arnold on Britain and the H-Bomb 
(2001). Pyne also worked with Professor Lord Peter Hennessy on Cabinets and The 
Bomb (2007), these women already had security clearance to view many of the 
documents they would have researched as part of the Official Histories of their 
respective departments. Access to files held at the National Archives are open for any 
interested person to view, so it is entirely possible that research and writing of nuclear 
history in the “Secret State” could be undertaken by anyone with an interest in the 
subject. Indeed, Hennessy started his career in journalism and, arguably, through his 
reputation as a constitutional historian, became a person who has been entrusted by 
governments to write about the “Secret State” and has enjoyed privileged access for his 
research. 
 
However, it has to be noted that in late 2018, all the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority files (including those that were viewed as part of the research into nuclear 
propulsion) held at the National Archives have been temporarily withdrawn by the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority as part of a review with the MoD and the AWE. 
This temporary withdrawal of files underscores the fact that the nuclear security is an 
ongoing matter prompting periodic review. Official Histories cannot be written without 
sponsorship from the inside, although research for this thesis has been supported by 
Commodore Mark Adams RN, it is not an Official History. Evidence has been 
presented which gives an insight into the decisions that had to be made for the Royal 
Navy to introduce nuclear propulsion to its submarine fleet. The thesis challenges 
traditional areas of writing about submarines; nuclear propulsion is the continuing 
source of fascination that inspires other authors and historians to focus on submarine 





centre of the narrative. It is the reactor that is at the heart of the nuclear-powered 
submarine and the reason for its submerged endurance and speed. The thesis is new to 
the historiography of ship propulsion because it offers an insight into the development 
of nuclear propulsion and will hopefully act as a spur to further research into submarine 
propulsion systems. The thesis is an informed narrative of events from the first 
submission by Rear Admiral Charles Daniel in 1946 deliberating the possibility of 
nuclear propulsion to the successful start-up of Core Z, the final core improvement of 
PWR 1 in December 1974. 
 
It has been demonstrated that the legacy of the political, military and engineering 
decisions, made over sixty years ago, have had a major impact on British political life 
and on military planning. These decisions continue to influence modern day political 
and military thinkers, not only here in the UK and the US, but also among future 
possible belligerents. The “Successor Project” (to replace the Vanguard class SSBNs) is 
being realised, the new HMS Dreadnought is building, the second of class has been 
named, HMS Warspite. Another four submarines of the Astute class are either in build 
or have been ordered. In giving the Royal Navy a head-start with the purchase of the 
S5W, Rickover’s assessment that the UK would be technically competent to produce 
(and improve) nuclear propulsion plants independently of the US has been justified.22  
 
As noted previously, Article III of the Mutual Defence Agreement authorised the sale of 
the S5W reactor and propulsion plant and information relating to it. Replacement cores 
or fuel elements were limited to ten years, subject to terms and conditions. Article II 
concerns the exchange of information, paragraph five particularly, refers to information 
on the research, development and design of military reactors. However, in practice, the 
                                                     





Westinghouse/Rolls-Royce Contract signed 10 February 1959, constituted the means by 
which the transfer of material and information took place. This contract was set to 
expire twelve months after HMS Dreadnought’s reactor went critical, achieved 12 
November 1962, after November 1963, no further information on nuclear propulsion 
reactors was exchanged despite the intentions of Article II paragraph five discussed in 
chapter four. However, since the late 1990s, the US and UK have collaborated on 
nuclear propulsion information and technology, each navy seconds a senior naval 
engineering officer to their respective departments, Director Nuclear Propulsion in the 
UK and the Office of Naval Reactors in the US. The PWR 3 reactor is a product of that 
collaboration and contains elements of the S9G reactor design which is fitted to the 
USN’s latest Virginia class SSN.23 The Royal Navy will continue operating nuclear 
propelled submarines into the second half of the twenty-first century. 
  
                                                     
23 Turner, Julian, Deep impact: inside the UK’s new Successor-Class Nuclear Submarine 29 July 2013. 
https://www.naval-technology.com/features/feature-nuclear-submarine-successor-uk-royal-navy 






Royal Navy Nuclear-Powered Submarines: 
 
Ship Submersible Nuclear – SSN 
 
HMS Dreadnought:  Commissioned 17/04/63 4,000 tons dived (S5W Fitted) 
 
HMS Valiant:  Commissioned 18/07/66 4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core A) 
 
HMS Warspite: Commissioned 18/04/67 4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core A) 
 
HMS Churchill: Commissioned 15/07/70 4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core A) 
 
HMS Conqueror:* Commissioned 09/11/71 4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core A) 
 
HMS Courageous: Commissioned 16/10/71 4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core A) 
 
HMS Swiftsure: Commissioned 17/04/73 4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core B) 
 
HMS Sovereign: Commissioned 11/07/74 4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core B) 
 
HMS Superb:  Commissioned 13/11/76 4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core B) 
 
HMS Sceptre:  Commissioned 14/02/78 4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core B) 
 
HMS Spartan:  Commissioned 22/09/79 4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core B) 
 
HMS Splendid: Commissioned 21/03/81  4,500 tons dived (PWR 1 Core B) 
 
HMS Trafalgar: Commissioned 25/05/83 5,200 tons dived (PWR 1 Core Z) 
 
HMS Turbulent: Commissioned 28/04/84 5,200 tons dived (PWR 1 Core Z) 
 
HMS Tireless:  Commissioned 50/10/85 5,200 tons dived (PWR 1 Core Z) 
 
HMS Torbay:  Commissioned 07/02/87 5,200 tons dived (PWR 1 Core Z) 
 
HMS Trenchant: Commissioned 14/01/89 5,200 tons dived (PWR 1 Core Z) 
 
HMS Talent:  Commissioned 12/05/90 5,200 tons dived (PWR 1 Core Z) 
 
HMS Triumph: Commissioned 02/10/91 5,200 tons dived (PWR 1 Core Z) 
 
HMS Astute:  Commissioned 27/08/10 7,400 tons dived (PWR 2 Core H) 
 
HMS Ambush: Commissioned 01/03/13 7,400 tons dived (PWR 2 Core H) 
 









Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear - SSBN 
 
HMS Resolution: Commissioned 30/10/67 8,400 tons dived (PWR 1 Core A) 
 
HMS Renown: * Commissioned 15/11/68 8,400 tons dived (PWR 1 Core A) 
 
HMS Repulse:  Commissioned 28/09/68 8,400 tons dived (PWR 1 Core A) 
 
HMS Revenge:* Commissioned 04/12/69 8,400 tons dived (PWR 1 Core A) 
 
HMS Vanguard: Commissioned 14/08/93 15,900 tons dived (PWR 2 Core G) 
 
HMS Victorious:  Commissioned 07/01/95 15,900 tons dived (PWR 2 Core G) 
 
HMS Vigilant:  Commissioned 02/11/96 15,900 tons dived (PWR 2 Core G) 
 
HMS Vengeance:  Commissioned 21/11/99 15,900 tons dived (PWR 2 Core G) 
 
*To fit in with the timescale of the Polaris programme, two Polaris and one Hunter-








Initial Dreadnought ME Crew: 
 
Samborne, B. F. P., Lt Cdr Trained in USS Skipjack 
 
Squires, R., Lt Cdr  Trained in USS Skate/Swordfish 
 
Grove, J., Lt Cdr  Trained in USS Skate 
 
Hammersley, P. G., Lt Cdr Trained in USS Skipjack 
 
Hutchinson, C. H., Lt Cdr  
 
Manson, J., Lt    
 
King, B. F, Lt    
 
Cochrane, I., Lt Cdr   
 
Timmis, K. P. I., Lt Cdr  
 
Bowyer, W., CPO  Trained in USS Halibut/Sargo  
 
Everett, G., CPO   
 
Faulkner, T., CPO  Trained in USS Skipjack 
 
Flavell, D., CPO   
 
French, C., CPO  Trained in USS Halibut/Sargo 
 
Lemmon, E., CPO  Trained in USS Skipjack/Skate 
 
Maryon, I., CPO  Trained in USS Skipjack 
 
Moorhouse, P., CPO   
 
Potter, A., CPO   
 
Rawle, D., CPO  Trained in USS Skate 
 
Rudkin, C., CPO   
 
Treen, P., CPO   
 
Walls, H., CPO  Trained in USS Halibut/Sargo 
 
Welford, CPO   
 

























Berry, Roger, Commander RN Ret’d 
 
Bowyer, W., Ex CERA 
 
Farley-Sutton, Colin, Captain RN Ret’d 
 
Hammersley, Peter, Rear Admiral RN 
 
Hill, Sir Robert, Vice Admiral RN 
 
Jacobsen, John, Captain RN Ret’d 
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